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THE VEDANTA

AND ITS

RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT

Lectures delivered before the Theological Society,
Calcutta, during session 1900-1901

BY

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PREFACE

The following lectures were delivered before the Theological Society, Calcutta, in connection with of a lectureship founded by the Society with the pecuniary aid of a young admirer of the Vedanta to whom both the Society and the lecturer appointed by them are deeply indebted, but whom they are not permitted to thank publicly by name. The lecturer was allowed to deal with his subject in the way he thought best, and for the views set forth in these discourses he alone should be held responsible.

The scope of these lectures and the method of exposition adopted in them cannot be better explained than in the following words that occur in the first lecture : "As an ancient system, as a system of religious thought and practice that has profoundly influenced, and is influencing the lives of millions of people in this ancient country, it (*i. e.* the Vedanta) is justly engaging the thought and industry of eminent scholars both here and in the West ; but it seems to me that it is a system which can satisfy, as it really is satisfying, not only those who have been brought up in it from their childhood, who and whose forefathers have breathed in it as in a spiritual atmosphere from time immemorial, and to whom the searching scepticisms of this most sceptical age are unfamiliar, but even those who have imbibed the critical spirit of our day to the utmost extent, and who, though ever ready to bow down to the dust before the majesty of truth when it conquers their intellects, breathe nothing but the pure mountain air of free thought and free inquiry. It is with this conviction, and not merely as an unconcerned vendor of religious and philosophical information, that I have undertaken to speak to you on

the religion and philosophy of the Vedanta. I will not simply record the opinions of,—the conclusions arrived at by,—the great Vedantic teachers ; I shall seek to find out and show you something of the way in which they arrived at these conclusions. I shall, under their guidance, analyse nature and mind in the way they seem to have done, and lay before you the result of this analysis. I shall follow their arguments as best I can, interpret them in the language of modern European logic, and show how far the premisses adopted by them bear out their conclusions. I shall see how far the ideals of social and spiritual life preached by the *rishis* and their interpreters bear the light of modern sociology and ethical and spiritual science, and whether those ideals have now become effete and impracticable or still deserve our most steadfast devotion in the face of rival ideals and schemes claiming our allegiance.” How far this object, which the lecturer set before himself in the opening lecture and steadily kept in view throughout the course, has been actually realised, it is for the reader to judge.

The quotations from Vedantic authorities are all given in their original in the Appendix, the translations only being given in the body of the book. For the latter, the author is, in many cases, indebted to Professors Thibaut and Max Muller, and in some to Professors Cowell, Gough and Telang. Some of the translations are the author's own, and are taken from his Devanagari and English edition of the *Upanishads*.

The following pages are a reprint of the first six lectures, which have gone through a revision in this second edition. The last six lectures are separately printed, but can be had bound together in a single volume with the first.

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The Vedanta And Its RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT

LECTURE I

THE VEDANTA AS SCRIPTURE AND PHILOSOPHY.

Harih Om. Namah Paramátmanc.

According to an honoured custom prevailing in this country, I remember, on this solemn occasion, those to whom I am specially indebted for whatever spiritual enlightenment I possess. I remember, first of all, those holy *rishis* of old, the composers of the *Upanishads*, whose thoughts I have undertaken to interpret. I remember them and bow down to them with the profoundest reverence. I next remember and reverently bow down to the great commentator, Śrī Śankaráchárya, who has been my chief guide in my study of the three great institutes of Vedántic thought—the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-sútras* and the *Bhagavadgítá*. Coming nearer home, I touch the feet of the great Rája Rámmohan

Ráy, the founder of the religious society to which I have the honour to belong, and the reviver of the Vedántic religion in modern times. Lastly, though by no means with the ~~last~~ feeling of esteem and affection, I remember the departed spirit of Thomas Hill Green, the English Idealist, the interpreter of Kant and Hegel, whose writings gave me my first insight into the deeper truths of Metaphysics.

Gentlemen,

An ancient system of faith or philosophy may claim attention for either of two reasons. It may be worthy of attentive study simply because it is an ancient system, because it has influenced the thought and lives of millions of our kind for thousands of years,—an influence that may have continued up to the present day. We may study such a system without any idea of accepting its teachings on any important subject, without any expectation of obtaining light from it on those deep problems of life, which our intellects are trying to solve. But again, an ancient system, though ancient in origin, may nevertheless be so very close to the thoughts and aspirations of our own day, its solution of the deeper problems of religion and philosophy may be so much helpful and even satisfactory to the modern scientific or speculative intellect, that it may claim a far deeper attention from us than those which at best only satisfy an enlightened curiosity. The Vedánta

it seems to me, is such a system. As an ancient system, as a system of religious thought and practice that has profoundly influenced and is influencing the lives of millions of people in this ancient country, it is justly engaging the thought and industry of eminent scholars both here and in the West ; but it seems to me that it is a system which can satisfy, as it really is satisfying, not only those who have been brought up in it from their childhood, who and whose forefathers have breathed in it as in a spiritual atmosphere from time immemorial, and to whom the searching scepticisms of this most sceptical age are unfamiliar, but even those who have imbibed the critical spirit of our day to the utmost extent, and who, though ever ready to bow down to the dust before the majesty of truth when it conquers their intellects, breathe nothing but the pure mountain air of free thought and free inquiry. It is with this conviction, and not merely as an unconcerned vendor of religious and philosophical information, that I have undertaken to speak to you on the religion and philosophy of the Vedānta. I will not simply record the opinions of,—the conclusions arrived at by,—the great Vedāntic teachers ; I shall seek to find out and show you something of the way in which they arrived at these conclusions. I shall, under their guidance,

analyse Nature and Mind in the way they seem to have done, and lay before you the result of this analysis. I shall follow their arguments as best I can, interpret them in the language of modern European logic, and show how far the premisses adopted by them bear out their conclusions. I shall see how far ideals of social and spiritual life preached by the *rishis* and their interpreters bear the light of modern Sociology and ethical and spiritual science, and whether those ideals have now become effete and impracticable or still deserve our most steadfast devotion in the face of rival ideals and schemes claiming our allegiance.

But is it not a preposterous claim that I am putting forward for the Vedānta,—a claim that should be dismissed summarily even without serious examination? Can it be possible, it may be asked, that a system, conceived thousands of year ago, in an unscientific age, should satisfy the intellectual cravings of people at a time when the discoveries of science have effected a through revolution in their ways of thinking and living? My answer to this question is, that in saying that the Vedānta can satisfy the intellectual cravings even of the most enlightened of the present age, I do not mean to say that it can satisfy our scientific inquiries, that its conclusions on such matters are always acceptable. The Vedānta does not profess to be a

scientific explanation of the universe, nor is it even a system of philosophy in the sense of a comprehensive theory of the world, showing the relation of the various sciences to one another and to a primary science of sciences as their common basis. In what sense it is a philosophy, we shall see by and by. It is a religion primarily, a theology based on a meditative insight into the relation of all things to their common source, God, and a system of spiritual culture arising out of this relation. As such a system, the progress of science, physical and moral, has not only not made it unacceptable, but has confirmed its truth as much as science can possibly do so. It is indeed true, that theories which have now been found to be unscientific are found mixed up with the metaphysical and spiritual truths of the Vedānta; but such theories, it will be seen, form no essential part of Vedāntic teaching as to the nature of God and our relation to him. In accepting the Vedānta as a true system of Theology and Metaphysics, one is not bound to accept these theories as true, just as in avowing oneself to be the follower of a modern religious, philosophical or political thinker, one does not necessarily commit oneself to his master's particular opinions, such as form no part of the essential principles of his system.

But is this distinction of the essential and the non-essential in the Vedānta, and the free and rational mode of dealing with it implied in this distinction, consistent with the teachings of the great representatives of Vedāntic thought? Do not they, ever and anon, appeal to the Vedas as to an external authority, infallible and unquestionable, to which we must submit whether our intellects harmonise with its dictates or not? To this question my answer is, that though there is, in the writings of our scholiasts, a good deal of what may at first sight appear as a blind appeal to external authority, the whole question of the authority of the sacred scriptures, as held by the accepted interpreters of the Vedas, is very much misunderstood by superficial readers,—a misunderstanding which has been intensified by the imperfect and biased expositions of Indian systems by foreigners. Leaving the whole question for a fuller treatment in a subsequent lecture of the present series, I shall content myself with making only a few preliminary remarks on the subject. First then, by a well-recognised canon of Vedic interpretation, the Vedas are an authority on such matters only as are not accessible to the senses and the intellect. Any such matter, therefore, if found in them, must be taken as merely subsidiary, brought in for the purpose of exposition

or illustration, and need not be accepted as true. Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between mere poetry, the natural play of imagination, and a serious enunciation of religious truth. Thirdly, the interpreters of our scriptures, specially those of the Vedāntic school, recognise distinctly that all parts of the Vedas are not of equal authority, that the Vedic sages do not always speak from the highest standpoint, that many of their utterances are tentative and relate only to particular stages of development, not applying to higher stages. As I have said in my *Hindu Theism* in speaking of "Authority and Free-thought," it is only the ignorant and the thoughtless to whom all *Śāstras*,—and by '*Śāstras*' they mean almost all works on religion written in the Sanskrit language—are of equal value. The learned and thoughtful leaders of our society have always recognised a clear distinction among the *Śāstras* according to their relative worth. Their valuation may not have been always correct, but the recognition of a distinction among works all believed to be more or less inspired, is itself remarkable. The distinction between *Śruti* and *Smṛiti* is well-known. This line of demarcation separates Vedic works from all other classes of works. The *Śrutis* are incomparably superior to the *Smṛitis*, and where these two classes of writings conflict, the

authority of the former is to be accepted. But the *Śruti* itself, though professedly infallible, was far from being practically accepted as such. There is, first, the accepted distinction between the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *jñānakāṇḍa*, the former represented by the *Sanhitās* and the *Brāhmanas*, and the latter by the *Upanishads*. The *jñānakāṇḍa* is decidedly superior to the *karmakāṇḍa*, and from the standpoint of the former, most of the rites and ceremonies inculcated in the latter are absolutely valueless, and even the motive to which it appeals are low and must be given up as obstructions to the attainment of the highest beatitude. And then, in the *jñānakāṇḍa* itself, there is a good deal which is quietly laid aside as mere *arthavāda*, that is, non-essential utterances on things not intimately connected with the main object at which the *Upanishads* aim. It will thus be seen, that though the accepted teachers and leaders of the national church never say in so many words that the scriptures are fallible, they by no means accept them practically as infallible. An illustration of the free, unrestricted manner in which our thinkers deal with the scriptures, may be found in the light in which Jaimini, the recognised interpreter of the Vedic *Sanhitās* and *Brāhmanas*, and author of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras*, accepts the Vedic utterances regarding the celestial beings, Indra,

Váyu, Varuna and others. According to him, these names stand only for certain natural objects, and their personification and worship is nothing but a free play of imagination indulged in by the Vedic *rishis*. If these gods really existed, argues this orthodox expounder of the Vedas, and if they cared to answer the prayers addressed to them in the Vedas, then the descent of Indra from heaven, mounted on his huge elephant, on our altars, would result in their immediate reduction to atoms, and the coming of Varuna with his watery train would mean the immediate extinguishing of our sacrificial fires. I need hardly say that I have no sympathy with this short and easy method of explaining Vedic theology as the play of mere poetic fancy, and that it does not find favour with all our interpreters. I mention the case only as an illustration of the perfect freedom allowed to interpreters of the Vedas whose orthodoxy no one ventures to question; and of the boldness of the position in which some of them have landed by following their methods. I shall only barely refer in passing to the six widely varying schools of philosophy, all of which accept the authority of the Vedas, and, in the far more limited area of Vedántic Philosophy, to the three main schools of Unqualified Monism, Qualified Monism and Dualism, all of which profess to base their

conclusions on the authoritative utterances of the *Upanishads*. The authoritative character ascribed to the Vedas by Vedántic teachers does not therefore detract from the claims of the Vedánta on our attention as a system of Theology and Metaphysics. It will be seen that the Vedántic appeal to the *Upanishads* is an appeal not to blind belief in authority, but really to spiritual experience and insight, an insight possible to all systematically trained thinkers and aspirants after truth.

However, all that I have said on the doctrine of Vedic authority and infallibility applies to a phase of Vedántic thought much later than that represented in the *Upanishads* themselves, the original *Vedántas*. Everything is different when one rises to their level of thought. The authors of the *Upanishads* recognise no authority higher than their own thoughts and experiences. They appeal, not to any external authority, but to the soul itself, purged of its impurities by long-practised disciplines, and of its errors and delusions by sustained meditation.

I shall now answer another question which may appear to some of you rather superfluous, but which I consider very important. It is a question which is rarely asked, not because it is really superfluous, but because it has already been wrongly answered by many persons and large

classes of persons. The question is, 'What is the Vedānta ?' It seems to me, that in this province, —in Bengal,—a very wrong idea is entertained as to what the Vedānta really is, not only by the unlearned, not only by those ignorant of Sanskrit, but even by the learned, even by those conversant with Sanskrit philosophical literature. A certain M. A. of the Calcutta University, an M. A. in Sanskrit and a writer on Hindu Philosophy, was once told that certain views were in accordance with the Vedānta. The Pandit's remark on this was that the views in question were in accordance with the *Upanishads*, but not with the Vedānta. Whatever idea the Pandit might have of the nature of the Vedānta, it was clear from his observation that he thought the *Upanishads* were not the Vedānta. The influence of the common misunderstanding of the true nature of the Vedānta had made him forget the fact—I cannot say he had never known it—that whatever else might deserve the name 'Vedānta,' the *Upanishads* at any rate were *Vedāntas*. I therefore deem it important to ask the question, 'What is the Vedānta ?' and give as distinct an answer to it as I can. The literal meaning of the word 'Vedānta' is the latter part of the Veda or the conclusion or gist of the Veda. It is difficult to ascertain which of these meanings is chronologically the first. It may well be that the

word was used in both the senses from the beginning. Now, what is this latter part of the Vedas in which the varied utterances scattered throughout the hymns and the *Brāhmanas* are, as it were, brought to a focus, or in which the various problems suggested here and there in the earlier portion find their ultimate solution? The answer is,—It is the *Upanishads*, all of which profess to form, and some of which do really form, parts of the Vedic canon and all of which, without exception treat of Brahman, the ultimate explanation of the Universe. The *anta* or conclusion to which all these writings bring the unsystematic speculations scattered throughout the Vedas, is that the world proceeds from and rests in one infinite and undivided Being, and that union with this Being is the highest good attainable by man. That the *Upanishads* are the original Vedānta or Vedāntas, is said by some of the *Upanishads* themselves. Thus the *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* says in its last but one verse,—

“This very secret doctrine, taught in a former age in the Vedānta, should not be imparted to one whose mind is not tranquil, and to an unworthy son or disciple.”

The *Myndaka Upanishad* III. 2. 6. says,—

“Those ascetics who have properly known the object, (*i. e.* Brahman,) of the science of the

Vedānta and whose hearts have been purified by detachment from the world, all become immortal in the world of Brahman at the end of their earthly existence, and are finally liberated."

The writings of Śrī Śankarāchārya, specially his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*, are, by many, identified with the Vedānta. They are in reality no more Vedānta than the Vedāntic works of any other writer, ancient or modern ; or, in another sense, they are as much Vedānta as any other work on Vedāntic doctrines, great or small, old or new. However, let us hear what Śankara himself says, in the very work whose character is so much misunderstood, as to what the Vedānta is. At the end of his introduction to the above commentary, he says,—

"In order to destroy this evil, the Vedāntas try to establish the knowledge of the unity of the self with Brahman. As this is the object of all the Vedāntas, so we too shall inculcate the same in this *Śāstraka Mīmāṃsā*. Of the science of the discussion of the Vedāntas which we are going to expound, the following is the first aphorism."

You will note, that, according to Śankara neither his own work, which is only a commentary, an exposition, as he calls it, nor the *Brahma Sūtras*, which he expounds, is the real Vedānta.

The *Brahma Sūtras* or *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā* is only a *Vedānta Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*, a philosophical work that discusses the Vedānta. The real Vedānta or Vedāntas are the *Upanishads*, whose texts are expounded and reduced to a system by the *Vedānta Mīmāṃsā*. I may here remark in passing that Śankara always uses the word 'Vedānta' in the plural number, and never understands anything else by it than the *Upanishads*. He never calls the *Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā*, not to speak of any other work of a similar character, by the name Vedānta.'

The *Upanishads* therefore are the true Vedānta—Vedānta in the primary sense,—and it is very important, as you will see by and by, to bear this in mind. But the word 'Vedānta' may be used in a secondary sense also. As one may call any work expounding the Critical Philosophy by the name 'Critical Philosophy,' so any work on the *Upanishads*, any work that discusses, expounds or systematises the teachings of the original Vedānta or Vedāntas, may be called 'Vedānta' too. But it must always be remembered that this is only a secondary application of the term. Now, this distinction between the original Vedāntas and later works on them called by the same name—between the primary and the secondary meaning of the term—can be easily remembered if we bear in mind

the important fact that the original Vedāntas or *Upanishads* form parts, or are, at any rate, believed to form parts, of the Vedic canon. They are therefore *Śrutis* or scriptures, and command a reverence which is never extended to any other work,—however meritorious it may be in itself,—not included in the canon of national scriptures fixed and consolidated ages ago. Later works on Vedāntic doctrines are not *Vedānta Śrutis*, as the *Upanishads* are, but only *Vedānta Darsanas*, philosophical works on the Vedāntas. This distinction between the Vedānta as *Śruti*, scripture, and the Vedānta as philosophy, must always be borne in mind.

Now, as might be expected, various attempts have been made, by various writers and at various times, to reduce the diffuse, unmethodical utterances of the *Upanishads* into a system. The earliest attempts, even if they ever took shape in regular compositions, oral or written, have not reached us. That such attempts were made, appears from the names of early Vedāntic teachers mentioned as authorities in the earliest record of such attempts that has reached us,—the *Brahma Sūtras* or *Vedānta Mīmāṃsā*, of which I have already spoken. It is worth while to remember the various names by which this work is called. These names are the *Vedānta Sūtras*, the *Brahma Sūtras*, the *Vyāsa*

Sūtras, the *Bādarāyana Sūtras*, the *Sārtraka Sūtras*, the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, the *Auṇishadī Mīmāṃsā*, and perhaps many more not known to me. This great work consists of a body of aphorisms, 558 in number, many of which contain the concentrated gist of a great deal of meditation and reasoning. We shall have occasion hereafter to examine in detail the nature and contents of this universally honoured text-book of Vedānta Philosophy. Though not a *Śruti*, its place is only next to the *Śrutis* in the estimation in which it is held by the leaders of Hindu religious thought. It is a *Smṛiti*, not in the sense of a law-book, but in the wider meaning of the term, according to which it denotes all works which, though not *Śrutis*, are yet composed by or ascribed to recognised *rishis*. The *Brahma Sūtras* are ascribed to Bādarāyana, supposed to be the same as Krishna Dvaipāyana or Veda Vyāsa, though Bādarāyana is referred to in the *Sūtras* in a way which would seem to show that he was not their composer. However, as regards the authorship of the *Brahma Sūtras*, like that of many more of our ancient books, sacred and profane, materials for making an authoritative statement are yet wanting.

The *Brahma Sūtras*, it is important to remember, represent chronologically the second stage of Vedāntic speculation, the first stage being represent-

-ed by the *Upanishads*. It is also important to note, that though many other works have been written to expound and systematise the doctrines of the *Upanishads*, no other work is considered so authoritative on the subject as these aphorisms. But there is another work, another compendium of Vedāntic thought, which, though not considered so authoritative from a philosophical point of view as the *Brahma Sūtras*, is yet even more deeply and widely honoured by our nation than these aphorisms themselves. I refer to the *Bhagavadgītā*, which, though not a systematic exposition of Vedāntic doctrines, has yet a system of its own, and though containing elements other than Vedāntic, is yet, in all essentials, a Vedāntic work. According to some, it contains the very cream of Vedāntic teaching, as will appear from the well-known and oft-quoted saying—"The *Upanishads* are cows, the cowherd's son, *i. e.*, Krishna, is the milker, Pārtha is the calf, and the nectar-like *Gītā* is the excellent milk."* This universally honoured work,—honoured not only by mutually conflicting religious sects in India, but also, since the discovery of Sanskrit literature by Europeans, by an ever-increasing number of people in the West,—will have to be dealt with

in great detail in my subsequent lectures, and so I refrain from speaking much about it at present. Suffice it to say that, this book also, like the *Brahma Sūtras*, represents the second stage of Vedāntic speculation, though the time of its composition, as well as its authorship, can no more be ascertained with any certainty than those of the *Brahma Sūtras* and many other ancient works. I am inclined to think, from the large admixture of Puranic ideas in the *Bhagavadgītā* on the one hand, and the relative freedom of the *Sūtras* from such ideas on the other, that the former belongs to a much later time than the latter. But on this matter no satisfactory conclusion has yet been arrived at by oriental scholars. The line '*Brahma-sūtra-padaishchaiva hetumadbhirvinishchitaih*,' in the thirteenth chapter of the *Gītā*, would seem to show that the *Brahma Sūtras* were known to the author. But the words '*Brahma Sūtras*' may very well refer to an earlier collection of aphorisms than that which has come down to us, and there is, besides, an aphorism (21st) of the fourth chapter, second pāda, of the *Sūtras*, which, in the opinion of all the chief commentators, refers to the *Gītā*, and therefore points to the fact that the *Gītā* was known to the author of the *Brahma Sūtras*.

However, these three works, namely, the *Upani-*

shads taken collectively, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, have, from very early times, been considered the principal text-books on Vedāntic doctrines. They are sometimes called the *Prasthānatrayam*, the three institutes of the Vedāntic religion and philosophy. Now, all later Vedāntic teachers have made the three institutes the basis of their teachings, and all the Vedāntic schools of thought have their own commentaries on them. It is these commentaries that represent the third stage of Vedāntic thought, which we now proceed to consider.


As I have chosen English as the vehicle of my remarks on the present occasion, and as I address a very much anglicised audience, I shall explain the relation of the three Vedāntic institutes to one another, and of them collectively to later Vedantic literature, by an analogy drawn from the literature of Christianity. The *Upanishads* stand somewhat in the same relation to the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā* as the four gospels, or rather the teachings of Jesus Christ, stand to the remaining books of the *New Testament*, and the *New Testament* itself, fixed and accepted in the early centuries of the Christian era as the authoritative statement of Christian doctrine, represents, by its relation to later Christian literature, that of the *Prasthānatrayam* to later Vedāntic literature. As, in the Christian

Church,—at any rate, in Protestantism,—the *New Testament* alone is recognised as the rule of Christian faith and life, and every Christian is allowed perfect freedom in interpreting it by his private judgment, and no one is considered bound to accept the interpretation of the scriptures given by any particular Christian teacher like Calvin or Arminius, Athanasius or Arian, so in Vedántism, the acceptance of the fundamental teachings of the *Prasthānatrayam* makes a man a Vedántist, whether he accepts the peculiar interpretation put upon these teachings by any later Vedántic teacher or not. A Vedántist may go even farther, and reject the view taken of the teachings of the *Upanishads* by the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and interpret the utterances of the ancient *rishis* by his own private judgment, just as some liberal Christians reject the peculiar teachings of Paul and the other apostles and fall back upon the simpler teachings of Jesus as they understand them by the light of their own spiritual experiences. I dwell upon this point, because it seems very important to do so in the present state of gross ignorance regarding Vedántism and the Vedānta. Many people in this country, at any rate in this province, think, that to be a Vedántist one must accept in their totality the teachings of a particular Vedántic teacher like Śankara or the author of the *Pancha-*

dast, and that one who does not do so has no right to call himself a Vedántist. This is the same mistake as what would be made if one were to say that one who does not believe in the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England, is not a Christian, or that one who is not a follower of Ignatius Loyola is not a Catholic. These people forget that there are several other interpreters of Vedántic doctrines than Śankara or Mádhava who have large followings, though perhaps not as large as Śankara's, and who respect the Vedánta *Śrutis* and *Smritis* as much as Śankara and his followers.

Now, I was once told by a Benares Pandit, that there were no fewer than eighteen well-known commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtras*. There must be, I presume, at least as many on the *Upanishads*, and many more on the *Bhagavadgītā*. However, the most well-known commentators on the *Prasthānatrayam* and the most honoured founders of Vedántic sects are only three in number. They are Śankara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, each of whom, as we shall presently see, represents a species of theological doctrine logically distinguishable from the other two. To these we may add, as specially interesting to us, Bengalī, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣana, a Vaiṣṇava philosopher of the Bengal School founded by Chaitanya. For a long time, Śankara was almost the only expounder of the Vedánta known in this

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province, which explains the widely current idea that a Vedántist must necessarily be a follower of Śankara. By and by, however, the other Vedántic teachers of eminence are becoming known through the publication of their commentaries either in this province or in the North-West, and it is time that, notwithstanding the great ability of Śankara, his large following, and the profound reverence in which he is justly held, Vedántism should no more be so exclusively identified with his name and those of his followers as it has hitherto been. I say this, not in any disparagement of the teachings of Śankara, who has been to me, up to the present moment, the best-known and most helpful of Vedántic teachers of what I have called the third stage of Vedántic thought, but in the name of free thought, and in justice to the other eminent teachers of the Vedánta religion and philosophy.

Now, as I shall have a great deal to say about the agreements and disagreements of these great commentators of the Vedánta in my subsequent lectures, it would be unnecessary to go into details on the subject in this opening lecture. But perhaps a slight indication of their divergences should be given even at this preliminary stage of our inquiry, and to do so is not a difficult task. I have already said, that the *anta* or conclusion to which the original *Vedāntas* or *Upanishads* bring the unsystem-

atic speculations scattered throughout the earlier portions of the Vedas, is, that the world proceeds from and rests in an infinite and undivided Being, and that union with this Being is the highest good attainable by man. It need hardly be said, that all the great Vedāntic teachers agree in upholding this fundamental principle of true Theism, and in opposing the Sāṅkhya doctrine of an uncreated Nature and of finite souls existing independently of an Infinite Spirit, and the Nyāya doctrine of a mere Divine Mechanic moulding the material and spiritual worlds out of pre-existing atoms and finite souls co-eternal with him. But their differences begin when they proceed to explain in what exact way the material world and individual souls are related to God, and the process of derivation of the created from the Creator. According to Śāṅkara, the material world and the finite soul are only apparently different from God; they are only appearances of which God is the sole Reality. That we think the created to be different from the Creator, is due to our ignorance, and this ignorance again is the effect of a mysterious power in God which cannot be more definitely characterized than by saying, that it is a power which makes the apparent seem real,—makes the Infinite and Unchanging, which is the sole Reality, seem finite and changing. Our union with God consists in getting

rid of the effects of this mysterious power and in living in the constant consciousness of the sole reality of God. Śankara, therefore, is an Absolute or Unqualified Monist, and his system is called Visuddha or Nirvishesha Advaitavāda. Rāmānuja thinks, that though God is indeed the Absolute Reality, the differences that constitute the created world are not unreal or merely apparent, but real modes of God's existence. The material world and the finite soul existed eternally in a potential or unmanifested form in God and became manifest in creation. As finite and partial modes of his existence, they do not represent his infinitude, and if they are one with him in one sense, they are different from him in another. Difference, in fact, is not opposed to unity, and God, though the sole Reality, comprehends in him the differences which make the world of material objects and finite souls. The individual's union with God is not, therefore, a union of mere knowledge, but also one of love, reverence, obedience &c., such as should exist between two spirits of which the one is infinitely superior to the other. Rāmānuja's system, therefore, is called Visishta Advaitavāda, Monism with difference, or Qualified Monism. Madhva, otherwise called Ānandatīrtha or Purnaprajna, was a defender of common sense and condemned Monism in both the unqualified and the qualified shape. Though

holding that matter and the individual soul are dependent on God, he conceived the Infinite in such an abstract manner, that he could see no unity between it and the finite. He put particular emphasis on the expressions of duality and difference in the *Upanishads* and the *Brahma Sūtras*, and explained all expressions of an opposite drift in the light of the former. In matters of religious practice, he agreed, in the main, with Rāmānuja and attached great importance to the culture of *bhakti* or reverential love and attachment to God. His system, therefore, is called Dvaitavāda, Dualism. It is of course Dvaita Vedānta, and is very different from the Dualism of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. Baladeva Vidyābhūṣana's system agrees in all essential features with the Madhva system, and is also a species of Vedāntic Dualism.

I have briefly indicated the three principal strata, or stages of Vedāntic thought,—the first represented by the *Upanishads*, the second by the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Gītā* and the third by the principal commentaries on the *Prasthānatrayam*. The fourth and last stage of Vedāntic speculation may be conceived as constituted by the several minor expositions of Vedāntic doctrines by followers of the great commentators and founders of Vedāntic schools named above. Some of the best known of these expositions are the *Upadesa Sahasrī* and

the *Vivekachūṛḍmani*, both ascribed to Śankara, but perhaps written in his spirit by two of his followers; the *Panchadasī* by Mādhavāchārya and Bharatīśrītha, the *Vedāntasāra* by Sadānanda, the *Vedānta Paribhāṣhā* by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, the *Yoga Vāsishṭha*, the *Adhyātma Rāmāyana*, the *VichāraSāgara* by Nishchala Dāsa, and some of the great Purānas and Tantras like the *Vishnu*, the *Bhāgavata*, the *Mārkanḍeya* and the *Mahānirvāṇa*. In fact it would scarcely be too much to say that the the whole religious literature of India, in its higher levels, is based on the Vedānta, and represents the one or the other of the phases of Vedāntic thought just noticed.

I shall now go back a little and say a word or two in answer to the question which of the *Upanishads*, about 150 in all, are really authoritative, at any rate, accepted as authoritative. The question arises from the fact that there are many treatises calling themselves *Upanishads*, which are neither parts of the Vedas nor genuine products of that stream of thought which had its source in the meditations of the primitive *rishis*. Later sectaries, finding that the *Upanishads* commanded universal reverence, embodied their sectarian views in several treatises and called them *Upanishads*. We have thus not only Śaiva, Śākta, Vaishṇava and other Hindu sectarian *Upanishads*, but an *A'llā*

Upanishad, teaching, I fancy, the tenets of Islam under the disguise of a Vedic work. Leaving out such sectarian treatises as spurious, there still remains the difficulty, whether all unsectarian treatises bearing the name '*Upanishads*' are really integral portions of the Vedas. The place of some of them, for instance the *Īśā*, the *Aitareya*, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, either in the *Mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa* or *Āraṇyaka* portions of the Vedas, is well assured by their being found in the existing rescensions of these works. But the Vedic character of the rest is not so well assured, though they are composed in the spirit of Vedic speculation. One important circumstance, though not final and satisfactory from an antiquarian standpoint, has marked out some of the *Upanishads* as worthy of special reverence, and practically assigned to them the place of the only genuine and authoritative *Upanishads*. It is that of the great Śāṅkara having left commentaries on them or referred to them in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. These are the well-known twelve,—the *Īśā*, *Kena*, *Katha*, *Prasna*, *Mundaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, *Chhāndogya*, *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, *Kaushītaki*, and *Śvetāsvatara*. To all these except the *Māṇḍūkya*, Śāṅkara refers in his *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, and on all these except the *Kaushītaki*, we possess commentaries from his pen. Whenever, therefore, I speak of the *Upani-*

shads, you will understand me as referring to these twelve alone. All the rest may be safely left out of account, and some of these, the sectarian ones, are really undeserving of appeal on questions of Vedāntic doctrine, though they are made much of by some Vaishnava philosophers.

I have now said almost all that I had to say in this introductory lecture. Perhaps some of my hearers expected to hear from me something about the result of Western antiquarian research about the probable time when the *Upanishads* were composed and the speculations started by the *rishis* took a systematic form in the *Brahma Sūtras*, and were further elaborated and popularised by the author of the *Bhagavadgītā*, as well as the date of the principal commentaries on the original Vedāntic canon. Now, these matters are yet so much wrapped up in obscurity, and the conclusions tentatively arrived at by European orientalists so much mere guess-work, even on their own confession, that I am not disposed to attach any importance whatever to them. I may also state, that whatever faith I formerly had in the calculations of European antiquarians as to the history of our national literature, has been effectively shaken by Pandit Satyavrata Sāmasrami's very learned introduction to the *Nimukta* lately published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. I cannot say the learned

scholar's arguments have given me entire satisfaction; but they have at least produced in me a strong impression that the dates assigned by Europeans to our ancient works are all too recent.

It now remains for me to notice briefly the revival of the Vedánta religion and philosophy that is now going on in the country, a phenomenon the importance of which, as regards the future religion, not only of this country, but indirectly of the whole civilised world, can scarcely be exaggerated. This revival was begun by the great Rájá Rámmohan Ráy. His deeply pious and sympathetic soul was profoundly affected by the spectacle of the whole country sunk in the deepest ignorance and the most degrading superstitions. The noble religion of the Vedánta had not only lost its hold on the nation, but even the name of the *Upanishads* was well-nigh forgotten. He keenly felt the need of a reform and girded up his loins for bringing it about. But his reforming ardour did not blind him, as it has done many a reformer who have come after him, to the value of the work done by the ancient religious leaders of the nation, and he concluded that the edifice of future religion must be built on the religious thought and experience of the past. This led him to publish some of the principal *Upanishads*, the *Brahma*

Sūtras and the *Bhagavadgītā*^{2, 520} with expositions of his own, though his exposition of the last work seems now to be lost. But he did not stop here. He defended the ancient theistic religion of the country against adverse critics, both native and foreign, and established the Bráhma Samáj for the promotion of the spiritual worship of God. The work begun by Rája Rámmohan Ráy was nobly continued and extended by his saintly successor, Maharshi Devendranàth Thàkur, who, through the Tattvabodhini Sabhá and the *Tattvabodhini Patriká* founded by him, widely diffused a knowledge of the Vedánta in the country, and by his inspiring sermons from the pulpit of the Bráhma Samáj as well as by his saintly life, did invaluable service to the cause of spiritual religion. But it must be sadly noticed, that with all this valuable service to the cause of Vedántic religion, Maharshi Devendranàth did one great harm, unintentionally of course, to that sacred cause by a declaration to the effect, that as he could not agree with the Vedánta in its teachings about the unity of the Creator and the created and the transmigration of the soul, he discarded Vedántism and would henceforth preach only a pure Theism founded on Reason and Intuition, as if Vedántic Theism was based on any other than those natural foundations. The Maharshi's appreciation of the spiritual worth of

the *Upanishads*, however, remained fully in tact, and to all intents and purposes, he continued to be and is still, as I conceive, a Vedántic saint and teacher of an exalted type. However, the unfortunate declaration referred to had a blighting effect on Vedántic studies, and though the Ádi Bráhma Samáj of the Maharshi continued these studies for a time even after the declaration, the evil done by it appeared in all its nakedness when the great secession of Brahmánanda Kesavchandra Sen took place ; for, though Sanskrit learning and scholarship were not wanting among his followers, the study of Vedántic literature was almost utterly neglected by them till the last days of the great leader, when his deepened spiritual experience and re-awakened nationality, and specially his contact with the great Rámakrishna Paramhansa, opened his eyes to the spiritual value and fundamental truth of the Vedánta. In the last utterances of the great Bráhma leader, in his sermons from the pulpit of his Samáj and his essay on *Yoga*, one can distinctly trace his return to the position occupied by the Bráhma Samáj before the Maharshi's anti-Vedántic declaration noticed above. If there could be any doubt as to this return, it was effectively set at rest by a declaration, conceived evidently in the spirit of Mr. Sen's teachings, but actually made just after his death, in his paper, *The Liberal and the New*

Dispensation, to the effect that the Bráhma Samáj had returned to the Vedánta.

The Sádharán Bráhma Samáj, which seceded from Mr. Sen's church as Mr. Sen had seceded from the parent church, has hitherto been neglecting the study of the Vedánta even more than the church from which it has broken off. But, for the last few years, a number of its members have been feeling the importance of studying the national literature and of a closer following of the spirit and method of the great founder of the Samáj than has been the case for a long time. With this object they have published nine of the principal *Upanishads* with annotations and translation, started a theological and philosophical quarterly which advocates their views, are pleading for a national mode of religious culture and propagation through the organs of the Samáj and through lectures and discussions in the Theological Society managed mainly by them, founded an Institution under the name of the Rámmohan Ráy Chatuspáthi for the systematic study of the Vedánta Philosophy and other kindred subjects, and lastly organised the present course of lectures with the pecuniary help and hearty co-operation of one who, whatever other guidance he may now be following, received his first lessons in spiritual religion and began his study of Vedántic literature in the Sádharán Bráhma Samáj.

The next agency that has helped in the present revival of Vedántism is the Theosophical Society. It took up, quite in time, the work so ably done but at last given up by the Tattvabodhiní Sabhá and the Ādi Bráhma Samáj, and has since been doing that work with the most praiseworthy energy and remarkable success. The growing interest, observed more or less in all parts of the country, in the study of our ancient religious literature and, among select circles, in following the methods of spiritual culture laid down in it, is mainly due to the incessant activity of the Theosophical Society. The society, indeed, is not bound by any fixed creed, and includes among its members men of various shades of opinion ; but the leaders have, from the beginning, been either Buddhists or Vedántists, and whatever may have been the case in the earlier years of its existence, the Vedántic element in it seems to have, during the last few years, prevailed over the Buddhistic. I have recently been studying with great interest and profit the utterances of Mrs. Annie Besant, the most energetic of its recent workers, and though I cannot always follow her in her views of the inner structure of the world and its government by innumerable divine beings, I have yet experienced the purest delight in discovering in this gifted speaker and writer one

of the truest followers of the 'ancient *rishis*, and a most potent factor in the revival of our ancient faith and spirituality.

The last to take up the cause of Vedāntic revival in recent times, is the famous and energetic Svāmī Vivekānanda, helped by a noble band of self-sacrificing and indefatigable co-adjutors. The enthusiasm of the Svāmī and his helpers in disseminating the religion of the Vedānta and in philanthropic work of the truest and most unsectarian type, seems to be boundless and deserves the highest praise and the heartiest sympathy and co-operation of all true lovers and well-wishers of the country. In the course of an interview with which the Svāmī honoured me and some of my friends in his convent at Belur, on which occasion we enjoyed his warm hospitality for almost a whole day, I was extremely glad to find that he is not—as might be feared—a worshipper of the mere letter of the scriptures, nor the unreasoning follower of any particular Vedāntic teacher of later times, but an advocate of a free, unsectarian Vedāntism, and that his wide sympathies and enlightened liberalism are worthy of his master, the great saint Paramhansa Rāmakrishna, whose profound love of man and appreciation of truth were not bound by any church, sect or nationality.

Now, having briefly noticed these recent movements for the revival of the Vedāntic religion and philosophy, I have only to say, that in my future expositions of the system, I shall not only follow in the footsteps of our ancient and medieval teachers, but also avail myself of every help that I can derive from these latter-day teachers of the Vedānta, both native and foreign.

And now, gentlemen, my task is quite done, and I shall no longer keep you confined within the four walls of this hall, and of my poor thoughts, but, thanking you heartily for the kind and patient hearing you have given me, allow you to seek the free air of Heaven.

LECTURE II

THE VEDANTIC DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION AND REVELATION

The last half-century has effected a remarkable change in the ideas of modern European nations regarding Inspiration and Revelation. In the eighteenth century and even in the first part of the nineteenth century, Inspiration and Revelation were believed to be supernatural, miraculous processes, and all supporters of Revelation were expected to hold that, in special cases and on special occasions, God violates the laws he has impressed upon Nature and the human mind, and thereby makes himself known to man. Whether this supernatural revelation of him took the form of his incarnation as a man, or of a physical miracle like raising the dead or calming a storm, or that of exerting a mysterious influence on the thoughts of chosen prophets or apostles, it was, at all events, supposed that Revelation was not a natural process, not the knowledge of God acquired by powers inherent in the constitution of man as man,—that, to put the antithesis pointedly—inspiration and its result revelation were the work of God and not the work of Nature.

On the other hand, the knowledge of God and things divine that man could acquire by using his

natural powers—powers that form a part of his constitution—was considered as something purely human, purely natural, and as having nothing divine in it, or as divine only in an indirect sense as having God for its proximate cause. Thus a sharp line of demarcation was drawn between teachers of religion on the one hand, speaking in the name of God, professing to have got special revelations from him, and on the other, philosophers, scientists and other men of genius who appealed to nothing higher than the faculties of thinking and observing with which they were endowed, and who called upon their fellow-men to test and verify the truths taught by them by placing themselves under those conditions which had helped them, the discoverers of the truths, to acquire them.

This sharply drawn antithesis between natural and revealed truth—between knowledge divinely revealed and knowledge acquired by natural and human means—was perfectly natural in times when Nature and God and God and man were sharply distinguished,—when the world, both material and spiritual, was believed to have been created once for all by God, and then let to have its own way,—to be guided by laws once for all stamped upon it and requiring only occasional divine intervention when its affairs got particularly

muddled. The antithesis became exceedingly sharp at times at the hands of over-zealous advocates of scriptural revelation, for instance Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel in England, according to whom man has no natural power of knowing God, the very constitution of the human mind confining man to a knowledge of the finite and the relative, and preventing him from knowing the Infinite and the Absolute. Such extreme views, however, are now being discredited more and more, and the very contrast between revelation and science, between natural and revealed knowledge, once so nicely drawn, is gradually dissolving, and has dissolved once for all in the case of a very large and increasing number of religious thinkers. Many have discovered and many more are gradually discovering the truth, that Nature, after all, is not merely natural, and man not purely human, and that though the finite and the Infinite are distinguishable, the distinction itself is based on an underlying unity. Knowledge, it is now seen,—the knowledge of God no less than of Nature,—is a divine process implying the direct action of God on the mind of man. It is seen that man is not *merely finite*, but as a rational and thinking being, he shares in the Divine infinitude, and that his rational nature, far from excluding him from a knowledge of God, is itself a revelation, a self-

manifestation of God in him. We need hardly say that there are still many people to whom such views are unintelligible, and to whom the antithesis of God and Nature, God and Man and of inspired and natural knowledge yet obtains and has not been replaced by a clearly grasped synthesis which sees both the unity and the difference. There are still whole communities in which philosophical and scientific knowledge is deemed a mere human accomplishment, and appeals to Inspiration, even though accompanied with the wildest tollies and vagaries, command respect and submission. There are yet hundreds of souls, even in the most reformed and progressive societies, who look upon the slow and patient acquisition of a knowledge of God and things divine by study and reflection with compassionate if not distrustful eyes, and live in expectation of a revelation of God to them through an unknown and mysterious, if not a miraculous, process. The general movement, however, towards a more rational view,—a view according to which truth obtained through natural powers is none the less revealed because of its naturalness, and divine revelation none the less natural because of its divine character,—is sure, and is steadily gaining ground with the general diffusion of scientific knowledge and liberal culture.

Now, it is remarkable, that to our ancient

thinkers the rational view of Inspiration just indicated—the synthesis of the natural and the revealed in knowledge—was known in all its essentials. It may indeed be said that the doctrine of the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas and the numerous utterances in the scriptures on the unknowableness of God by the ordinary understanding, seem to point to a very different conclusion. It is also true, that to many who profess to follow the teachings of our ancient sages and seers, the change depicted above, from a false to a rational doctrine of inspiration, has not taken place. But it is nevertheless a fact, as I propose to show by-and-by, that with the founders of our national philosophy, the change had really taken place, and that their view of inspiration is as rational as any held by the most advanced thinkers of the West. Utterances as regards the unknowability of God are easily explicable. They imply, in the first place, the impossibility of knowing God except for the pure-hearted and the meditative. How can the Invisible and the Intangible be conceived by those whose thoughts are fully occupied with sensuous objects, and how can the All-holy, the All-good, be intelligible to those who are immersed in selfishness and sensuality? In the second place, such utterances seek to give expression to the truth, quite unintelligible to the ordinary under-

standing, that God is not the *object*, but the *subject* of knowledge. or to speak more correctly, he transcends, while he makes possible, the distinction of subject and object, and that it is only in the exalted and most rare state of conscious identity with the Absolute—with the transcendent Unity of subject and object—that man knows him. Thus the seemingly contradictory texts of the scriptures on the knowableness on the one hand and the unknowableness on the other, of the Absolute, are not really contradictory. While they deny that God is knowable in the same sense and in the same way as things finite and relative are knowable, they at the same time affirm his knowableness in a higher sense and by higher processes. That these processes were conceived by our thinkers to be natural, unmiraculous, universal, and at the same time divine, involving the direct action of God on the human mind, I shall show, first, in a general way, by examining a number of texts from the *Upanishads*, and secondly, by an exposition of the doctrine of the Logos or Sabda Brahma propounded by our Mīmāṃsā philosophers and by the great Grammarian Pāṇini and his followers.

The *Kenopanishad* contains a number of verses which have been much tortured for the purpose of showing that they teach Agnosticism pure and

simple, whereas those very verses and others lying about them show that the author identifies Brahman with the knowing subject implied in all knowledge, and in that sense pronounces him to be different from all known and knowable objects. The author says :—

“That which is not revealed by speech, but by which speech is revealed,—know that to be Brahman, and not this that people worship (*i. e.* not anything that belongs to the world of objects.) That which people do not think with the *manas*, (*i. e.* the faculty of forming mental images of things), but by which the *manas* itself is thought,—know that to be Brahman, and not this that people worship. That which people do not see with the eye, but by which people see visual objects,—know that to be Brahman, and not this that people worship. That which people do not hear with the ear, but by which the ear is heard, (*i. e.* made an object),—know that to be Brahman, and not this that people worship. That which people do not smell, but by which the power of smelling is led to its object,—know that to be Brahman, and not this that people worship.” (I. 4-1.)

But by identifying Brahman with the subject of knowledge, the *Upanishads* do not make him either plural or limited. The subject of all know-

ledge is conceived by them to be one and undivided and identical with Brahman. There is no other subject or knower than he ; he therefore cannot be known by, that is, become the object of, anyone else's knowledge. As Śankara says in his comment on the verse succeeding those I have quoted : " It is clearly affirmed by all the Vedāntas, that Brahman is the Self of all knowers. Here also the same truth is inculcated by the answer to a question beginning with 'Śrotrasya Śrotram &c.' It is confirmed by the verses 'Yadvāchānābhyuditam &c.' There is no other knower than Brahman of whom Brahman can be an object of knowledge, for the existence of any other knower is denied by the text 'There is no other knower than this.' " The text referred to occurs in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, and is so relevant to the subject in question, that I shall quote it in full. It forms the latter part of both the 7th and 8th brāhmanas of the third chapter of the *Upanishad*. I quote it from the 8th brāhmana : " O Gārgi, this imperishable One is a seer, but is not seen ; a hearer, but not heard ; a thinker, but not thought of ; a knower, but not known. There is no other seer than this, no other hearer than this, no other thinker than this, no other knower than this. It is in this imperishable One, O Gārgi, that space is interwoven."

The same truth is echoed by the *Bhagavadgītā* in the thirteenth chapter, where Krishna, representing the Supreme Being, says: "O Bhārata. know me to be the subject in all bodies or objects." What unity our thinkers saw in the apparent diversity of mental life, we shall see when we come to examine their analysis of knowledge and existence. It will be seen from the above quotations, however, that even in our ordinary perceptions, the *rishis* saw the hand of God. To them all knowledge, the knowledge even of material objects, was the result of Divine inspiration. This will be more evident as we proceed.

That the *rishis* held God to be unknowable by the impure-hearted, the restless, the thoughtless, the irreverent, and that they led their disciples through a long process of discipline before trying to instil into them the principles of the divine science, appears from many a fine anecdote and emphatic utterance scattered throughout the *Upanishads*. Thus, in the *Pras'nopanishad*, we find the Rishi Pippalāda sending away six inquirers after God,—inquirers who are described as worshippers of God,—sending away even such men, for another year of disciplinary exercises before undertaking their regular instruction. In the *Chhāndogya*, Satyakāma, Jābala is turned out to

tend his teacher's cattle, which not only tests his theological ardour, and teaches him to be dutiful and obedient under the most trying circumstances but further brings him into direct contact with Nature, and gives him special opportunities for cultivating habits of solitary reflection so essential to the knowledge of things divine, so that, after his long and rigorous course of apprenticeship, he is enabled to know God with only a little help from his master. How much Satyakáma appreciated the value of the discipline administered to him, is shown by his leading his own disciple, Upakoshala Kámaláyana, through twelve years of ceremonial and spiritual exercises, though under far less painful circumstances, and letting him acquire the preliminaries of the science of Brahman by meditations on natural objects before giving his finishing touch to the boy's education. In the same *Upanishad*, we are told of Indra and Birochana representing the gods and the demons respectively, apprenticing themselves to Prajápati for acquiring the knowledge of the Supreme Self. Twelve years of *brahmacharya* did not make Birochona quite fit for the acquisition of the sacred science, and he came away contented with a false idea of the Self, while Indra had to stay with his preceptor for a whole century till he mastered the knowledge that leads to peace and immortality. In the *Kathopa-*

hishad, Mrityu consents to instruct Nachiketá in the mysteries of the soul only when, after offering him all the attractions of his divine palace, including all that men value most, he saw that the young man was insensible to them and would not be satisfied with anything else than the knowledge he sought.

I need not multiply examples. The *rishis* deeply felt the difficulty of knowing God, but did not share in the Agnostic's despair of knowledge. They say :—"Arise, awake, seek competent teachers, and try to know God. The wise say, that that way is as difficult to pass as the sharp edge of a razor." (*Katha*, I. 3. 14.) Again, as to impurity and restlessness of heart as of obstacles to the gaining of saving knowledge, they say :—"One who has not given up bad habits, whose mind is not tranquil and used to spiritual concentration, cannot find him (*i. e.* God) even by knowledge." (*Ibid*, I. 2. 24.) Again :—"The senses of him who is not guided by Reason and whose mind is restless, are like the naughty horses of a charioteer. He who is not guided by Reason, who is inattentive and always impure, does not attain that state, *i. e.*, communion with God, but returns to the world. But he who is guided by Reason, who is attentive and always pure, attain to that state from which there is no rebirth. He whose charioteer is Reason and whose

reins are the mind, reaches the end of the journey, which is the highest place of the All-pervading One." (*Ibid*, 1. 3. 5.)

The moral and spiritual exercises indispensable for the acquisition of the science of God were in later times formulated into what are called the *Sādhana-chatustaya*, the four-fold discipline. These are (1) *nityānitya-vastu-viveka*, the discrimination of things permanent and transitory ; (2) *ihāmutrā-phalabhogavirāga*, non-attachment to the rewards of actions, earthly or heavenly ; (3) *samādādi-sādhana-sampat*, disciplines beginning with *sama* and *dama* ; and (4) *mumukshutvam*, the desire for liberation. The disciplines classed under the third head are *sama*, the drawing away of the mind from things earthly ; *dama*, the restraining of the external senses ; *uparati*, giving up, for the sake of obtaining the higher knowledge, the duties prescribed in the lower code ; *titiksha*, patiently bearing the sufferings caused by heat, cold &c., *samādhānam*, the concentration of the mind in higher things by giving up sleepiness and laziness ; and *sraddha*, faith in all higher things. In enumerating and explaining the meaning of these disciplines, I follow Śankara's commentary on the first aphorism of the *Sātraka Mīmāṃsā* and Govindānanda's annotations on the commentary. But they will be found enumerated and expounded in

all important Vedāntic works, with only slight variations in the exposition.

We see, then, in what sense and to what class of men our theologians held the Divine Being to be unknowable and what they believed to be the conditions of obtaining divine inspiration and enlightenment. That they deemed the knowledge of God to be the result of inspiration from above,—a process of self-revelation on the part of God to man—and at the same time a purely natural process, will appear from a few more texts which I shall take the liberty to quote.* The *Kathopanishad* says :—“This Self *i.e.*, the Divine Spirit, cannot be found by teaching the Vedas, neither by the understanding, nor by much learning. He is obtainable by him alone whom he chooses (for self-manifestation). This Spirit reveals his nature to him alone” (I. 2. 23.)* Mere outward learning and keenness of understanding do not suffice for the knowledge of God ; this knowledge is unattainable by reasoning, as the same. *Upanishad* says elsewhere. (I. 2. 9.) The grace of God is essential ; it is God alone who can reveal himself. The same truth is taught by the *Bhagavadgītā* when, in the 10th Chapter, it makes the Divine Being say :—“Those who are devoted to me, those who live in me, understand one another, and speaking of me constantly, rejoice exceedingly.

To them who are ever devoted, and who worship me with love, I give that power of understanding through which they obtain me. In order to help them, I take possession of their minds and scatter the darkness of ignorance by the bright lamp of knowledge." But by making revelation a matter of grace, the *rishis* do not take it out of the province of law and make it miraculous. They conceive it still to be a natural process, one that takes place through the powers with which man is endowed by God. Thus the same *Upanishad* that speaks of revelation as a matter of Divine grace, says:—"Brahman has no visible form, no one can see him with his eyes. He is revealed through the heart and through such meditation as keeps down the oscillations of the mind. They who know him become immortal." (VI. 9). In the same spirit, the *Mundaka* says:—"He cannot be perceived by the eye, nor by speech, nor by any other senses ; neither can he be obtained through work. He whose heart is purified by pure knowledge, sees the invisible One through meditation. This subtle Spirit, in whom the vital air rests, in five forms, is knowable by the heart. The heart of created beings is fully pervaded by the senses (*i.e.* by sensuous desires) ; when the heart is purified, this Spirit reveals himself." (III. 1.8,9). I need not multiply quotations.

The conception of God as the inspiring Spirit, as the director of the human understanding, was formed and universally accepted at least as early as every 'twice-born Hindu began to utter as his daily devotion the *Gāyatrī mantra*, in which God is described as "*dhiyo yo nah prachodayāt*,"—"he who directs our powers of understanding," and the same truth is repeated in a beautiful *mantra* in the *Svetāsvatara Upanishad*:—"Verily the Person *i.e.* the Supreme Being, is the great Lord: he is the sole director of the heart; he is the dispenser of this holy state, and he is the inexhaustible light."

I now turn to the second part of my subject, the doctrine of Sabda Brahma or the Vedas as the eternal word of God. You know that our scholiasts hold the Vedas to be *apauruṣeya*, without a personal composer. They are believed to be eternal and to have been, in ancient times, not composed by, but only manifested to, the *rishis*. The *rishis* were not their authors, but only their seers, *drashtārah*. Now, this doctrine has an exoteric as well as an esoteric form, and it was in its latter form that our philosophical thinkers held it. The exoteric form I need not explain: it is quite well-known. Let us see what the other is. In my exposition,* I shall keep close to the thought of our philosophers, but I shall also try to make

clear what seems obscure in their statement or exposition, and at the end prove the substantial faithfulness of my exposition by two quotations, one from Sankara and the other from Mādhavāchārya.

The Vedas are, as every one knows, the foundation of all later Indian literature. Roughly speaking, they may be said to contain, at least in a general form, all the conceptions that have found expression in the later thought of the nation. They are also the first important utterances of the human race, and express its earliest thoughts. Again, before their embodiment in books, which is comparatively a recent occurrence, they were handed down by oral tradition from generation to generation. They were thus, as they still are, a body of *śabdās*, words,—words expressing all important things and concerns of life, so that they pervade not only our literature, but also our everyday speech. The words that we utter day after day and moment after moment, are the same as are found in the Vedas. The Vedas, therefore, are, to our philosophers, identical with words,—words representing all things, earthly and heavenly. Now, what are words? Are they mere letters, mere sounds or mere combinations of them? Mere sounds, however combined, do not make real words unless such a combination convey some

thought,—some conception,—to the mind. It is not merely the sounds, *c*, *o* and *w* or their combination that form the word *cow*. Unless the sound or combination of sounds, *cow*, conveyed the conception of an object to the mind, it would not be called a word. Letters or sounds, *varṇāḥ*, therefore, are merely the outward and sensuous forms of words ; their essence consists in the conception manifested in the mind on their utterance—in a *sphota*, as our philosophers call it. Now, a *sphota* or conception does not represent an individual thing, —a *vyakti* ; it represents a class, a *jāti*. The word *cow* means not merely this or that cow, but the whole class of cows. In perceiving a cow, we know that the object before us is only a particular embodiment of a generic conception. The particular complex of sensuous matter before us might pass away, but the conception would remain and recur to our minds whenever the sensuous conditions of its recurrence would be fulfilled. It is the same with all other objects. We have to distinguish between their sensuous, particular, perishing matter on the one hand, and the rational, universal and permanent forms in which this matter is moulded as it were when it becomes an object of our knowledge. It is this rational, universal and permanent form in which every object appears to us,—it is the idea or concep-

tion that arises in the mind when an object is perceived, or its name uttered, that our philosophers call *śabda* or *śpota* to distinguish it from its merely passing or accidental aspect. Now, *śabdas* or conceptions, they say, are not only relatively permanent,—more permanent than sounds or letters—but absolutely permanent. They not only last—and last for ever—after sounds have come and gone, but they existed—and existed eternally—before sounds were ever uttered. They indeed become manifest only when sounds are uttered, or other sensations are experienced, but such manifestation is not their origination. They existed before such manifestation and last even when it ceases.

Now, can this doctrine be true? Let us see. Let us analyse our knowledge of a cow and see if this analysis discloses anything eternal in the object of our knowledge. I know that such analysis cannot be exhaustive, first because it is impossible to lay bare everything that we know, and secondly because we cannot command either the time or the patience required for a thorough analysis. But let us have only so much as is required for our present purpose. As our first step in our analysis, then, we should see that in perceiving a cow or, for that matter, any other object, we do not experience mere sensations, mere sensuous events,

mere colours, touches or sounds. "Mere sensation" is a phrase without any real meaning. In perceiving sensations or sensuous events, we perceive them in relation to a percipient subject or mind which distinguishes itself from them. Here, then, is a non-sensuous element in our perception. In knowing sensations as sensations, the mind knows itself as non-sensuous. Secondly, we should see that while the sensuous elements in our knowledge are particulars, distinct from and in a sense excluding one another, the mind that knows them is not a particular identified with any one or any particular number of them, but a universal—related to every one of them. Whether we contemplate the colour, shape, size, smell, strength or habits of the cow, we find them all related to the knowing subject. Thirdly, in perceiving passing sensations or sensuous events as such, we know the knowing subject to be permanent,—permanent not only relatively, but absolutely, for time or events can be known only in relation to the timeless,—to that which is the very opposite of an event or series of events. If, for a moment, it be admitted for argument's sake that the knowing subject can be conceived as itself passing away, it should be seen that the conception of its passing away is possible only in relation to another subject which does not pass away. Fourthly, it should be seen that

the mind to which the cow appears related, is not only timeless or eternal, but also spaceless, or, in other words, not confined to a particular spot, but is in, or related to, all space. It is related not only to every part of the cow's body, but to every part of space lying outside of it. The cow, as an extended object, as having a definite size and shape, can be perceived only in relation to outlying space, and the relation of these parts of space can be conceived only in relation to a knowing subject for which both the parts exist. Further, particular spaces can be known and conceived only as parts of one infinite space, and the conception of one infinite space is impossible except in relation to an all-relating, all-containing, infinite Mind ; in other words, it is impossible unless we conceive the knowing subject that we call "I" to be infinite. Fifthly, we should see that the knowing subject, which we find to be above space and time, is not a mere relating principle, not a bare, abstract, colourless entity, but has an infinitely complex nature of its own, that, what we call the characteristics of the cow, are really permanent, eternal ideas in it. We say the cow has colour. Now, colour has really two aspects, a passing and a permanent aspect. It is, in one aspect, a sensuous event, flowing and evanescent ; in another, a permanent idea. You look at a

cow and see it to be white. You experience a sensuous event. Shut your eyes, and the event is past. Your experience may be repeated a hundred times. In each of these you experience a fresh event. If this event were colour, the cow should have at least a hundred colours—and that one after another—and not one, as it really has. We see, then, that colour is not a mere sensation, not a mere event, not a mere particular. It is a unity that persists in the midst of infinite variety. It is a general idea or conception which makes the experience of particular sensuous events possible without being identified with them. As such a conception, it is a power, a function, a manifestation, of the all-relating mind that makes experience possible. The same is true of all the other characteristics of our object, the cow. We say its body is strongly built—it is a hard substance. Hardness is not the particular feeling of touch that you experience in touching and pressing your limbs on its body, though with every such passing feeling you experience hardness. It is a conception, a relating, uniting function or power of the mind, which forms the very essence of mind, and which manifests itself when the sensuous conditions of such manifestation are fulfilled. We see, then, that what we call the characteristics of a cow,—its colour, its strength, its size, its shape, its sound, its

habits as a grazing, digesting, growing, conceiving, milk-giving, decaying animal, and so on, are really general ideas or conceptions implying a conceiving mind, and that all these ideas, again, are comprehended in the more general idea of 'cow', which also, in the same manner, reveals the mind of which it is an idea. We see also that this idea and the ideas comprehended under it, are all functions or powers inherent in a mind which we call and may truly call our own in so far as it constitutes our rational existence, and in so far as it manifests itself under limited conditions, but which is really universal, all-comprehending and eternal. All conceptions, then,—all general ideas—inasmuch as they are powers of the Eternal Mind, are themselves eternal. They are manifested, revealed, to individual minds—*i.e.*, in individual reproductions or incarnations of the Universal Mind—from time to time; but in themselves they are above time;—they are as eternal as the Mind of which they are powers. Thus all knowledge—the knowledge of the lowest and grossest as well as the highest and subtlest objects,—is really the knowledge of God. All names are, in reality, the names of God. The Veda, therefore, *i. e.* the stock of human knowledge—whether embodied or not in books—is eternal,—the eternal word or self-revelation of God.

My exposition will stop here, and I shall only point out in passing, and not dwell on, the remarkable identity, in essentials, of this theory of ideas propounded by our national philosophers with the Platonic theory of ideas and the Neo-platonic and Christian doctrine of the Logos or eternal Word of God, as also partially with the Realistic and Conceptualistic doctrines of mediæval times. It will be seen that it is also in close agreement with the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, the great German philosopher.

I shall close with the promised quotations from Sankara and Mādhava. In reply to an opponent's arguments, directed to showing the non-eternity of things as well as of words signifying them, Sankara, in his commentary on the *Sārīraka Sūtras*, (I. 3.28.) says through the mouth of a *pūrvapakshin* or objector :—

“Of what nature, then, is the ‘word’ with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the ‘word’?—It is a *sphota*, the *pūrvapakshin* says. For, on the assumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (*i. e.* pronounced.) These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to

the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yajnadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption; nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together with the impressions produced by the perception of preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense,) just as the smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letters, combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters, does not actually take place, because those impressions are not

objects of perception. Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter, combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters—which impressions are apprehended from their effects—is that which intimates the sense of the word ; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed each other in time. From all this it follows that the *sphota* is the word. After the apprehending agent, *i. e.* the buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word, received the rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the *sphota* presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension. And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is an act of remembrance having for its objects the letters of the word ; for the letters, which are more than one, cannot form the object of one act of apprehension. As that *sphota* is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal ; while the apprehension of difference referred to above, has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which

is of the nature of the *sphota* and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, *i. e.* this world which consists of actions, agents, and the results of actions."*

I now come to Mádhaváchárya, the author of *Sarvadarshana Sangraha*. In expounding the theory of ideas, which seems to have been first propounded by Jaimini and afterwards developed by Pánini and his followers, and which Mádhava himself appears fully to endorse, he says :—

“ ‘But,’ say some, ‘why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called *sphota* ?’ This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing.’ We reply that our perception is the proof. Thus there is one word ‘cow’, since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception. Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as a *sphota*, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma :—Are the letters supposed to produce this cogni-

* Professor Thibaut's Translation in the *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXIV.

tion of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a *sphota* by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning, and this *sphota* is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the the cognition of the meaning... Existence is that great *summun genus* which is found in cows, horses &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides; and the inferior species, 'cow', 'horse,' &c., are not really different from it; for the species 'cow' and 'horse' (*gotva* and *ashvatva*) are not really new subjects, but each is 'existence' as residing in the subjects 'cow' and 'horse.' Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one *summun genus*, existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence 'existence' is the meaning of the stem-word (*prātipadika*).....This is pure existence, from

its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be ; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance : this existence is called the 'Great Soul.'.....The real fact is that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman. 'This is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word ; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls (the individual and the universal).' The meaning of this *kārikā* is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words ; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form ; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance."*

* Professors Cowell and Gough's Translation, Chap. XIII.

LECTURE III

THE VEDANTIC PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

We have seen that according to the Vedánta, inspiration and revelation are perfectly natural processes, natural in the sense of unmiraculous, consistent with the laws of nature,—and yet supernatural, that is, due to the action of God on the mind of man. We have also seen that the Vedántic appeal to the Vedas is really an appeal to knowledge, primitive and eternal,—to ideas which are implied in all experience, and which have their source in the Infinite Mind. Let us now proceed to examine what conclusions as to the nature of knowledge and reality the Vedánta comes to by following the path of natural yet God-revealed knowledge. We shall first take up its view of Nature and then come gradually to the soul and to God. There is indeed an indissoluble connexion between these three realities, and the Vedánta goes so far as to affirm their ultimate unity. But it will be one of my most important points to show, that above this ultimate or underlying unity, the Vedánta recognises a relative difference ; and it is more as something

relatively different from God and the finite soul than as one with them that I shall, in this lecture, speak of Nature.

The Philosophy of Nature is a department of Metaphysics. Metaphysics divides itself into two studies, (1) Epistemology or the theory of knowledge, and (2) Ontology or the theory of existence. Ontology deals with the existence of man, Nature and God as relatives. It presupposes Epistemology ; for before we have made ourselves sure of the process and scope of knowledge, we are not entitled to deal with any objective reality, be it the knowing mind or Nature or God as things known. This distinction of Epistemology and Ontology, as distinct departments of metaphysical inquiry, was, to all intents and purposes, unknown in ancient philosophy. Dr. James Martineau, the eminent English philosopher who has just passed to the other world, resolves all philosophical methods into two, (1) the psychological and (2) the unpsychological, and puts all ancient philosophical methods under the first-named class. By 'the psychological method', Dr. Martineau means the method of interrogating the individual consciousness as to its contents, including the testimony it bears to the existence of realities beyond itself, and by 'the unpsychological', he means the method of drawing conclusions concern-

ing realities by a direct interrogation, as it were, of Nature and God, without making inquiries as to how and what we really know. The latter method Dr. Martineau justly pronounces as unsafe and unsure ; but his calling the opposite method 'psychological' seems misleading. It is not as an individual, as one out of innumerable things, that the mind we call human knows either itself or other realities. It is only by rising to an objective, cosmic or supra-individual standpoint that the mind has cognisance of objective realities. The ignoring of this truth, the idea that our direct knowledge of reality is confined to our own consciousness, and that it is by a supreme act of faith in the testimony of our faculties that we know or rather believe in realities beyond ourselves, is apt to make Metaphysics an affair of blind belief or common sense, and not of knowledge. As, however, facts seem to me really otherwise than as the Doctor represents them to be, as the mind, as subject of knowledge, seems to transcend its individuality, the method of inquiring first into the nature, conditions and contents of knowledge should rather be called 'epistemological' or by some other appropriate name than 'psychological.' In saying this, however, I am far from denying the importance of Psychology, the science of the manifestation of knowledge in individual life, as

well as the development of the emotional and volitional aspects of the human mind, as a special science. With this suggestion of a change of name to avoid mistakes as to the exact scope of the inquiry, I cannot but apply Dr. Martineau's remark as to the nature of ancient European philosophy to our Indian philosophy. I cannot but confess with regret that the method indicated, if not fitly described by the term 'psychological,' is as much absent from our native philosophy as from that of ancient Europe. There are, indeed, in our philosophical works, isolated efforts at analysis of mental facts here and there; and an enumeration of the sources of knowledge and the methods of deduction and induction are also not wanting in some of our philosophers, specially those of the Nyāya School; but a regular Epistemology, a systematic analysis of the contents and processes of knowledge, and a carrying out of the principles thus obtained into ontological conclusions, is what we seek for in vain in our philosophy, and in this respect writers on the Vedānta seem to be greater sinners than those of the other school.

How, then, did our Vedāntic thinkers come to their conclusions? Did not they follow any method that can be, to some extent at least, justified? Now, notwithstanding all that I have

said as to the absence of a systematic Epistemology in our philosophy, the answer to questions like these cannot be doubtful. It is this. The conclusions arrived at by our Metaphysicians are such as cannot have been obtained by mere guessing. They unmistakably imply a large amount of close thought behind them. The very distinctions with which our philosophers deal, matter and mind, subject and object, the phenomenal and the real, the particular and the universal, Monism and Dualism, the gross and the subtle body, the sensorium and the understanding, understanding and reason, the self and its five sheaths, *máyá* and *parináma*, the qualified and the unqualified Brahman, and a thousand others, are clearly the result of deep reflection—reflection gone through according to methods which the thinkers had either no inclination or leisure to state in words, or the stating of which was considered needless, as instruction in philosophy continued to be conducted orally even long after the art of writing was invented.

But it cannot be said that our thinkers have left us completely in the dark as to the method of their philosophising ; and as regards our Vedántists, it may be said that though unmindful of the other recognised proofs of Hindu philosophy, they have not been quite unmindful of that which establishes

the existence of the Supreme Reality, which was the sole object of real concern to them. The *pramānas* or sources of knowledge recognised by both Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntists are three, (1) *Pratyaksha*, sensuous apprehension, (2) *Anumāna*, inference, admitting of various kinds, and (3) *Śabda*, which, though ordinarily meaning Vedic authority, we have seen to be really identical with Intuition or Reason (in the German sense). As such, it is called *aparokṣham* (not ordinarily *pratyakṣham*, in order not to confound it with sense-perception) *aparokṣhānubhūti*, *ātmapratyaya*, *ātmajñānam* and the like. It is clearly taught by the Vedāntic authorities that the knowledge of self, which is really the knowledge of God, is necessary and intuitive, and the basis of all other knowledge. Thus Sankara in his commentary on the seventh aphorism of the third pāda, Chapter II, of the *Sārīraka Mīmāṃsā*, says :—

“The knowledge of the self is not contingent in the case of any person ; for it is self-evident. The self is not established by proofs of the existence of the self. Perception and other proofs, which are employed in the case of things not proved but to be proved, belong to it. No one assumes such things as ether and the like as self-evident and needing no proof. But the self, being itself the condition of employing proofs and

such other things, is accepted as evident even before the employment of proofs and such other things. Nor is it possible to deny such a reality; for it is the very essence of him who would deny it. Fire cannot reject its own warmth. Let us take an example. It is I who know what is present. It is I who knew what is past and what is more remotely past. It is I who shall know the future, and what is more remotely future. In these cases, though the object of knowledge differs according as it is present, past or future, the knowing subject does not change, for it is always present. And, as it is always present, the self cannot be destroyed even when the body is reduced to ashes. Nor is it possible to make it different from what it is.”*

I would draw your special attention to what Sankara says, in the extract I have just read, as to self-knowledge being the condition of all other knowledge. He clearly lays down that nothing else can be known without knowing the self. This truth, which is the foundation of all true metaphysics, was taught, long before Sankara, by those whose utterances he expounds. Thus the *Kathopanishad* says:—“The sun does not shine there,

* Professor Thibaut's Translation in the *Sacred Books of the East*.

nor do the moon, the stars or these lightnings. How shall this fire shine there? All shine after him, the shining One. All this shines by his light." (II. 9. 15.) It is not by any material light, the *rishi* means, that the Self can be revealed. How can matter, how can any object, make the subject known when objects as such are known only in relation to the subject. The same idea is echoed in the *Bhagavad-gītā* :—"As, O Bhārata, the one sun reveals the whole of this world, so does the subject reveal all bodies or objects." (XIII. 3).

Now, this simple truth, that if we know anything else than the self, we know it only along with the self, or, in other words, in relation to the self, does not seem to be so plain a thing to all as it does to philosophers, and to many of those who admit it to be a plain thing, it seems to be a truism of no philosophical importance. Its philosophical importance we shall see presently. As to its being a self-evident truth, any one may convince himself of this by trying to think its opposite, which will be found to be not only unthinkable, but actually self-contradictory. Thus, if it seems to you that while listening to me with deep attention, you really forget yourselves, you will find, on actual examination, that the proposition is really un-

thinkable and even absurd. You will see that if such a thing were possible, if you could really forget yourselves in listening to me, if you could know my lecture out of conscious relation to yourselves, it would not be possible for you afterwards to bring the subject in relation to your consciousness, as you actually do. You say, let me suppose, that at one moment you actually know the lecture, that is, hear it, without knowing yourselves as hearers, that is, without knowing that it is you who hear it, but, that at another moment you remember that it was really yourselves who heard the lecture. Now, how can it be possible for any one to remember anything without actually knowing it? Remembering is recognition, and there can be no recognition without cognition. To say, therefore, that one remembers anything without knowing it, is to say that one knows it without knowing it, which is absurd. Our philosophers are therefore quite right in thinking that self-knowledge is the necessary condition of all other knowledge, and we shall see presently that it is a most important truth of Epistemology and the very basis of a true Ontology.

Now, having enunciated this fundamental principle of Epistemology, our philosophers do not further trouble themselves with the details of

the science. They do not, for instance, deduce, like Kant, the twelve categories of the Understanding, namely, Unity, Plurality, Totality; Affirmation, Negation, Limitation; Substance, Causality, Reciprocity; Possibility, Actuality and Necessity, from this fundamental principle of self-consciousness and show how these are employed in our knowledge of Nature. But though confining themselves to the first principle, they are enabled, by means of it, to make the transition from Epistemology to Ontology, from knowledge to reality, if they are at all aware of a transition. If we cannot know objects without knowing ourselves, it follows that we cannot think of objects without thinking of ourselves. Objects, therefore, can be known and thought of only in relation to a subject; and if it is only from our knowledge and thought that we are entitled to assert anything concerning the existence and nature of things, it follows that we can assert the existence of things and their properties only in relation to a subject. It is only as objects of knowledge to a conscious being that we can know, think and believe things to exist. In other words, it is only in knowledge, in consciousness, and in this sense, in a knowing, conscious being, that we can know, think and believe things to exist. Now, knowledge or consciousness constitutes the very nature, the very essence, as it were, of

a knowing being, a mind or spirit. If it be true, therefore, that things exist only in relation to mind, the same truth may be stated in the form—‘Things exist in mind or spirit.’ The ‘in relation to’ bears the same sense as the ‘in.’ We find, therefore, this latter form of the truth preferred almost everywhere in Vedāntic works. Our philosophers saw the truth of Idealism—the relativity of subject and object, mind and matter, as much as Western thinkers, and stated it clearly, if somewhat crudely. Idealistic expressions are scattered throughout the *Upanishads*. I shall quote only two or three. The *Aitareya Upanishad*, for example, after enumerating the principal classes of objects, animate and inanimate, says :—“All this is produced by Reason and rests in Reason ; and Reason is Brahman.” (III. 3.) The *Prasna* prefaces an enumeration of things with the statement :—“As, my dear, birds take shelter in trees for rest, so all that rests in the Supreme Self.” (IV. 7.) The *Katha* says :—“This Person, who wakes while all persons sleep, making one desirable object after another, that alone is bright, that is Brahman, that verily is called the Immortal. In it rest all the worlds, and none go beyond it. This is that.” (II. 2.8.)

The question now is, what sort of Idealism is it that the Vedānta teaches ? Idealism is of three kinds, Subjective, Objective, and Absolute. To say

that objects exist in relation to individual minds only, is subjective Idealism. To say, for instance, that the paper before me is an aggregate or series of sensations in my mind and nothing more, is to speak like a Subjective Idealist. To say that these sensations are produced by the Divine Mind, which is outside my mind and in which there are ideas corresponding to my ideas, is Objective Idealism. Again, to say that the paper indeed is constituted by ideas, but that these ideas exist in an Infinite Mind and it is these very ideas of the Divine Mind, and not their ectypes or reflections, that I know, is Absolute Idealism. Now, it is evidently this last-mentioned species of Idealism that the Vedānta teaches. This is proved (1) negatively by its saying nothing as to the objects of our perception being reflections or representations of ideas existing in a Mind external to ours, and (2) positively by its oft-repeated identification of the individual mind with the Universal. I need not quote utterances teaching this unity. I shall rather refer to a remarkable controversy in the *Brahma Sūtras* between the author and his commentator, Sankarāchārya, on the one side and Buddhist Sensationalists on the other. These Sensationalists are exact counterparts of their youngest brothers, the British Sensationalists, the followers of David Hume. Like the latter, they at first reason like Idealists,

arguing that nothing can exist independently of mind, that everything is an idea or sensation in the mind, and then turn round and say that the mind itself is nothing but a series of perishing sensations. Sankara seems fully aware of their tactics, and so does not give them any handle, so to say. It might be expected that, in so far as the Buddhists reason like Idealists, saying that everything is in mind, Sankara, as an Idealist himself, would agree with them and make common cause with them against Dualists,—against people who give an independent existence to matter. But he does nothing of the kind ; he rather speaks like a Dualist and stands up for the independent existence of matter. This may seem surprising, and an English writer on the philosophy of the Vedānta actually accuses Sankara of inconsistency in thus playing the Dualist while controverting Buddhists and avowing himself an Idealist while defending Monism. But I think such an accusation to be based on a misapprehension. If the Buddhists were real Idealists, if in saying that everything is in mind, they really understood mind in its true sense, Sankara, as a Vedāntist, would have nothing to say against them. But by 'mind,' by '*viññāna*,' the term used by them, they mean only a transient act of perception. Their Idealism consists in saying that an object exists only in relation to an act of

perceiving on our part, and that such an act ceases immediately after it has taken place. According to them, the world is nothing but a series of such acts—*kshanika vijñānas*, as they call them. It is clear that a Metaphysician and Monist like Sankara could not have anything common with such out-and-out Sensationalists. It is therefore not at all surprising, when one really understands the nature of the controversy, that Sankara should say, in reply to his opponents, that things do exist outside *vijñānas*, independently of *vijñānas*, independently, that is, of those transient acts of perception by which individual minds know them.

The subject of contention between Sensationalists like the Buddhists and Rationalists like Sankara is this : When I perceive the book before me, when I see and touch it, does the object of my knowledge consist in an act or a series of acts on my part, those implied in my seeing the colour of the book, feeling its hardness and smoothness and so on, or is the object something which is distinguishable from these acts, which existed before these acts took place, and which continues when they cease ? That a number of mental changes do take place when we perceive an object like this, and that it is through these changes that the object is revealed to us, Sankara does not deny. But he says, in entire agreement with

the dictates of common sense, that it is not these acts which constitute the object. Far from being constituted by these, it is rather the object that makes the acts possible. It is not because we perceive it that the object exists, but it is rather because the object exists that we perceive it. But because the object exists independently of our acts of perception, it does not follow that it exists independently of a witness—a knowing subject ; and so Sankara, while carefully steering clear of the plausibilities of an easy-going Sensationalism trying to pass off as true Idealism, makes good his own position that all objects, including the acts of perception which the Buddhists identify with the mind, are relative to a permanent witness or subject. He shows too that the Buddhistic substitute for this permanent subject, *ālayavijñāna*, a continuous series of sensations represented as the support of particular sensations, is not an adequate explanation of experience, that it is only a permanent Mind existing in past, present and future, a Mind in which the past, though past as an event, is yet present as a fact,—that it is only such a mind that can satisfactorily explain such facts of consciousness as recognition, memory and the like. I shall close this subject with an extract from Sankara's commentary on the 31st aphorism of the 2nd pāda, Chapter II, of the

Brahma Sūtras. The refutation of Buddhist Sensationalism will be found with all its details in the commentary on the 26th to 32nd aphorisms of the páda. On the *ālayavijñāna* of the Buddhists, Sankara says ;—

“What you call the *ālayavijñāna* and conceive as the support of mental impressions, cannot be, any more than the *pravṛtṭi vijñāna* (noticed above), the support of impressions, because you admit it to be momentary and therefore impermanent. For, unless there exists one relating principle in the past, present and future, one which is unchangeable and sees all things, the facts of remembrance, recognition &c., which depend upon mental impressions, requiring space, time and occasional cause, cannot be explained. If, on the other hand, you admit your *ālayavijñāna* to be something permanent, you abandon your own doctrine of the impermanence of everything.”* One cannot but be reminded by all this of the way in which Green, the British Idealist, shows the necessity of an Eternal Consciousness to account for experience.

Now, Idealistic systems labour under a difficulty which, however, some of these systems seems not to be sensible of. It is this. An Idealistic explanation of Nature requires, not only a permanent

* Professor Thibaut's Translation.

Mind as the support of the permanent ideas implied in the existence of the cosmos, but also a changing mind to account for the changes of Nature. The relation of these two minds or aspects of the same mind,—if that is the doctrine upheld,—is a point of no less difficulty. In the systems of Berkerley and Kant, I do not find any recognition of this difficulty nor any attempt to solve it, so that the facts of creation and change remain quite unexplained, and leave the mind in a state of utter dissatisfaction as regards the philosophical value of these systems. The question is, if everything is relative to mind, to what mind are the changes of Nature relative? Changes of which we are cognisant may be explained as changes in our individual minds. But it is only of an infinitesimal portion of cosmic changes that we are cognisant. While we remain shut up in our rooms, the air blows, the ocean roars, the sun diffuses heat and light, the heavenly bodies go on revolving, and so on. Of what mind are these the changes? The late Professor Green, whom I have already named, seems to have fully grasped the importance of the problem, and he solves it by postulating a Divine Sensibility, a changing aspect of the Divine Mind, in addition to its eternal, unchanging aspect. As Professor Green's solution is embodied in a few lines only, I shall take the liberty of quoting them. They

occur in one of his lectures on the philosophy of Kant published in the second volume of his works. He says: "Sensibility is the condition of existence in time, of there being events related to each other as past, present and future. Ask yourself what meaning the terms 'now' and 'then' have except as derived from relation between a perpetually vanishing consciousness and one that is permanent, and you find they have none. Time is simply the relation between any 'now' and 'then'." Then, after giving a number of illustrations, Professor Green continues: "But all these expressions about 'events' and 'happening' and 'taking place' imply or derive their meaning from a sensibility of which the perpetually vanishing modes are held together by a subject equally present to and distinguishing itself from all of them. Thus it appears that changes and the relation of before and after between changes, presuppose a sensibility determined by reason. Just as each man in fact can only think a past before he was by throwing back his sensibility ('If I had been there, I should have seen it,') so the possibility of changes prior to the existence of feeling on earth or anywhere else must have lain in a sensibility which never was not, in such sensibility as is related to a self-distinguishing subject. Such sensibility is the eternal condition of time. Out of it, in relation to reason, arises the eternal

fact of change or 'nature' carrying with it the contradiction of determination by endless antecedents. Such 'nature' is at once not God and that without which God would not be what he is."

It seems almost impossible to exaggerate the philosophical value of these suggestive remarks. They seem to remove a heap of difficulties from the Idealistic explanation of the universe and to give a remarkable fulness and satisfactoriness to that explanation. But does it remove all difficulties? Does the postulation of an abstract sensibility in the Divine Mind meet all requirements? Can cosmic changes be interpreted in terms of mere sensation? That they cannot be so interpreted, is indirectly admitted by Green himself when he says that "now" and 'then' have a meaning which is derived from relation between a perpetually vanishing consciousness and one that is permanent." Changes, then, are changes in a consciousness, and not merely modes of a sensibility. Green, the Idealist, would be the first to tell us that mere sensations are nothing. Thought and sensation are indeed distinguishable, but they are not separable; there can be no sensation without thought—without such conceptions of the understanding as causality, substantiality, reciprocity &c. Cosmic changes, therefore, like the changes of our individual consciousness, are not

mere passing sensations ; they must be conceived as ideas appearing in and disappearing from a mind. Consider, gentlemen, what these sounds,—sounds uttered by me—are to you. They are ideas—sensuous matter organized by the laws of thought—formed objects of knowledge. They appear before minds previously ignorant of them, and when they cease, they disappear from these minds. Cosmic changes, if they are to be conceived at all, must be conceived like these. The gradual growth of a tree, for instance, the appearance of its different stages one after another, can be conceived only as the appearance of objects one after another to a mind either unaware of them before their appearance or aware of them only by way of imperfect anticipation, but not conscious of them in all their fulness. Such a mind is surely not the Absolute Mind to which things must be eternally present in all the fulness of their properties and modifications. Such a mind is, again, far more than a mere sensibility. In its essence, it must have all the characteristics of our minds, sensibility, understanding and reason ; but in its objective contents and capacities it must be inconceivably greater than any individual mind, however great, since it underlies and explains all cosmic changes, far and near,—past, present and future. It is such a mind that the Vedānta postulates

under the name of Brahmá or Hiranyagarbha. Of this cosmic mind I say in my *Hindu Theism*: "This world-soul, implied in finitude and change, and postulated under various names in the *Upanishads* and their commentaries, is significantly called the Kárya-Brahman, the Effect-God, as distinguished from the Kárana Brahman, the Causal God or Isvara. He is also called the Apra-Brahman, the Lower God, as distinct from Para-Brahman, the Higher Brahman, the God that transcends finite existence. This Effect-God, then, the first and highest emanation from the Supreme Cause, is the totality of created existence—the whole of which so called inanimate objects as well as finite souls are parts. Things that seem to us quite apart from any conscious life, events that appear to be entirely objective,—all cosmic changes in fact—are apprehended in the all-containing consciousness of Brahmá. It is to be remembered, however, that these distinctions of Brahman, Isvara and Brahmá are only so many standpoints from which the same Being is looked at. They do not imply any divisions in him who, though variously contemplated, is one and indivisible. It is the same Being that, contemplated as absolutely self-identical, as one and without a second, is Brahman; as the cause of the world, Isvara; and as the conscious totality of all effects, Brahmá or Hiranyagarbha."

LECTURE IV

THE VEDANTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

In discussing the Vedántic philosophy of nature, we have partly seen what the Vedánta teaches as regards the nature of spirit and its relation to matter. We have seen how, according to it, self-knowledge is the basis of the knowledge of other things, and how this fundamental principle leads it to a species of Absolute Idealism. But the subject in hand, the nature of mind—mind in its finite and infinite aspects—is so important, and the Vedántic doctrine of spirit is, to ordinary intellects, so difficult to be understood, and has been, besides, subject to so much misapprehension, that we should not be contented with the imperfect discussion we have had of the subject in the last lecture, but should have a separate lecture devoted to its exposition.

The Vedántic philosophy of spirit is known to be monistic. The Vedánta recognises only one Spirit pervading the universe. The individual is, according to it, identical with the Universal. This Monism is, on the one hand, praised by some

philosophical critics as the glory of the Vedánta, and on the other hand cried down by many students of philosophy as its disgrace, as the source of philosophic conceit, spiritual dryness and even moral corruption: It often seems to me that both the praise and the blame proceed from an imperfect and more or less incorrect idea of what Vedántic Monism really is. The praise often ignores the tentative and imperfect form in which the Vedánta formulates the unity of God and man, while the blame scarcely takes cognisance of the fact that it is the infinite and absolute element in man, and not his finiteness, relativity and individuality, which the Vedánta pronounces to be identical with God, and that there are utterances in the Vedánta, unmistakable in their meaning, according to which the individuality of man remains in tact even after he has attained the final unity with the Universal Soul. The questions, therefore, that suggest themselves to us, while we are studying the present subject, are (1) What is the Vedántic idea of spirit? (2) In what does the individuality of the human spirit, its finiteness and its distinction from other finite spirits and the Infinite Spirit consist? and (3) In what sense is the individual soul identical with the Universal?

Now, as to the Vedántic idea of spirit, here is the clearest definition of mind I can find in the

Upanishads. The Aitareya Upanishad, III. 1. 2, says :—"What is the self on which we meditate? Which among these things is that self? It is verily that by which one sees visible objects, by which one hears sound, by which one smells smell, by which one knows a good and a bad taste. This, what is called the heart, this, what is called the sensorium, consciousness, activity, ideation, reason, intellect, knowledge, power of grasping, attention, meditation, alertness, memory, determination, resolution, vitality, desire, will—all these are names of reason."

Now, this definition of mind may seem very commonplace and not quite clear, though we shall see by and by that there is more in it than what at first appears. I quote it in order to show, what may be doubted by certain critics of the philosophy of the *Upanishads*, that their authors were as clearly aware as ourselves of the fact that spirit is the knowing principle in man, that it is a subject and not a mere substance, and that the distinction of subject and object is the key to ancient Hindu Philosophy, as it is, according to Dr. James Martineau, the key to the philosophy of modern Europe. The first part of the definition quoted speaks of the self as,—not the instrument of knowing, as the word *by* may lead us to suppose,—but as that of which the existence in us makes us

knowing beings. The second part enumerates a few internal manifestations of spirit.

I shall now quote a definition of spirit from Sankaráchárya in which the distinction of subject and object, or rather of matter and mind, is more clearly drawn than in the above. Aphorism 54 of the third páda, third chapter, of the *Brahma Sūtras* incidentally refers to the materialistic view of mind as a function of matter and refutes it. Sankara, in his commentary on the aphorism, says among other things :—

“We must further ask our opponent what he conceives to be the nature of this consciousness which he assumes to spring from the elements. The materialists do not admit the existence of anything beyond the four elements. If they say that consciousness is the perception of the elements and whatever springs from the elements, then our reply is that the elements and their products being the objects of consciousness, the latter cannot be a quality of the former, for it is contradictory that anything should act upon itself. Fire, though ever so hot, cannot burn itself. A dancer, though ever so well-trained, cannot mount on his own shoulders. So, consciousness, if it were a quality of the elements and their products, could not make these its objects. But consciousness does actually make external and internal things its objects. Hence

as the existence of the consciousness of the elements and their products is admitted, so its distinction from them should also be admitted. And as consciousness is the essence of the self we speak of, it must be distinct from the body ; and, as consciousness is uniform (under varying conditions) it must also be eternal. This conclusion also follows from the fact that the self, even when it has passed through another state of consciousness, recognises itself as the perceiver (of a past state,) which makes remembrance and such other states possible." *

The truth insisted upon in the latter part of the extract read by me—the truth of the unity and permanence of the knowing subject,—will be made clearer if I quote another passage from Sankara, a passage in which this truth is expressly dealt with. In discussing Buddhist Nihilism, the doctrine of universal flux, in his commentary on aphorism 25, 2nd chapter, 2nd páda, of the *Brahma Sūtras*, Sankara says :—"The Nihilist, who maintains that everything is momentary, would have to affirm the momentariness of the knowing subject also ; that is, however, not possible on account of the remembrance of the original perception. Remembrance

* Prof. Thibaut's Translation (somewhat altered).

is the act of recalling what takes place after the act of direct perception, and this is possible only to the same person who is the perceiver, for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the notion expressed in the sentences 'I saw that thing and now I see this thing' unless the person seeing the former and latter were the same? Besides, it is known to very one that the agent in seeing and remembering is the same,—thus 'I saw that,' 'I see this.' If there were different agents in the two cases, the notion arising would be, 'I remember what another person saw. But no such notion does arise. When, on the other hand, such a notion does arise, every body knows that the agents in seeing and remembering are different, as is exemplified in the case, 'I remember that that person saw that.' In the case under discussion, however, the Nihilist himself knows himself to be the same agent in both seeing and remembering,—thus 'I saw that'—and does not deny his seeing by saying 'I did not see,' any more than he says that fire is not hot and does not give light. Thus, only one agent being connected with the two actions of seeing and remembering, the Nihilist should abandon his doctrine of flux. And recognising his successive cognitions as his own, as belonging to one agent, and admitting all his

past cognitions from the moment of his birth to his last breath to be due to one agent, how can the Nihilist fail to be ashamed of his doctrine of flux? Should he maintain that the recognition of the agent as one and the same is due to the similarity of the cognitions, our reply to him would be that the cognition of similarity being dependent on two things, and there being, for the advocate of the doctrine of flux, no one subject to take cognisance of the two similar things, it is meaningless for him to talk of the above cognition as due to similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind taking cognisance of the similarity of two successive moments, then the existence of the same thing for two moments being admitted, his doctrine of flux would be contradicted. Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different cognition not due to cognising two successive moments, our reply would be that it cannot be so, as different terms viz. 'to that' and 'this' are actually used. If the judgment of similarity were a different judgment (not concerned with two similar things), the expression 'this is similar to that' would be meaningless and we would, in the case, speak only of similarity (and not similarity to anything else.) Nor can the judgment in question be reasonably represented as due to similarity, for identity and not similarity is the

fact cognised. With regard to an external thing, an illusion being possible, a doubt such as 'Is this that or similar to that?' is possible. But in the case of the knowing subject, a doubt such as 'Am I that person or similar to that?' never arises, for there is, in his case, the sure judgment of identity, namely, 'I who saw the thing yesterday is the same person that remembers it to-day.' On this ground also, then, the Nihilistic doctrine must be pronounced unreasonable." *

Having seen what the general idea of spirit is, as held by the Vedānta, I shall now try to answer the second of the questions proposed by me, namely, "What constitutes the individuality of the finite spirit?" This question is answered by the Vedāntic doctrine of the five *koshas* or sheaths of the soul. The finite soul is, according to the Vedānta, essentially one with the Infinite. Its finiteness consists in its having a body of gross matter and four additional involucra of finer substance. These five sheaths, that is, five individualising powers concealing the essential infinitude of the self, are the *annamaya kosha* or the nutrimentitious or material sheath; the *prāṇamaya kosha* or the vital sheath; the *manomaya kosha* or the sensuous sheath; the *vijñānamaya kosha*, or the conceptual sheath; and the *ānandamaya kosha*, or the blissful

* Prof. Thibaut's Translation (somewhat altered.)

sheath. These sheaths are dealt with in the order in which they are here mentioned and in some detail in the *Taittiriya Upanishad*, though the statement is highly poetical, whereas in some of the other *Upanishads* they are only mentioned incidentally and in an unsystematic manner. Later Vedāntic works try to give a systematic and rational exposition of the doctrine, but I have failed to discover anything like a psychological method in these expositions, so that it is impossible to trace an exact correspondence between the views of these Vedāntic writers and that taken by modern thinkers. The guess may, however, be hazarded with some confidence that the *prāṇamaya kośha* corresponds to the modern conception of life, as something higher and more complex than matter, to which the *annamaya kośha* clearly corresponds, and that the *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya* and *ānandamaya kośhas* correspond to sense, intellect and emotion respectively, though emotion, which includes both pleasurable and painful feelings, is really more comprehensive than the last *kośha*, which is confined to pleasurable feelings only. Body, life, sense, intellect and emotion, therefore, constitute the individuality of a finite being, and when the gross material body perishes at death, the finite soul is conceived as continuing its individual existence

in connection with its *linga* or *sūkshma śarīra*, i.e. subtle body formed of the four remaining principles of individualisation. Let us, however, discuss these four principles a little more fully.

Prāna or life exists in five forms, *prāna*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*, and performs all the vital functions of the body, such as respiration, digestion and the movements of the limbs. The peculiar function of each of the five vital airs named is not clearly laid down. At death, these airs, though their actions cease, are supposed to persist as powers and to be re-incarnated with the finite soul, or carried with it to the Divine regions, according as the fate of the soul may happen to be.

We then come to the third. We have described *manas* or *manomaya kosha* as sense, and much that Vedāntic writers have said of the functions of *manas* confirms our representation. But sense, though distinguishable, is not separable from intellect, so that neither our thinkers nor those of the West have been able to describe the functions of these two faculties without confusing them. But our philosophers have been so far consistent and true to the facts of mental life as to represent sense as the principle of change and differentiation, and intellect as that of unity and permanence. The sight of this piece of paper before me, to take an example, is commonly represented as a matter of

sense. The impressions received by me in perceiving the colour of the paper are momentary and evanescent feelings that continually go and come, and are no more permanent and identical than the fleeting moments of time. But there are permanent and self-identical elements involved in this experience without which it would be impossible. The ideas of 'white' and 'black' and that of 'colour,' for example, are such elements. They are principles of unity and not fleeting sensations. We shall see that these unities, which underlie our sensuous life, are due to the permanence and self-identity of the knowing subject in the midst of the evanescence of varying sensations. For two sensuous experiences to be referred to 'colour,' it is necessary for both to be present to one, unchanging and self-identical subject. In the same manner the distinction of 'black' and 'white,' or that of 'colour' and 'smell,' depends upon the same condition. But unity, permanence, identity etc. are functions not of sense, but of intellect; not of *manas*, but of *vijnāna*. All lower functions of the mind are dependent on the higher, and this truth finds recognition in the doctrine held by Vedāntic writers, that every higher *kosha* interpenetrates and fills the lower.

The fourth, the *vijnānamya kosha* or intellect is, therefore, the principle of unity. To it belongs the

function of referring attributes to substances, effects to causes, changes to permanent agents or or subjects of change, and finally all mental phenomena, all feelings, thoughts, desires and actions, to a permanent, self-identical and self-conscious subject. On all mental experiences it impresses the form 'I' or 'mine'. 'It is I,' it says, 'that feel, think, desire and act.' 'These things, these feelings, thoughts, actions &c., are mine,' it says. The *viññānamaya kosha*, it will thus be seen, constitutes the proper individuality of the finite soul. Until we come to it, we do not see its true nature as spirit, as a self-conscious being referring all experiences to itself and by that very act distinguishing itself from them.

The fifth, *ānandamaya kosha*, need not detain us. It is, to our philosophers, the capacity of the soul to enjoy happiness. It manifests itself indistinctly in every mortal pleasure, even the lowest, whereas its highest manifestation is seen in moments of direct God-consciousness, when the one, undivided, infinite Self is seen both within and without, filling all time, space and being. Perhaps it is with reference to this highest manifestation of the *kosha* that it is placed above the *viññānamaya*, which, though conscious of itself, and by that very consciousness implicitly conscious of the Absolute, may not always, as we shall see presently,

be aware of the full implication of self-consciousness.

We see, then, what the individual self is. It is a living, feeling, thinking, self-conscious being, referring all its experiences to itself as to a centre or source. Now, it is this necessary self-reference, the reference of all objects to a subject, that constitutes, in one sense, the limitation, and in another sense, the infinitude of the self according as it interprets to itself the meaning of this reference. This twofold interpretation we must carefully discuss and distinguish if we are to understand the Vedāntic philosophy of spirit.

Let us see what is meant by the reference of objects to a subject and what characteristics of the self are revealed by this reference. Let us take a most familiar example,—the knowledge of the book before me. Now, this fact of knowledge may be represented in two very different ways. In one aspect of it, it is a series of mental states, impermanent and evanescent. The sight of the colour of the book is an event ; it takes place at a particular moment of time and ceases at another moment. The touching of the paper, feeling its smoothness and hardness, and knowing the other qualities of the thing by the various modes of observation and experiment—are all events of a like nature. And so are remembering these events,

connecting one with the other and drawing conclusions from such connections. These events have indeed each a subjective and an objective aspect. There is "I" on the one hand and the colour seen by me on the other. There is the feeling of hardness on the one hand, and the "I" to which it belongs, on the other. And so on. But the consciousness of self—the reference to self—that accompanies the knowledge of each object, is itself an event when looked at from the standpoint we are considering. The reference of the colour of the book to my self is an event distinct from the like reference of its hardness, and the former may cease when the latter takes place ; and when I turn to another object, and forget the present one, the self-consciousness accompanying the consciousness of the object disappears as much as the latter consciousness. Looked at from this standpoint, therefore, consciousness is a series of events; a process; a stream. This applies to both our waking and our dreaming life,—the unity and difference of which two modes of consciousness are drawn in all Vedāntic works, though, for our present purpose, the subject need not be touched upon. So far as consciousness is a stream, a process of change, waking and dreaming are identical. But what of the state of dreamless sleep? What becomes then of the stream or process which we call our con-

sciousness? Does any consciousness of objects remain then? Does self-consciousness persist in the condition? These questions, it is evident, must be answered in the negative. There are indeed some Vedāntists who fancy that self-consciousness persists in the state of dreamless sleep, which they describe as one of intense joy. The authors of the *Upanishads* are better psychologists, and affirm, with the disappearance of object-consciousness, that of self-consciousness also in its individual form. (See, e. g. *Prāsnopanishad*, V.) They describe this disappearance as the merging of the individual self in the Universal,—the truth and meaning of which we shall consider hereafter. If consciousness, then, is a series of states or events, and, from the standpoint from which we are considering it, it does not seem to be anything more, the series evidently comes to an end every time we fall soundly asleep. If you say the series implies a connecting link,—the changes imply something that is changed but yet persists in the midst of its changes,—the hypothesis may be granted; but it must be seen that the supposed link or persisting substance does not explain anything. If it is something which becomes conscious at times and ever and anon lapses into unconsciousness, at which times we do not know what it is

but the merest possibility of future consciousness, we cannot be sure even of its identity. How can we know that the same substance that falls asleep to-day reawakes to-morrow? If the fact is proved by the identity of self-consciousness, the consciousness, for example, that I am the same person to-day that I was to-morrow, the continued existence of self-consciousness and with that the persistence of the consciousness of to-morrow as an object must be taken for granted; that is to say, the self must be conceived as an ever-waking, ever-conscious being. But have we not just seen that the self, conceived as an individual, as subject to constant changes of mental states, is subject also to sleep and oblivion,—to constant lapses of consciousness? It will thus be seen that the conception of the self as such an individual cannot explain even its own persistence and self-identity. Far less can it explain the world as a system of permanent, self-identical objects and persons. The individual, we shall see, can be explained only in the light of the Universal; the temporal only in the light of the Eternal.

Let us now look at the same facts from a different standpoint, and without denying the truth of what has been just said, see if there is more in consciousness than appears on a superficial view of it. Recurring to the same example, the per-

ception of this book, let us ask ourselves whether the sight of its colour is merely an event. As I have pointed out more than once before, if the perception of colour were a mere event, there would not be such a thing as the idea of colour. The sensations involved in the perception pass away, but colour as a permanent idea remains. The momentary acts of perception are interpreted as the perceptions of an object, an object which is not momentary, and the permanent object or idea appears as the idea of a permanent subject. The subject distinguishes itself as a permanent knowing being, with a permanent idea, in the midst of its momentary acts of perception. It is this permanent subject-object that makes the consciousness of change possible. The mind could not know its perceptions to be momentary—as one after another,—if it were itself momentary, if it were indistinguishable from the passing perceptions. To know the event A to be past when B takes place, it is necessary for the knower not only to persist and be present to B, but to retain a knowledge of A as a permanent idea. The knowledge of events, therefore, implies the knowledge of the knowing self as a conscious being with permanent ideas. The perception of the colour of the book before me, then, implies—not by way of inference, but as a fact directly involved

in it and making it possible,—a permanent knowing self with a permanent idea or object known. Perception is, on the one hand, an event in time, non-existent both before its happening and non-existent after; on the other, it is the manifestation of a Reality which is not in time,—the self-revelation of a permanent subject-object. The fact is not that there is at first only a sensuous event and then another followed by it and then thirdly a connection and comparison of the two events resulting in the formation of the idea of colour; for a mere sensuous event not present to a permanent and self-distinguishing consciousness could by no means bring itself into connection with another such event and give rise to a permanent idea. An event as such could only come and go, and would be incapable of being related to another event. It is only because an event involves something more than itself, it is because it is the self-manifestation of a Reality, that it admits of being connected, in idea, with other events. The manifestation of a Reality, of consciousness as a subject-object, can indeed, as an event, come after any number of events, events which, looked at from the standpoint of Physics or Physiology, are merely physical, or merely sensuous—though ultimately no events can be merely such; but the formation of consciousness

—of the idea of self and the idea of an object—out of such events, is an impossibility ; for consciousness is not an event, and the self-distinction, the unity and difference of subject and object involved in it, is an ultimate, unanalysable, underrived element in it. The perception of colour, therefore, while it is an event on the one hand, an event which never happened before and will never happen again in future, is, on the other, the revelation of a Reality which is not in time, which, as an ultimate, underived unity, has existed in all past time and will exist during all futurity, if past and future are at all to be spoken of in connection with it. It is the same with all else that we perceive. The size, form, weight and other qualities of the book are, from one point of view,—the point of view of empirical psychology—mere sensuous events—passing sensations or perceptions ; but from another and not less firm standpoint, eternal ideas in an eternal Mind.

Let us now look at the object in another aspect of it—let us consider it as an object occupying space. As a visible, tangible, and resisting object it occupies a certain extent of space, a definite position in relation to other objects and a definite portion of the universal space in which the material world exists. Now, it should be seen that just as the consciousness of change and time

involves the consciousness of an unchangeable Reality above time, without beginning and without end, so the consciousness of space involves the consciousness of a Reality above space. The knowledge of things or points as external to one another involves the knowledge of a Reality which is not external to anything—which is all-comprehensive and complete in itself. The idea of limitation is correlative to that of the Unlimited. In knowing the book as a spatial object, then, the self knows itself as above space. Just as the knowledge of successive events would not be possible unless the knowing subject distinguished itself from the events as not successive, as not in time, so the consciousness of the book as consisting of spatial parts would not be possible if the conscious subject did not distinguish itself from the parts and hold them together in the undivided unity of its consciousness. The knowledge of the book as existing in spatial relation to other objects would not be possible if the knowing self were confined to a particular portion of space. In knowing this object in space, then, my self knows itself as not in space. In knowing the limitations of this object, it knows itself as unlimited.

Now, it will be seen that the point we are now dealing with is of the utmost importance.

On its proper understanding depends a correct comprehension of the Vedāntic philosophy of mind. The key to the oft-repeated affirmation of the identity of man and God, to utterances like *So'hamasmi*, I am he, *Aham Brahmdsmi*, I am Brahman, *Ayamātma Brahma*, this self is Brahman, *Tat tvam asi*, Thou art that—is here. In knowing our true Self, we know a Reality which is infinite and eternal—a Reality for which all things in space and time exist and which is absolutely one and undivided. When, in referring all objects to a subject, we are contented with a subject which we conceive as limited in time and space, to a subject which has other subjects co-ordinate to it, we really stop half-way and forget for a time the true meaning of such reference. As I have said in my *Hindu Theism*, while speaking of the self and its sheaths, "In referring objects to a subject, we refer things relative to something absolute, something which exists for itself and not for anything else. It is not to a point in space, an event in time or to an aggregate of feeling and ideas, that we refer objects; for every one of these carry with it the idea of relativity, of limitation, of being an object to another, but to something the very essence of which consists in being an object unto itself, in being absolute and therefore unlimited by any-

thing else. When, therefore, the subject is conceived as limited in time and space, and by other subjects, the real meaning of the distinction of subject and object is forgotten. The subject, in its entire reality, cannot but be absolutely one and infinite. A finite, individual subject, therefore, with many other individuals co-ordinate to it, can mean only a certain reflection or reproduction of the one, undivided, universal Subject in connection with a certain aggregate of thoughts and feelings. In such a conception of the Absolute Subject as reflected in and so far identified with a certain aggregate of ideas, the individuality or or finiteness attaches, it will be seen, not to the Subject itself, which illumines this as well every other aggregate, but to the particular aggregate with which it is identified. The real subject to which thought, out of an internal necessity, refers all objects, internal and external, is, by the same necessity, thought of as one, undivided, all-comprehending." In another portion of the same book, in speaking of the Theosophy of the *Upanishads*, I have said: "In thinking of objects, we necessarily think of a subject. In knowing and thinking of the limitations of object, even of mutually exclusive thinking objects or minds, we necessarily do so from the standpoint of a subject which transcends all limitations.—we do so only by iden-

tifying ourselves with a Universal which, since it is the necessary condition of knowing and thinking limits, cannot itself be limited. In other words, it is not any individual,—any particular centre of spiritual activity as distinguished from other centres,—that knows and thinks limits as such, but the Infinite itself that does so; and in as much as the Infinite thinks my thoughts for me, I am one with it."

We see then, that the individual as such, the *viñānamaya kośa* or *viñānatma*, is not real in itself, but is so only in relation to,—only as the manifestation in time and space of—a Reality which transcends time and space, which is essentially universal. Now, the difficulties in the way of reconciling this view with the apparent finitude of what we call our self, are doubtless obvious, but they do not seem to be insuperable. One of these difficulties has already been hinted at, and its solution also indirectly suggested. It is that which arises from the self in us being apparently subject to sleep and forgetfulness, and the solution suggested is that the implied limitation is only apparent and not real,—that the self is really ever-waking. On this point, I shall make an extract from an article on "The Eternal in Man" contributed by me to the *Oriental*: "After enjoying a night's profound sleep, in which my self-consciousness and conscious-

ness of objects were both suspended, (otherwise it would not be sleep—not, at any rate, profound sleep) I wake, let us suppose, and recognise myself as the same person that I was before I went to sleep, perceive this table before me and remember that the same person that perceived it before sleep perceives it now again. Now, what does this temporary suspense of consciousness mean? Does it simply mean that the consciousness which is in me, the consciousness which I call mine, ceased for a time to manifest itself through my phenomenal life, through the organs of my body,—ceased for a while to use my eyes, my ears, my brain, as organs of self-manifestation,—but that nevertheless it continued to be conscious, losing none of its contents as a consciousness? Or, does it mean that it altogether ceased to be conscious, losing all its contents as a consciousness, and thus reducing itself to nothing or to a mere substance without attributes, or to something like an empty receptacle into which fresh materials could afterwards be thrown. If the latter were the case, then it is clear that there could be no such thing as recognition,—the recognition of self as the same before and after sleep and the recognition of objects as the same before and after sleep. In such a case self-consciousness, which is, according to supposition, a mere event, which comes to an end when

we fall asleep, could never come back. Self-consciousness after sleep would be quite a different thing from self-consciousness before sleep, and the two could as little be identified as two events occurring at different times. For the self to lose consciousness is really to cease to exist. But even if it be admitted for a moment that there is something more in the self than self-consciousness,—that, when it loses consciousness, it still exists as a substance, and that, having lost self-consciousness once, it can again become self-conscious,—it is nevertheless evident that if it lost self-consciousness in sleep, it would be impossible to recognise itself as the same self before and after sleep. The recognition of self implies the reproduction of self-consciousness as in time past and its association with self-consciousness as in time present, just as the recognition of objects implies the reproduction of the knowledge of past sensations and its association with that of present sensations. But if the self lost self-consciousness in sleep, its self-consciousness as in time past (which is supposed to be lost) could never be reproduced. But the fact is that our self-consciousness as before sleep *is* reproduced in us after sleep, and it is this reproduction alone that makes it possible for us to say that the self after sleep is the same self that it was before sleep,—that the same self that

perceived the table before sleep, perceives it also after sleep. It is evident, then, that our self-consciousness, with the consciousness of objects through which it realises itself, is not lost in sleep. If the self lost consciousness in sleep, sleep for it would be veritable death, and waking veritable rebirth, a fresh commencement of conscious life. The very fact, then, that waking is waking, and not rebirth, that it is not the fresh commencement, but the restoration, of all that we were conscious of before going to sleep, shows conclusively that in sleep we lose neither our self-consciousness nor our consciousness of objects. That, as individuals, we lose our consciousness—self-consciousness and object-consciousness both—is undoubted. But the individual loss of consciousness does not mean the absolute loss of consciousness. That the consciousness we call our own is not our individual property, but something in regard to which we are mere pensioners, as Emerson says, is seen most clearly in cases like this. In sleep and such other times, in which consciousness (in the individual form) is temporarily suspended, what actually takes place is, that the eternal, ever-waking Consciousness, which is in us as our consciousness, ceases to reveal itself through our organs of knowledge. Its re-appearance, after sleep, as our consciousness, with all its wonderful wealth of

knowledge, proves conclusively that while we, as individuals, sleep, the Life and Light of our being wakes and preserves in him all that we know—all that we are—through him."

The other difficulty about the Vedāntic doctrine of the identity of the Universal and the individual arises from the apparent limitation, in space, of the self in us. It is only a small portion of the world in space that appears to me now, the rest remaining apparently outside the consciousness I call mine. How can I say, then, it is suggested by common sense; that my consciousness is infinite and comprehends all things in space? And, since different objects or different portions of space are present to different minds, how can these minds be said to be essentially one? Now, the solution of this difficulty will be found in a correct apprehension of the difference which the Vedānta conceives to exist between the *vijñānatmans* or individual manifestations of the one undivided Self and this very Self in its absolute nature. The manifestations are confessedly finite—both in space and time—and plural—indefinitely plural. But it will be seen, when we dive deep into the ultimate conditions of knowledge and thought, that the individual selves or *vijñānatmans* welling up in portions of space cannot be known or thought of except as manifestations of one infinite, undivided Self. Different

spaces cannot be conceived—cannot be believed in—except as parts of one, undivided space, and this one, undivided space cannot be conceived—cannot be given any intelligible meaning to—except as related to one, indivisible, all-comprehending Mind. Not that an infinite Mind, numerically different from the individual minds, is conceived as making or supporting the latter, but that every individual mind, when it plunges deep into its essence, sees that individuality is only a contingent form—a form for its manifestation or reproduction, and does not enter into its inmost essence,—that this inmost essence is really infinite, enabling it to transcend its limitations as an individual and conceive of the whole world as an inter-related whole existing in relation to itself in its absolute nature. This twofold nature of the self in us,—its manifested and contingent character as an individual different from other individuals, and its unmanifested but essential character as the one, undivided Self of all—is the key to those utterances scattered throughout the *Upanishads*, which, representing the Divine Being now as identical with everything finite—and then again as not identical with anything—appear mutually contradictory, and offend common sense. They repel even philosophers who, contented with the difference and multiplicity appearing on the surface of Nature,

do not care to seek the ultimate explanation of knowledge and existence.

Various questions arise out of this doctrine of the unity and difference of the individual and the Universal,—questions which we must take up in our future lectures. I shall close the present one with a remark as to the method I have followed in expounding the Vedántic doctrine of the unity of the finite and the Infinite. The method is not wholly Vedántic. Neither the *rishis* nor their expounders, so far as I am acquainted with the writings of the latter, offer any demonstration of the cardinal principle of their philosophy—the unity of the individual and the universal self. And there can be, in fact, no demonstration, in the proper sense of the term, of a truth which is the presupposition of all knowledge—of all demonstration. But even of such a truth, an exposition,—a reasoned and analytic exposition—is possible. Attempts can be made to bring it home to thoughtful minds and remove the doubts which unreflecting common sense or critical scepticism suggests. Well, Vedántists, either ancient or mediæval, do not, as a rule, make such attempts, and where they do make them,—where they do employ some method of exposition, the method does not satisfy us, moderns. Thus the dialogues between Āruni and Svetaketu, between Sanatkumára and Nárada

and those between Prájapati and Indra in the *Chhândogya Upanishad*, and the discussions between Yájnavalkya and his many interlocutors in the *Brihadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, are such expositions. But they are more suggestive than convincing. They supply us with pregnant hints which, when developed by reflection, prove very helpful to us. In the exposition of Vedāntic Monism I have just given, an exposition for which I hold no one else than myself to be responsible, I have made the best use I could of such hints ; but I must confess, that though the truths expounded are surely those taught by the Vedāntic *rishis*—taught by them long before the thinkers of any other country had the faintest idea of them,—yet, in conceiving and developing the method I have adopted, I am, at least as much indebted to the followers of Kant of Hegel as to the authors and expounders of the Vedānta.

LECTURE V

SANKARACHARYA AND HIS UNQUALIFIED MONISM

I have already, in my first lecture, briefly indicated Sankarácárya's place in regard to the Vedánta and Vedantism. Before entering into the details of his philosophy—his peculiar presentation and exposition of Vedántic doctrine,—a short account of his life and work may be welcome to and perhaps even necessary for some of my hearers.*

There are various theories extant as to the date of Sankara's birth. Without discussing these conflicting opinions, I shall accept as true, for our present purpose, the one that is most widely received. According to this, Sankarácárya was born in the year 3889 of the Kali Era, corresponding to A. D. 799. Two places in the Deccan,—one a village named Káládi in Kerala, and another,

* Since the following short account of Sankara was written, several good biographies of him have been published both in this province and elsewhere. I may refer specially to *Srī Sankarácárya*, published by Messrs. Natesan & Co. of Madras, which, besides a detailed and interesting life of the theologian by a Madras scholar, contains a much fuller account of his philosophy by the present writer than that given in this lecture.

Chidamvara in Malabar—claim to be the birthplace of the great theologian. It seems probable that he was born in the one, and his family removed to the other while he was yet a child. Sankara's father belonged to a class of Bráhmanas called Námbudri, and a member of this honoured class has been, ever since Sankara's time, discharging the priestly functions of the Jyosi Matha in Kashmir, in accordance, perhaps, with a rule established by himself or one of his immediate followers. The name of his honoured father was Visvajit *alias* Sivaguru, and that of the mother, Visishtá. The pious couple seem to have got their illustrious son when both of them, specially the father, were very old, and this circumstance seems to have been taken advantage of by their castemen—at what period of Sankara's life it is difficult to say—to spread a rumour to the effect that the child was a natural one. Sankara's father died when he was about twelve, and no difficulty seems to have been experienced on the solemn occasion of his funeral and requiem ceremonies on account of any suspicion on the part of his caste people. But very different was the case when, long after this, the pious Vishishtá followed her husband to the other world. It is stated that the lady, having been excommunicated by her castemen for giving birth to an illegitimate child, as they suspected or

professed to suspect, they did not come to Sankara's assistance in performing her funeral ceremony, and the forsaken son had to perform it all alone. If one, at this distance of time, might speculate on the matter, it would seem, from the circumstances, that this story of Sankara's illegitimacy was an invention, that it was concocted after Visvajit's death, and at a time when Sankara had already achieved his wide-spread fame. Whether it is to be credited to his enemies or his friends and admirers, it is scarcely possible to ascertain. His reforming zeal and controversial warfare must have very early brought him into contact with many who were jealous of his intellectual superiority and indignant at the demolition of their philosophical systems at his hands. These, taking advantage of his being the child of his father's old age, may probably have attempted to make him an object of general contempt by throwing doubts on his legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not unlikely, that his followers, like those of Jesus Christ, invented the story of his having been born without a human father in order to establish his divinity—his being an incarnation of Siva—on a miraculous basis. It is said that this god, whose image used to be worshipped in Chidamvara, entered the womb of Visishtá one day in the presence of a large number of worshippers, in response

to her and her husband's earnest prayers and long-practised penances. This story of the miraculous birth of their great opponent could not of course be received with credence by his enemies ; it could only be interpreted in the light in which they seem to have interpreted it. Be that as it may, the childhood and education of Sankara were what could be expected of one whose writings continue to be deeply admired and appreciated by the most thoughtful of our race, both here and in the remote West, even after the lapse of twelve centuries. He went through the *upanayana* ceremony (*i. e.* presentation before a teacher of the Vedas) at eight, according to the rules of his caste ; and it is said that he mastered the four Vedas in the very first year of his initiation and was versed in all the important branches of Hindu learning when he was only twelve. It is also said, that the greatest of his works, his famous commentary on the *Prasthāna-trayam*, was written when he was only sixteen years old. These and other marvellous anecdotes connected with our philosopher's intellectual history will not appear incredible to any one who is familiar with the extraordinary and nevertheless genuine story of the precocity of John Stuart Mill, the great English philosopher. I may perhaps be allowed to say that I have personal experience of a boy who had, at eight, gone through the *Rāmāyana*, the

Mahābhārata and one or two of the *Purānas*, and who discussed theological problems with a wonderful earnestness. However, Sankara became a *sannyāsin* shortly after finishing his education and began his life-work. His mother, who was naturally opposed to his betaking himself to a mendicant's life, is said to have given her consent to it under peculiar circumstances. Once, when Sankara was returning home with his mother from a relative's place, he had to cross a river which was fordable when they began to cross it. But all on a sudden, when they were in the middle of the stream, the water began to increase. Sankara seized this opportunity of extorting his mother's consent to his becoming a *sannyāsin*. He told the terrified lady that if she gave her consent to his entering the order of mendicants, he would pray to God for the deliverance of both of them ; if not, both would be drowned by the swelling flood. The lady yielded, and Sankara, having carried her safely on his shoulders to the other side, took leave of her and got admitted into the monastic order.

The work which Sankara chose as the one great object of his labours, was the revival of the system of religion taught in the *Upanishads*, systematised in the *Brahma Sūtras* and made practical and popular in the *Bhagavadgītā*. He wrote commentaries on ten or eleven of the principal

Upanishads and on the two other works named. He is also said to have written a large number of original works, large and small, in exposition of his views. But of the vast number of books popularly ascribed to him, it is difficult to ascertain which are directly from his pen and which owe their origin to him only indirectly—having been written by his followers under the inspiration of his teachings. Some scholars seem to think that the three commentaries are the only works that may be pronounced to be his without doubt, and I propose, in these lectures, to confine my references and quotations in regard to Sankara's opinions, to them. I do this as a matter of prudence, and not out of any want of respect for the other works ascribed to the great theologian. However, besides writing, Sankara very largely resorted to oral lecturing and controversy as a means of disseminating his views. From the places mentioned as visited by him, it appears that this energetic missionary traversed the whole Indian continent. He travelled as far as Kamrupa *i. e.* Assam, in the north-east, and Kashmir and Balkh in the north-west and thus went not only through the whole breadth of the country, but also beyond its present limits. Its whole length also, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, was done by this indefatigable worker. In the course of his

missionary peregrinations, he came into contact with philosophical and theological opponents of various creeds and classes, and made converts among all. His greatest opponents seem to have been the Buddhists, who were opposed to all forms of Vedic religion. It was through the exertions of Sankara and his followers that the already waning influence of Buddhism in the country was finally overthrown. But it ought to be stated in this connection, that the widely accepted theory of his having bitterly persecuted the Buddhists, does not receive the least support from his writings, which throughout breathe a most liberal and tolerant spirit. He always gives his opponents a patient hearing, sometimes drawing out their arguments at great length, taxing his reader's patience, but betraying no impatience in himself, and then goes on heaping argument upon argument in their refutation. Nothing severer than a mild and only occasional feeling of disgust and astonishment at their preposterous sensationalism is to be met with in his long controversy with those whom he is said to have pursued with humiliation and banishment. However, there is a very beautiful anecdote connected with Sankara's missionary travels which should not be omitted from any account of his life and work, however short. Of all the converts that Sankara made, the greatest seem to have been

Mandana Misra, afterwards named Suresvara, and his gifted wife Ubhay Bháratī. This remarkable lady was, it is stated, deeply read in the Vedas, with all the branches of knowledge auxiliary to their study, in all the six schools of philosophy, as well as in poetry and drama. It is said that when Sankara declared his intention to have a controversy with Mandana, Ubhay Bháratī was chosen umpire. But when, in the course of the long disputation, extending through several days, she found her learned husband giving way, she took his side with Sankara's permission and kept his opponent at bay for a long while. At the end both husband and wife were defeated by the great controversialist and became his disciples. The other principal followers of Sankara were Padmapáda, Hastámalaka and Totaka. Of these, Papmapáda had two disciples, Tírtha and Ásrama; Hastámalaka two, Vana and Aranya; Mandana three, Sarasvatī, Bháratī and Purī. These names are of course titles conferred on the disciples on their entering the order. I mention them particularly in order to explain why the order of monks established by Sankara and called *Dasanámī Sannyásis*, have ten sections with ten distinct names. The sections acknowledge as their heads and derive their names from the ten leaders just named. Of the many mathas or

colleges of the order, four seem to have been established by the illustrious founder himself. They are the Srīngagiri Matha on the Srīngeri Hills, the Śārādā Matha at Dvārakā, the Govardhana Matha at Purī and the Jyosi Matha on the Himalayas (Badarikāsrama).

All this vast and fruitful work, which has had and continues to have up to this day the deepest influence on the religious life of the country, was done by one who, at the close of his wonderful career, had not yet passed his youth, for Sankara died in A. D. 830, at the early age of 32, at Kedār on the Himalayas.

To come, now, to Sankara's philosophy. I shall, in this lecture, consider only one aspect of it, its doctrine of Unqualified Monism—Nirviśeṣha or Viśuddha Advaitavāda, though it will be found that all the other doctrines of his philosophy are logically connected with this.

To understand Sankara's Monism, it will be necessary for us to recall the conclusions of our last two lectures, those on the Vedāntic philosophy of nature and spirit. We have seen that the Vedāntic philosophy of nature is a species of Absolute Idealism, holding nature to be relative to and dependent on an Infinite Mind, and that in its philosophy of mind, the Vedānta is monistic, teaching that there is only one Absolute Spirit of

which finite intelligences are reproductions or manifestations in time and space. We have also seen that the Mind in relation to which nature and finite minds exist, is a self-distinguishing Spirit, distinguishing itself from objects in time and space, while, at the same time, making their existence possible by its presence to them ; so that, though these objects own their continued existence to the Infinite Spirit, it cannot be said that the Spirit itself shares in their limitations and is, in that sense, in time and space. Objects in time and space are indeed manifestations of God, but he who manifests himself thus, must have a nature independent of his manifestations. Thus there come to be two modes of speaking of the Divine Being. Of these two modes, I say in my *Hindu Theism* : "The writers and interpreters of the *Upanishads* contemplate God in two ways, as immanent and as transcendent,—as embodied in the various objects of the world and as beyond these objects. The primary qualities of the objective world, the fundamental elements of which all objects are so many mixtures, are, according to our philosophers, *sattvam*, the principle of manifested intelligence, *rajas*, the principle of attraction, and *tamas*, the principle of darkness (*i. e.* materiality, inertia). These are the three *gunas*, qualities, into which Hindu philo-

sophy resolves everything, objective. Now, God being the only Reality in the universe, the All-in-all, the *gunas* must be contemplated as nothing but forms in which he manifests himself. As manifesting himself in these forms, then, God is *saguna*, with the *gunas*, i. e. qualified, differentiated, embodied in a sense, immanent in nature. But the Reality that manifests itself in these various forms, shows, by this very fact of manifestation, that it has an inner, independent nature apart from its modifications. The modifications come and go, but the Reality persists and brings out fresh phenomena from the inexhaustible source of its inner nature. Again, the phenomena of nature are objects, and, as such, related to a permanent subject. Or, if we contemplate subject and object as mutually related, inter-dependent, they imply an Absolute Intelligence in which they are unified and their distinction resolved. This Absolute Intelligence, by its very function of uniting related objects distinguished from one another, must transcend all relations and distinctions, all *gunas*, all that belongs to phenomenal objects. By its every nature, it must be indefinable, indescribable, unspeakable, except in terms of objects and relations which it transcends. Hence our philosophers call it *nirguna*, without the *gunas*, and *nirvishesha*, undifferentiated or

unqualified—transcending all natural objects, gross and fine, and their various relations.” (Pp. 48,49.)

The terms *guna*, *saguna* and *nirguna* are not met with in eleven of the twelve principal *Upanishads*, though all contain texts in which the Supreme Being is spoken of in both the forms indicated. The terms are explicitly met with in the *Svetâsvatara Upanishad*. Here are some texts in which, as if to show the truth and connection of both these aspects of the Divine nature, it is spoken of as both *saguna* and *nirguna* :—

“It moves and it moves not. It is far and it is near. It is in all this and it is out of all this.” (*Isa* 5.)

“As the one fire, entering the world, takes the form of each object it burns, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object, and is also beyond all objects. As the one air, entering the world, takes the form of each object, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object and is also beyond all objects.” (*Katha*, II. 2, 9, 10.)

“The one only Divine Being is hidden in all things ; he is omnipresent and the Inner Self of all creatures ; he guides all actions and lives in all beings ; he is the Witness and the Animator ; he is detached from the world and is without the *gunas*. (*Svetâsvatara*, VI. 11.)

Now, are not these two aspects of the Divine nature mutually contradictory? How can God be both *saguna* and *nirguna*,—both with and without the *gunas*? How can he be both in and out of space, both in and out of time? How can he be infinite and yet be related to finite things distinguishable from him? How can he be infinite knowledge and yet have room in him for inanimate things or ignorant beings? How can he be perfectly holy and yet the cause of unholy things or beings? Now, Sankara's oft-repeated answer to such questions is that the alleged contradiction would be real if both the *saguna* and *nirguna*, immanent and transcendent, aspects of the Divine nature were real. But, he says, the *saguna* aspect is only apparent and not real. The terms used by him are *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*. A *vyāvahārika* truth is a belief entertained so long as the highest truth—that Brahman alone is real,—is not known, and a real truth is truth that agrees with the nature of an object; it is dependent upon the object and not merely relative to our imperfect and misleading faculties. We shall let Sankara himself speak on the subject. In reply to those who hold both the immanent and transcendent aspects of the Divine nature to be equally true, and who, in support of their views, cite passages from the *Upanishads* speaking of Brahman modify-

ing himself in the shape of the world as a piece of clay or gold is moulded into various shapes, Sankara says in his commentary on the 14th aphorism, 2nd páda, 2nd chapter, of the *Brahma Sutras* :—

“This theory, we reply, is untenable, because in the instance cited, the phrase ‘as clay only they are true’ asserts the substance only to be true, while the phrase ‘made only of words’ *i. e.* only verbal, declares the unreality of modifications. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given, we read : ‘All this is Brahman in essence,’ and again, ‘That is true,’ whereby it is asserted that the Supreme Cause alone is true. The following passage, again, ‘That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu,’ teaches that the embodied soul also is Brahman.* And the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul being Brahman in essence is self-evident and not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the embodied soul being Brahman in essence, if once accepted as scriptural, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of a rope being a snake is removed by the knowledge of the rope. And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the

* The quotations are all from the sixth *prápathaka* of the *Chhândogya Upanishad*.

individual soul has to be set aside, then the belief in the entire phenomenal world, which is based on the individual soul having an independent existence, is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman in addition to the element of unity. Scriptural passages also, such as 'When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' (*Bṛihad. II. 4. 13.*) declare that for him who sees that everything is Brahman in essence, the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, scripture, showing, by the instance of the thief (*Chhând. VI. 16.*) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that Unity is the one true Existence, while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For, if both were true, how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world, be called false-minded? Another scriptural passage, 'From death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity' (*Katha, IV. 10.*) declares

the same by blaming those who perceive any distinction.”*

Again, in reply to those who say that Sankara's doctrine of the unreality of the phenomenal world subjects the ordinary sources of knowledge, perception and inference to incredibility, he says in the same commentary :—

“These objections, we reply, do not damage our position, because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of the Brahman as the essence of all has not arisen ; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue ; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects as forming part of and belonging to his self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the essence of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is con-

*Prof. Thibaut's Translation, with slight variations. So elsewhere.

vinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent one."

But, if the world is unreal, what becomes of the doctrine taught alike in the *Upanishads* and the *Brahma Sutras* that Brahman is the cause of the world? Is not that doctrine contradicted by Sankara's view of the unreality of the world? Sankara thinks that it is not. On this subject he says in the commentary already twice quoted:—"The fundamental tenet which we maintain in accordance with such scriptural passages as 'From this Self sprang ether' &c. (*Taitt. II. 1.*) is that the creation, sustentation and re-absorption of the world proceed from the Lord, who is eternal, holy, wise, and free, and who is the omniscient and omnipotent Lord,—and not from a non-intelligent *pradhàna* or any other principle. That tenet we have stated in our commentary on the aporism—"From which the origin &c., of this" and here we do not teach anything contrary to it. 'But how,' the question may be asked, 'can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?' Listen how. Belonging to the self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as identical with or different from him; the

germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in Sruti and Smṛiti the *Māyā-Sakti* or Prakṛiti of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following :—

‘He who is called ether, is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman.’ (*Chhānd VIII. 14. 1.*), ‘Let me evolve names and forms. (*Ibid. VI. 3. 2.*) ‘He, the wise one, who, having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names).’ (*Taitt. Ar. III. 12. 7.*) ‘He who makes the one seed manifold’ (*Svet. VI. 12.*) Thus the Lord depends as Lord upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nescience, just as the universal ether depends as limited ether upon the limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots &c. He rules, as regards their phenomenal life, the *vijnānātmans* called individual souls, which are indeed one with himself, just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether, but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action, *i. e.*, bodies produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord’s being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c., all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose essence is Nescience ; while in reality none of

these qualities belong to the Self, whose true nature is seen by knowledge to be free from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. (*Chhānd. VII. 24, 1*). Again, 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (*Bṛih. II. 4. 13*). In this manner the Vedānta texts declare that for him who has reached the state of reality, the whole phenomenal world ceases to exist.... That, on the other hand, the distinctions of Lord and other things are valid as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, is said in the scriptures also, thus, 'He is the Lord of all, the King of kings, the Protector of all things ; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be destroyed.' (*Bṛih. IV. 4. 22.*) ... The Sūtrakāra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect in the aphorism '*Tadanyatvam*' &c. only with regard to the state of reality ; while, looking to the phenomenal world, he compares Brahman in the aphorism '*Syāllokavat*' &c. to the great ocean and the like, and, assuming the reality of the world of effects, admits Brahman as undergoing the process of modification, as such as view is of use in the worship of the qualified Brahman."

We see, then, how Sankara resolves the ap-

parent contradiction implied in Brahman being infinite and eternal and his being related to a world finite and ever-changing. Not only is such a world, according to him, an apparent and not a real world, but even those attributes of Brahman that have reference to such a world, namely his omniscience, his almightiness and the like, are only apparent and not real in the highest sense. 'Omniscience' means the quality of knowing all, and if the 'all' is unreal, the all-knowingness is also unreal. In like manner, 'almightiness', which means the power of doing all things, cannot but be unreal if 'doing' and 'all things' are unreal. All attributes, in short, which make God what is called in Theological parlance a personal being, are rejected by Sankara's attempt to conceive of him as a Being free from everything phenomenal or one unrelated to phenomena. In the process of refinement adopted by him, he casts off not only Brahmá or Hiranagarbha, the *Kārya Brahman* or Effect-God, whose existence is necessitated by the Idealism of the Vedānta, as we saw in our third lecture, and whose necessity, as we also saw, is distinctly recognised by the authors of the *Upanishads*, but also Brahman as Cause, the *Kāraṇa Brahman*, whose praise is sung throughout the *Upanishads*, and tries to keep his last hold on a Being who, whatever he may be in him-

self, must be conceived as having not even the least touch with the phenomenal world. We shall come back to Sankara's idea of this Being by and by. In the meantime, let us see how far, if at all, we understand the *Māyā-shakti* of which Sankara speaks, and which seems to be so potent as to make unreal not only its effect, the world of time and space, but also the Supreme Cause of it. Our difficulty in understanding this *Māyā* becomes particularly great when we find in what terms—terms of the highest reverence—Sankara speaks of Isvara, the Causal Brahman, whom his theory makes unreal. The following extracts will make clear what I mean.

In reply to the Sāṅkhya objection to the Vedāntic doctrine of creation by an all-knowing Being, saying there can be no knowledge before the existence of objects, Sankara at first says that knowledge need not have anything but the knowing Being himself for its object, and then goes on ;—
 “If, however, an object is supposed to be required for Divine knowledge, the texts ascribing knowledge to Brahman will fit all the better. What, then, is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world ? Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but.

about to be evolved. For, if, as the adherents of the Yoga-shástra assume, the *yogins* have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord, does it need to be said that the eternally perfect Lord has eternal knowledge of the creation, sustentation and dissolution of the world ?”

So it seems that the Lord, whose lordship, according to Sankara's *Máyá* theory, is only relative to the unreal world, the product of Nescience, is not only eternally perfect, but has also eternal knowledge of the world before its creation, before there have come into existence those individual souls on whom, according to Sankará's own showing, Nescience depends.

Again, we have seen, from the last but one extract from Sankara, that he speaks of Isvara as *suddha-buddha-mukta-svarupa*, *i. e.* of a holy, enlightened and free nature, and in his commentary on aphorism 9 of the 2nd chapter, 2nd páda, of the *Sútras*, he explicitly speaks of the Lord as untouched by *Máyá*. “As a magician, he says, “is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world of illusion.” Not only is Isvara above *Máyá*, but the knowledge of him is, according to Sankara, the means of deliverance from *Máyá*, or

identical with such deliverance. As he says in his commentary on the 5th aphorism of the third chapter, 2nd páda, of the *Brahma Sūtras* :—

“Has the individual soul an identical nature with the Lord or not ? We say that the identity of nature, although existing, is hidden by the intervention of Nescience. In the case of some persons, indeed, who strenuously meditate on the Lord, and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last, obtain, through the favour of the Lord, extraordinary powers and insight, that hidden quality becomes manifest, just as through the action of some strong medicines the power of sight becomes manifest in a blind man ; but it does not, on its own account, reveal itself to all men. Why not ? Because ‘from him,’ *i. e.* from the Lord, ‘are there bondage and release of it’ *viz.* of the individual soul. That means : bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord’s true nature ; release is due to the presence of such knowledge. Thus the Sruti declares : “When that Divine Being is known, all fetters fall off ; sufferings are destroyed, and birth and death cease. From meditating on him, there arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that of universal lordship ; he who is alone, is satisfied.” (*Svet. I. 11.*) and similar passages.”

After this, can we say we have understood Sankara’s Isvara who is at once unreal from the

highest standpoint, and the Giver of that state of freedom which is above all illusion, all tinge of unreality? And we have seen that we do not understand the *Máyá-sakti* which Isvara on the one hand wields, and on which, on the other hand, he is dependent. Let us see if the following extract, which is taken from the commentary on the third aphorism of chap. I. páda 4, of the *Sūtras*, makes things anyway clearer for us. The *Sánkhyas* having urged that the *Vedántists*, in admitting the existence of an undeveloped state of the world before creation, out of which everything that exists is developed, accepts in a sense the *Sánkhya* doctrine of *Pradhána*, *i. e.* of an unconscious cause of the world, *Sankara* replies :—

“If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the *Pradhána* doctrine ; what we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the Supreme Lord, not an independent state. A previous state of the world, such as the one assumed by us, must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For, without it the Supreme Lord could not be conceived as Creator as he could not become active if he were destitute of the power of action. Released souls, however, do not enter on new courses of existence, for that seminal

power is destroyed by knowledge. That seminal power is of the nature of Nescience, and is denoted by the term 'undeveloped.' It is dependent on the Supreme Lord, and is of the nature of illusion, a state of profound sleep in which individual souls lie asleep, unconscious of their true nature."

You will see that Sankara represents Mâyá as both subjective and objective, both individual and universal,—belonging both to the individual soul and to Isvara. As belonging to the individual soul, it is dissolvable by knowledge ; as belonging to Isvara, it is eternal. We have seen that Sankara admits its existence before creation, and I may point out here that he admits its existence even in the state of *pralaya* or dissolution of the world.* He could not but make this admission, as a power is inseparable from the being to whom it belongs. But have we not seen already that Isvara is free from, untouched by, Mâyá ? It is clear then, that Mâyá, as it is in Isvara, is very different from what it is in the individual soul. Is it not therefore exceedingly misleading to call two such different things by the same name—*avidyā*, nescience ? In the individual, Mâyá may truly be called nescience or illusion, if you choose; for he is really subject to ignorance—ignorance of, among

* See the close of his commentary on aphorism 9 of the 1st padá, 2nd chapter, of the *Brahma Sūtras*.

other things, his own true nature. But it is palpably contradictory to ascribe *avidyā*, in any sense, to him who is conceived as omniscient and perfectly holy. What Sankara perhaps meant and ought to have said is that there is, in Iswara, a power which produces in the individual soul the illusion of things which do not really exist. As a power producing illusory appearances, it is somewhat like the magical power of a juggler and may therefore be called *Máyá-sakti*. In Isvara, *Máyá* produces no effect, as he, being its wielder, is above its influence. There is, therefore, no *avidyā* in the Lord. *Avidyā* exists only in the individual, and is the product of *Máyá* acting upon him. But he is released from its influence when the Lord reveals himself to him.

Understood in this way, the *Máyá* theory would lose much of its incomprehensibility ; but this interpretation of the theory cannot consistently be accepted by its upholders. For, in order that the individual soul may be subject to illusion, it must first exist,—exist as a reality and not as an illusory thing ; but this real existence of the individual as such cannot be admitted by believers in the *Máyá* theory, as it conflicts, according to them, with the perfect non-duality of Brahman. According to them, the very existence of the individual is constituted by *avidyā*, and neither in

the state of bondage nor in that of liberation does the individual really exist, so that *avidyā* or illusion in all its forms must, consistently with this theory, be held to belong to Isvara, however incomprehensible and unmeaning such a proposition may be. As Sankara says in his commentary on the 21st aphorism of the 3rd chapter, 2nd páda, of the *Sūtras*, in reply to an opponent who contends that even after Brahman's non-duality has been known, there is room for injunctions :—

“Does the individual soul on which the injunction (of knowing Brahman) is laid, belong to the phenomenal world or to that of Brahman? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as earth and other elements are, as soon as the knowledge of Brahman's true nature has arisen. On whom, then, should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?—If the latter, (*i. e.* if the individual be Brahman) we are led to the same result. For, as soon as there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can become the subject of an injunction, is the true essence of the individual, while, on the other hand, individuality is due to Nescience, there remains no being on whom injunctions could be laid and no room for injunctions at all.”

But in the absence of a real individual to whom *avidyā* may belong, and in presence of the fact

that Isvara is unaffected by *avidyā*, *avidyā* loses its character as *avidyā*. There can be no delusion when there is no one to be deluded. There can be no appearance when there is none to distinguish between it and reality. What becomes of the phenomenal world then? Is it absolutely nothing? If it were absolutely nothing, we could not even so much as speak of it, and the scriptures would not be full of talk about it. Sankara knows this, and so, without absolutely denying its reality, tries to give it an intermediate place between reality and unreality by describing it as *avidyā*. We have seen that the world, whatever else it may be, cannot be *avidyā* in the absence of a real subject of it. But even if the world could be truly described as *avidyā*, lasting for a while as such and dissolved by knowledge, it would, even in that case, have to be conceived as real and not apparent,—real as a passing, evanescent thing, and as such, distinguished from Brahman, the unchanging, eternally permanent Being. But even as such a thing, as a series of changes, Sankara is not prepared to admit the reality of the world. He explains away the scriptural texts that speak of creation as having a purport other than their apparent meaning. It is not to teach that there has been, or is going on, a real creation, that the scriptures speak of the creation of the world by Brahman, but only to

confirm, by a popular mode of speaking, the truth, explicitly taught in many a text, that everything is an effect, and is therefore unreal, the one only Reality being Brahman, the indescribable, incomprehensible Being. (Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*, IV. 3. 14.) One may very well wonder what the *rishis* who conceived the various theories of creation given in the *Upanishads*, would say to such an interpretation of their theories. The steps of evolution conceived by them may not be all accepted by modern science as correctly conceived, but at any rate, these steps were believed by them to be real stages in the evolution of a real though changing world, and not those of an evolving dream without a dreamer.

We see, then, how unsatisfactory is Sankara's attempt to establish a system of Absolute Monism on the denial of reality to the phenomenal world and to the individual soul. The Monism of the Vedānta is true and rational enough without the unreliable and dangerous prop of a Māyā theory. The fundamental mistake of this theory—the cause of all its confusion—is, we see, a false idea of unity. Sankara thinks that unity is opposed not only to duality—to the notion of two or more independent realities,—which it really is, but also to difference and relativity. When the scriptures speak of Brahman as one, without a second, they must be

understood, thinks Sankara, as meaning not only that there is no independent reality besides him, but also that there is no world in space and time and of a diverse form, relative to and dependent on him. That such a conclusion is not warranted by the Vedántic theory of nature and spirit, we have already, to some extent, seen in our third and fourth lectures. The question of unity and difference will be more fully considered after we have examined Ramanuja's Qualified Monism—Visishta Advaitaváda. We shall then see, that the absolute attributes which Sankara ascribes to his *Nirgunam*, are in a sense no less relative than those personal attributes which he shrinks from ascribing to Brahman in his real essence lest he should make him limited ; for, if omniscience, almightiness, justice, goodness and the like cannot be conceived except with reference to a phenomenal world, so do absolute truth, knowledge, infinitude, eternality, indivisibility, unchangeability and the like derive all the meaning they bear from the ideas opposed to them, ideas implying the existence of a relative, finite, manifold and changing world. Monism is interested not in denying the reality of such a world, but in showing its relativity to and dependence on the Infinite and Absolute.

LECTURE VI

HOW FAR IS THE MAYA THEORY VEDANTIC ?

In my last lecture, I stated the Máya theory of Sankaráchárya, and criticised it, not from the standpoint of his opponents, but from that of the Vedánta itself, as I understand it. I said that the distinction of Brahman and Isvara, an impersonal and a personal God, is foreign to the *Upanishads*, and that the unreality of the world as a series of changes is an idea inconsistent with the description of creation given in those writings. I shall, in this lecture, make good the last statement. As to the first, enough was said in my fourth lecture;—that on the Vedántic Philosophy of Mind—to show that the Supreme Being of the *Upanishads* is a self-distinguishing Intelligence, distinguishing himself from, while giving reality to, the passing determinations of his own activity. But while showing that Sankara is not true to the Vedántic doctrine of creation, I shall, on the other hand, try in the present lecture to do that justice to him which I could not do in my last. I shall consider the question whether, though his peculiar theory of Máya or Avidyá is not truly Vedántic, there is anything

in the Vedánta which seems to favour his theory, and the more important question whether Vedántism, as a system of Monism, is necessarily committed to a doctrine of illusion, however different that doctrine may be from Sankara's theory.

First, then as to the Vedántic doctrine of creation, I shall refer to the more important descriptions of creation given in the *Upanishads* and see if they any way favour Sankara's view of the unreality of change. The first description I shall refer to is that given in the *Mundakopani-shad*. The first part of the 2nd Mundaka is one long description of the production of various classes of objects from the Supreme Cause. The relation of created objects to the Creator is likened to that of sparks of fire to fire itself, a similitude very unfavourable to Sankara's view of creation as merely apparent. The author says: "This is true,—As sparks similar to fire come out of a blazing fire by thousands, so, my dear, do various creatures come out of the Undecaying One, and also return to it." The author closes this description by declaring the essential unity of the Creator and the created: "The Person alone is all this; he is *karma*, (*i. e.* deeds), discipline, and the supreme, undecaying, Brahman. He who knows him as hidden in

the heart, my dear, cuts the knot of ignorance even here."

The next important description of creation is to be found in the *Aitareya Upanishad*, Chapter I. This description is somewhat fanciful, but it is true to what I conceive to be the two fundamental principles of the Vedantic doctrine of creation, namely that the change implied in it is real, and that the objects created are essentially one with the Creator. The author begins thus:—"Verily, in the beginning all this was the Self, one only ; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought : 'Shall I send forth worlds ?' He sent forth these worlds, Ambhas, Marichi, Mara and Ap. That Ambhas is above heaven, and it is heaven, the support. The Marichis are the sky. Mara is the earth, and the waters under the earth are the Ap world. He thought, 'There are those worlds ; shall I send forth guardians of the worlds ?' He then formed a person , taking him forth from the water." The close is similar in spirit to that of the *Mundaka* description : "When born (*i. e.* when the Highest Self had entered the body as the individual self), he looked through all things in order to see whether anything wished to proclaim here another self. He saw this Person only (*i. e.* himself) as the widely diffused Brahman and he said, 'I saw it'"

The description given in the first chapter of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, though very fanciful, is identical in spirit with those I have already referred to and need not detain us. I shall close these quotations and references with an extract from the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, embodying a description of creation far more significant in some respects than any of those yet referred to. The *Upanishad* says:—"In the the beginning, my dear, there was that' only which is one only without a second...It thought 'May I be many, may I grow forth.' It sent forth fire. That fire (*i. e.* the One in the form of fire) thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth earth...That being (*i. e.* that which had produced fire, water and earth) thought, 'Let me now enter those three beings with this living self and let me reveal names and forms.'" (*Chāndogya*, VI. 2, 3.)

On the above accounts of creation, I repeat what I have said in my *Hindu Theism*:—"It will be seen that, however mysterious a thing creation may be, however difficult it may be to conceive its real nature, the writers of the *Upanishads* all believe in its reality. They indeed never lose sight of the principle that in creation nothing was produced that' was apart from Brahman, nothing that constituted a real duality. But that there has been a change in some sense or other, or

to be more exact, that change in one sense or other is real, in the sense of being an object of the Divine knowledge, an effect of the Divine power,—of this the founders of Hindu Theism seem to have not the slightest doubt. It is true that the *Svetāśvatara Upanishad*—the only one of the twelve principal *Upanishads*,—calls Nature by the significant name of *Máyá*. But except using this much misunderstood term, the writer of this *Upanishad* says nothing as to the unreality of Nature, but is, throughout his description of creation, as realistic as the writers of the other *Upanishads*. The later form of the *Máyá* theory, namely, that creation is unreal and our belief in it due to ignorance, is quite unknown to the founders of our theology, and is to be credited not to them, but to some of their commentators and expounders. We do not know, however, of any one who has ever held the theory without contradicting himself. Belief in creation or change, it says, is due to ignorance. Well, this ignorance must belong to a finite being. This finite being, therefore, whether he be a man, a god or the great *Hiranyagarbha* himself, must first be created in order that his ignorance may be possible. His creation would therefore be a change not due to his or any one else's ignorance, but a fact related to the divine knowledge itself. Even if the finite being

conceived were supposed to be co-eternal with, though dependent on, the Supreme Being, the succession of ideas in his mind,—that in which the life of a finite being consists,—his progress from relative ignorance to knowledge, even the apparent changes fancied by him, would constitute a series of changes of which the All-knowing Being must be conceived as cognizant, and which would, in that sense, be real, objective changes, and not such as are due to the ignorance of a finite being. Creation, then, including the creation of finite souls, is not due to ignorance. The individualization of Brahman in the form of finite spirits, his entrance, in the language of the *Chhândogya*, into finite materials as the living soul of men and other beings, is an occurrence due to the divine activity and irrespective of the ignorance inseparable from the conditions of finite life." (p. 108-110.)

Let us now consider the point whether there are passages in the *Upanishads* which seem to favour Sankara's Mâyá theory. As we have seen in our last lecture, Sankara cites several such passages. I shall consider the more important among them. The dialogue between Uddálaka Aruni and his son Svetaketu in the sixth *prapáthaka* of the *Chhândogya Upanishad* contains several of these passages and Sankara seems to

consider this dialogue as the very basis of his theory, turning to it ever and anon as to a house built upon a rock. I shall read to you, therefore, as much of the story as is necessary for our purpose. "There lived once," says the *Upa-nishad*, "Svetaketu Aruneya. To him his father said, 'Svetaketu, go to school ; for there is no one belonging to our family, my dear, who, not having studied the Veda, is, as it were, a Bráhmāna by birth only.' Having begun his apprenticeship when he was twelve years of age, Svetaketu returned to his father when he was twenty-four, having then studied all the Vedas,—conceited, considering himself well-read and stern. His father said to him, 'Svetaketu, as you are so conceited, considering yourself well-read, and so stern, my dear, have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known ? 'What is that instruction, Sir?' he asked. The father replied, 'My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the change being only a name, arising from speech (*i. e.* verbal), but the truth being that ail is clay ; and as, my dear, by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the change being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being

that all is gold ; and as, my dear, by one nail-cutter all that is made of iron is known, the change being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron,—thus, my dear, is that instruction.”

Then follows the description of creation from which I have already made extracts and a good deal of other matters not directly connected with the subject in hand. Aruni then traces water and fire, which have been assigned as the cause of the body, to the True or Being *i. e.* Brahman. He says :—“And where could its root be except in water ? As water is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. As fire in an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True (or Being). Yes, all these creatures, O son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True. And how these three beings, fire, water, and earth, O son, when they reach man, become each of them tripartite, has been said before. When a man departs from hence, his speech is merged in his sensorium, his sensorium in his breath, his breath in heat, and heat in the Highest Being. Now, that which is that subtile essence, in it all that exists has its being. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.”

Then follows a number of similitudes or parables all intended to illustrate the truth embodied

in the last part of the last extract, namely, the origin of the world of matter and mind from Brahman and its essential unity with him.

Now, let us see whether there is anything in the extracts made which favours Sankara's view of creation. To take, first, the first three figures by which the relation between the Creator and the created is sought to be explained. Brahman is compared to a lump of earth, a ball of gold and a nail-cutter of iron, and created objects to various things made of these substances. All these objects, says the *Upanishad*, can be known by knowing the substance of which they are made. The particular objects, the forms taken by the substances, are, it adds, only the result of speech, meaning evidently that in taking these various forms the substances do not cease to be the substances they are, do not change their essential characteristics, and that the objects, however different from one another in form, are substantially one. It cannot be said that the author means to deny the difference of the objects in form, or the reality of the change of form which the substances undergo when they are called by various names. To suppose this would be to set him down as a fool. And yet, one does not see what countenance these similitudes give to Sankara's view of creation if our interpretation

be right. If the truth sought to be taught is nothing more than this, that the world, however diverse in form, is essentially Brahman, and that these diversities are only diversities of form, and not of substance, no Vedántist who is earnest about the Monism of the Vedánta, will have the slightest hesitation in accepting this interpretation. But this interpretation, far from favouring, seems directly to contradict the view of those according to whom natural objects are not, but only seem to be, real, and are known to be unreal as soon as the reality of Brahman is known. According to the interpretation given, they are as real as Brahman himself, for they are the forms actually assumed by him.

The grand formula to which the similitudes mentioned above and those which have been briefly referred to lead, need not detain us. It is but a clear enunciation of the Monism of the Vedánta, affirming the essential unity of the world and the self as it is in man with the supreme, universal Self. It no more favours Sankara's interpretation of Monism than any other interpretation. Or, it rather favours our interpretation—the view of the reality of the world and the individual self—by pronouncing them as essentially identical with Brahman.

The other important passage I shall consider

in this connexion is *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* II. 4, 14, and my remarks on it will apply to one of similar import in the 7th chapter of the *Chhāndogya*. I shall quote the passages in full :—"For, when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, one smells the other, one hears the other, one salutes the other, one perceives the other, one knows the other ; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he smell another, how should he hear another, how should he salute another, how should he perceive another, and how should he know another ?" Again, in *Chhāndogya* VI. 23, 24, Sanatkumāra says to Nārada :—"The infinite is bliss. There is no bliss in anything finite. Infinity only is bliss. This infinity, however, we must desire to understand." "Sir," says Nārada, "I desire to understand it." Sanatkumāra proceeds to define the Infinite : "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the finite." These passages, again, like the one considered last, seem to me nothing but clear, unmistakable expressions of the Monism of the Vedānta, and not to countenance Sankara's view of the unreality of the finite world, material or spiritual. They seem even to contain words recognising that difference

which is not inconsistent with the essential unity of the universe. What, for example, does the word *yatra* point to but different stages of the spiritual progress of the worshipper? And that even in the highest stage of his progress he does not lose his individuality—that difference from the object of worship which is consistent with essential unity—seems to be recognised in the word *asya*. Now, in the state of vivid perception of the Divine Reality, it is really seen that the light with which we see it is its own light, that the seer and the seen, the knower and the known, are essentially one,—that the individual is nothing apart from the Universal, but is really its manifestation. It is to this state of supreme illumination that the *Upanishads* evidently refer in the passages quoted. That even in such a state, even when the individual is seen to be a manifestation of the universal, the finitude implied in the fact of manifestation remains in tact, appears evident from two facts, namely (1) that the vision of absolute unity, though a true vision, is yet an event taking place at a certain time, and as the result of a process of spiritual culture, and is therefore distinguishable from the Divine vision of the same fact, which has neither beginning nor end, and which is irrespective of any process of development, and (2) that, notwithstanding the revelation of the fundamental unity of the individual

and the Universal, the contents of the universal Consciousness, with their infinite variety of time, space and form, are far from being revealed in its individual expression.

Coming, now, to the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*, the two other institutes of Vedāntic thought, we may dismiss the question in a few words. There is absolutely nothing in the former which, interpreted independently of Sankara's commentary, lends any support to his peculiar theory of Māyā, and Sankara himself seems to be somewhat aware of this, inasmuch as he draws very little upon the *Sūtras* when he cites authorities in favour of his view. His commentary on the aphorisms are indeed full of his theory, as you must have seen from the extracts I made from it in my last lecture, but the expositions of his theory in the commentary are given rather in the form of independent remarks than direct explanations of the aphorisms. He indeed believes the author of the *Sūtras* to be of his opinion and represents him as saying this or that from the standpoint occupied by himself ; but to one who is not already imbued with Sankara's principles, it is difficult to believe that the standpoint of the author and the commentator of the aphorisms is the same. For instance, when the author speaks of Brahman as the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the world, as a Being

of infinite knowledge, power and goodness, he does not give so much as a hint that he says all this only from the popular, or *vyāvahārika* point of view, and that there is a higher standpoint from which all this is seen to be false. Again, when he describes the gradual evolution of the world, he never suggests that the process described by him is a false one, one that is found to be imaginary as soon as we know the sole and absolute unity and reality of Brahman. The author of the aphorisms is indeed a Monist, affirming, in unequivocal terms, the essential unity of the world and the individual soul with Brahman, and this affords Sankara an opportunity for representing him as holding the unreality of creation ; but this is to beg the whole question at issue from the very beginning,—to assume what has to be proved,—that unity is inconsistent with diversity and difference. I take the author to be of the opposite view, to be a believer in both unity and difference, and speaking of the creation and diversity of the world of matter and mind when emphasising the element of difference in it, and of its identity with the one only real Brahman when intending to bring into prominence the essential unity of the universe.

As to the *Bhagavadgītā*, it need not detain us, for every word that we have said regarding the *Brahma Sūtras*, applies to it. There are two or

three passages in it which contain the word *Máyá*, but the context does not show that the word is used in the sense which Sankara attaches to it. For instance, in Chapter VII the Supreme Being is made to say: "Deluded by the power of the three *gunas*, the whole of this world fails to distinguish me from these as transcending them and as unchangeable. This Divine *Máyá* of mine, consisting in the *gunas*, is difficult to be freed from. Those who worship me pass beyond this *Máyá*. Those who are sinful, foolish, the worst of men, whose knowledge is darkened by *Máyá*, and who have adopted the character of demons, do not worship me." Again, in Chapter XIII, "O Arjuna, God lives in the heart of all creatures and whirls them with *Máyá* as if they were things placed on a machine. Devote yourself to him with all your heart and you will, by his grace, obtain the highest peace and the ever-lasting abode." In both these passages '*Máyá*' is used to mean that power of producing illusion to which every finite being is subject previously to his attaining the supreme illumination. There is no suggestion in the couplets in which the word occurs that the finite being itself, which is subject to illusion, or the world around it, is unreal.

We now come to the third of the questions proposed by us, namely, whether there is not a *Máyá* theory, however different it may be from

Sankara's, to which Vedántism, as a system of Monism, is committed. My opinion is, that Vedántism, and for that matter, every philosophical system which is really, and not merely in name, monistic, is committed to some such theory of illusion. Nay, I go so far as to say that such a theory, however little its advocates may wish it, must be couched in very much the same language as that used by Sankara, and I must do Sankara the justice to say that it *sometimes* seems that, notwithstanding the many paradoxical utterances which the great Theologian is led to indulge in, he did not really mean to say anything more than what such a theory must admit as true. To proceed, however, without any more words of introduction, to state what Monism, as a theory of the universe, is bound to postulate by way of a mysterious power of producing illusions. If the world of time and space is really relative to God, it cannot but be an illusion to think of it as something independent of him, and to this illusion every created being who has not attained the supreme illumination is subject. The illusion is not due to any fault of his, but is the necessary result of the conditions of his being. It must therefore be ascribed to God himself, the Author of his being. The question then occurs whether a relative, dependent thing, a thing which is nothing apart from its

support, can be called a thing at all when its relativity, its dependence, is once seen. When the world is seen to be related to God as thought to a thinker, as action to an agent, its concreteness is gone, it dwindles into an abstract quality, and it seems unworthy of being affirmed in a way which may imply that it is anything apart from the Reality to which it belongs as a quality. When God has been affirmed, when the Thinker has been affirmed, the world, his thought, seems to have been affirmed also, and it appears foolish, a mere concession to popular ignorance, to affirm the existence of the world separately. The popular notion of the world is that of a concrete, independent reality. The idea of such a reality is truly sublated—proved to be false—by true knowledge. To the Idealist, to the Vedāntist, the world ceases to exist as a reality, *i.e.* as a concrete, independent object ; when, therefore, he says, with the unenlightened mass, that the world exists, he is aware of using *vyāvaharika*, *i.e.* popular or practical language, and not giving utterance to *pāramarthika* or real truth. When the relativity of things has been seen, when God has been seen to be the only concrete, independent, absolute reality, a distinction cannot but be made between absolute truth and truth that is only relative. The existence of the world is seen to be only relative truth, the only absolute truth being

the existence of God. And when we see that things are not what they seem, we cannot but wonder at the power which makes things seem what they are not, and see also its resemblance to the power wielded by a successful juggler.

But we must proceed further—penetrate deeper into the nature of things and see whether they really possess even that much of reality which is implied in calling them thoughts or abstract qualities. We conceive the material world to be a process of change. Change seems to be a very simple idea, but when one thinks of it, it is found to be one of the most mysterious things possible. We have seen how Sankara tries to get rid of the difficulty involved in the idea by denying its reality. When the world is seen to be relative to mind, all change is reduced to the appearance and disappearance of ideas,—their appearance to mind and their disappearance from mind. But such appearance and disappearance we have seen in our third lecture to be impossible to the Supreme Mind, and we have further seen the reasonableness of the Vedántic postulation of a cosmic soul under the name of Brahmá or Hiranyagarbha to account for the world of change. But if change be impossible to the Supreme Mind, does it not cease to be real? And if change is admitted to be unreal to him who is the only absolutely real Thing, what do we

gain by conceiving a cosmic soul or innumerable individual souls to which it is real? What is not real from the divine, the ultimate, standpoint, is only apparent and not real. Besides, the cosmic soul and the finite individual souls are or are not one with God. If they are one with him, there is no change for them, for, what is true of him must be true of them also. If they are not one with him, we land in Dualism, which is opposed to true Vedántism.

The difficulty is not overcome by supposing the changing element of Nature or Reality to be non-mental, non-spiritual—to be material or external in the popular sense, or merely sensuous, non-intellectual or non-ideal. The supposition of an extra-mental material world involves all the difficulties of Dualism besides being inconsistent with a correct analysis of the contents of consciousness. Such an analysis discloses only such facts as are related to consciousness and not an extra-mental reality, and from the standpoint of Metaphysics such a reality is incompatible with the Divine infinitude. The repugnance of Vedántism to such a twofold division of Reality is too patent to require emphasising. The supposition of a merely sensuous Nature, a series of mere sensations, unformed by principles of synthesis, and unrelated therefore to the unity of conscious-

ness, is a scarcely more helpful expedient. That there are, and can be, no such things as 'mere sensations,' has been insisted upon more than once in these lectures. If change be real, it must belong, not to a material substance unrelated to mind, or to merely sensuous matter unorganised by thought, but to mind or thought in its full, concrete reality. But we have seen how unintelligible change is when it is thought of in relation to God. We can see its unintelligibility even without going through the process of thought I have indicated. 'We can see it more simply. Is not change inconsistent with perfection? To change is to become what one is not, or to cease to be what one is. How can he who is eternally perfect, have become what he was not or cease to be what he is? Does not this imply want and therefore imperfection?

We see, then, how inconsistent with the idea of an infinite and perfect Being the idea of change, and therefore of creation, seems. We see how unintelligible the notion becomes when we try to understand it. And yet we cannot but believe in change. It confronts us at every step. Even in the act of denying change, you affirm it, for you turn, *i. e.* change, from one opinion to another. But nevertheless, the mysteriousness attached to it remains, and the mysteriousness of the power which causes this

—what ?—‘illusion’ shall we call it ? But if creation be unreal, the creative power itself must be equally unreal, for the cause is not cause without the effect. And if the creative power be unreal, Brahman is not what he seems to be—not the Creator, Preserver and destroyer of the world—not what his relation to the world makes him. You see now how Sankara arrived at his conclusions. We may not accept them, but we see the difficulty which confronted him.

This difficulty becomes clearer when we come to deal directly with mind. If the spirit in us is essentially the same with the spirit in Nature, our habitual belief in our independence, in our difference from him, must be ignorance,—an illusion,—and the power of producing this illusion must be ascribed to God himself. If we insist upon the fact that the individual is one with the Universal only in essence, and not in form, and that it is its form, the limitations of its knowledge and power, in which its individuality consists, so that when the illusion of its difference of essence from the Universal is removed, its individuality still remains in tact, and is a truth untouched by illusion,—if we stand upon this truth, as I have done in these lectures, we must, in justice to Sankara and those who think with him, consider how far the idea of individuality and limitation, as applied to spirit,

is an intelligible one. If the individual and the Universal are essentially identical, the difference consisting only in the limitation of the former's knowledge, we should ask ourselves questions like the following ;—"What makes this limitation possible?" How can the All-knowing enclose, as it were, a part of himself and make it finite? How is such partition possible in the indivisible unity of consciousness? Consciousness being the only reality, what can there be to effect this partition? When such questions are asked, it is seen that they do not admit of any satisfactory answer. An infinite Being, having a place in him for a finite being or a number of such beings, is not a perfectly intelligible idea, however forced we may be to believe in its truth. If we try to make it intelligible by the notion of manifestation or reproduction, conceiving the Universal to be the unmanifested or original Consciousness, and the individual to be its manifestation or reproduction, we see that we hardly succeed. Manifestation is nothing but appearance or revelation, and this presupposes an intelligence to which the manifestation, appearance or revelation is made. But there is no intelligence other than the Universal to which it may appear or reveal itself; and as to appearing or revealing itself to itself, that is an eternal affair. The Infinite reveals itself to itself eternally and in its

totality, not in time or in part. The idea of manifestation, therefore, does not help us in understanding the relation of the finite and the Infinite. I need hardly say that the idea of reproduction is not in the least more helpful. The Infinite cannot reproduce itself to itself. We thus see that the Universal becoming individual and yet keeping its infinitude in tact, the One becoming many and yet remaining one, is an idea which we can, by no means, make perfectly intelligible, whatever justification in reason we may have for entertaining it. I shall go even so far as to admit that if the principle of non-contradiction were applicable to the sphere of thought we are moving in,—which, I think, it is not,—the proposition in question, namely that the Infinite is one with the finite or becomes finite, would have to be pronounced self-contradictory. It is this apparently self-contradictory character of the proposition which seems to have led Sankara to pronounce creation to be unreal, and our belief in finite and changing things to be only *vyāvahārika* and the Infinite and Unchangeable to be alone absolute truth. We have seen, and will yet see more clearly as we proceed, that we must believe both in the Infinite and the finite, the Eternal and the temporal, and hold both these aspects of Reality to be one and yet different. We have seen that though we are really subject to

Máyá, to a power of illusion which, in our unenlightened state, makes us believe that we ourselves and the world are independent of Brahman, yet when enlightenment comes and the darkness of illusion is scattered, ourselves and the world are not scattered with it, but remain as facts, not independent of God indeed, but yet as undeniable as his infinitude and eternity. Call the finite relative, if you like, *i. e.* relative to God, and not absolute in that sense, but it is not merely *vyāvahārika*, that is relative to ignorance, for we find it existing even after knowledge has taken the place of ignorance. Here, then, lies the difference, clear and unmistakable, between what we conceive to be the correct interpretation of Vedāntic Monism, and Sankara's interpretation of it; but the fact remains that in a system of Monism the finite and the changing are as inconceivable and even apparently self-contradictory ideas as Sankara represents them to be. Whether the Infinite and the Eternal are not also as inconceivable without relation to the finite and the temporal, we have partly seen, and shall see more fully as we proceed.



APPENDIX



LECTURE I.

Page 12.

वेदान्ते परमं गुह्यं पुरा कल्पे प्रचोदितम् ।

नाप्रशान्ताय दातव्यं नापुत्रायाशिष्याय वा पुनः ।

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत् ६।२२।

P. 1b.

वेदान्तविज्ञान-सुनिश्चितार्थाः

सन्न्यासयोगाद् यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।

ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले

परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्व्वे ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषत् ३।२।६ ।

P. 13.

अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायामैकत्वविद्या-प्रतिपत्तये सर्व्वे
वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते । ' यथाचायमर्थः सर्व्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा च
वयमस्यां शरीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः । वेदान्तमीमांसा-
शास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्याऽस्माभिरिदमादिमं सूत्रम् ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य-भूमिका ।

Page 17.

सर्वोपनिषदो गावो दोग्धा गोपालनन्दनः ।

पार्थो वत्सः सुधीर्भोक्ता दुग्धं गीतामृतं महत् ॥

वैष्णवीयतन्त्रसारे गीतामाहात्म्यम् ।

LECTURE II.

P. 42.

यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येनवागभ्युद्यते ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनोमतम् ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

यच्चक्षुषा न पश्यति येन चक्षूषि पश्यति ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

यच्छ्रोत्रेण न शृणोति येन श्रोत्रमिदं श्रुतम् ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

यत् प्राणेन न प्राणिति येन प्राणः प्रणयते ।

तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते ॥

केनोपनिषत् १।४।८

P. 43.

सर्वस्य हि वेदितुः स्वात्मा ब्रह्मेति सर्ववेदान्तान्
मुनिश्चितोऽर्थः । इह च तदेव प्रतिपादितं प्रश्नप्रतिवचनोक्त्य

श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रमित्याद्यया । यद्वाचानभ्युदितमिति विशेषतो-
ऽवधारितम् ।.....न चान्यो वेदिता ब्रह्मणोऽस्ति यस्य वेद्यमन्यत्
स्याद् ब्रह्म नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञात्रित्यन्यो विज्ञाता प्रतिषिध्यते ।

शाङ्कर-केनोपनिषद्भाष्यम् २।१ ।

P. 1b.

तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यदृष्टं द्रष्टुं श्रुतं श्रावऽमनं मन्त्रऽविज्ञातं
विज्ञातं नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टुं नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतुं नान्यदतोऽस्ति
मन्त्रं नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञात्रेतस्मिन् खल्वक्षरे गार्ग्याकाश श्रोतश्च
प्रोतश्चेति ।

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् ३।८।११ ।

P. 44.

क्षेत्रज्ञश्चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।

भगवद्गीता १३।२ ।

P. 46.

उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान् निबोधत ।

क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया

दुर्गम् पथस्तत् कवयो वदन्ति ॥

कठोपनिषत् १।३।१४ ।

P. 1b.

नावितरो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।

नाशान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैवमाप्नुयात् ॥

कठोपनिषत् १।२।२४ः

P. 16.

यस्त्वविज्ञानवान् भवत्ययुक्तेन मनसा सदा ।
 तस्येन्द्रियान्यवस्थानि दुष्टाश्वा इव सारथेः ॥
 यस्तु विज्ञानवान् भवति युक्तेन मनसा सदा ।
 तस्येन्द्रियानि वस्थानि सदश्वा इव सारथेः ॥
 यस्त्वविज्ञानवान् भवत्यमनस्कः सदाऽशुचिः ।
 न स तत्पदमाप्नोति संसारञ्चाधिगच्छति ॥
 यस्तु विज्ञानवान् भवति समनस्कः सदा शुचिः ।
 स तु तत्पदमाप्नोति यस्माद्भूयो न जायते ॥
 विज्ञानः सारथिर्यस्तु मनः प्रग्रहवान्नरः ।
 सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥

कठोपनिषत् १।३।५-८

P. 48.

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
 यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा वृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ॥

कठोपनिषत् १।२।२३

P. 16.

मच्चित्ता मद्गतप्राणा बोधयन्तः परस्परम् ।
 कथयन्तश्च मां नित्यं तुष्यन्ति च रमन्ति च ॥
 तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
 ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमज्ञानजं तमः ।

नाशयाम्यात्मभावस्थो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता ॥

भगवद्गीता १०।८-११ ।

P. 49.

न सन्दृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् ।

हृदा मनोषा मनसाभिक्षृप्तो य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥

कठोपनिषत् २।२।८ ।

न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा ।

ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्वस्ततस्तु तं पश्यति निष्कलं ध्यायमानः ॥

एषोऽनुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यो

यस्मिन् प्राणः पञ्चधा संविवेश ।

प्राणैश्चित्तं सर्व्वमोतं प्रजानां

यस्मिन् विशुद्धे विभवत्येष आत्मा ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषत् ३।१।८, ९ ।

P. 50.

महान् प्रभुर्वै पुरुषः सत्त्वस्थैषः प्रवर्त्तकः ।

सुनिर्म्मलमिमां प्राप्तिमीशानो ज्योतिरव्ययः ॥

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत् ३।१२ ।

P. 58.

किमात्मकं पुनः शब्दमभिप्रेत्येदं शब्दप्रभवत्वमुच्यते ।

स्फोटमित्याह । वर्णपक्षे हि तेषामुत्पन्नप्रध्वंसित्वान्नित्येभ्यः

शब्देभ्यो देवादिव्यक्तानां प्रभव इत्यनुपपन्नं स्यात् । उत्पन्न-

प्रध्वंसिनश्च वर्णाः प्रत्युच्चारणमन्यथा चान्यथा च प्रतीयमान-
 त्वात् । तथाह्यदृश्यमानेऽपि पुरुषविशेषोऽध्ययनध्वनिश्रवणा-
 देव विशेषतो निर्द्धार्यते देवदत्तोऽयमधीते यज्ञदत्तोऽयमधीते
 इति न चायं वर्णविषयोऽन्यथात्वप्रत्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानं बाधक-
 प्रत्ययाभावात् । न च वर्णेभ्योऽर्थावगतिर्युक्ता न ह्येकैको
 वर्णोऽर्थं प्रत्याययेत् व्यभिचारात् । न च वर्णसमुदायप्रत्ययो-
 ऽस्ति क्रमवत्त्वादर्शनात् । पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कार-
 सहितोऽन्योवर्णोऽर्थं प्रत्याययिष्यतीति यद्युच्येत, तन्न, सम्बन्ध-
 ग्रहणपेक्षो हि शब्दः स्वयं प्रतीयमानोऽर्थं प्रत्याययेत् धूमादिवत्,
 न च पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहितस्यान्तवर्णस्य प्रतीति-
 रस्यप्रत्यक्षत्वात् संस्काराणाम् । कार्यप्रत्यायितैः संस्कारैः
 सहितोऽन्यवर्णोऽर्थं प्रत्याययिष्यतीति चेन्न, संस्कारकार्यस्यापि
 स्मरणस्य क्रमवर्त्तित्वात्, तस्मात् स्फोट एव शब्दः, सचैकैकवर्ण-
 प्रत्ययाहितसंस्कारबीजेऽन्यवर्णप्रत्ययजनितपरिपाके प्रत्ययिन्येक-
 प्रत्ययविषयतया भटिति प्रत्यवभासते । न चायमेकप्रत्ययो
 वर्णविषया स्मृतिवर्णानामनेकत्वादेकप्रत्ययविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः ।
 तस्य च प्रत्युच्चारणं प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वान्नित्यत्वं, भेदप्रत्ययस्य
 वर्णविषयत्वात् । तस्मान्नित्याच्छब्दात् स्फोटरूपात् अभि-
 धायकात् क्रियाकारकफललक्षणं जगदभिधेयभूतं प्रभवतीति ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् १।३।२८ ।

LECTURE III.

Page 69.

न ह्यात्मागन्तुकः कस्यचित्, स्वयं सिद्धत्वात् । न ह्यात्मा-
त्मनः प्रमाणमपेक्ष्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्य-
सिद्धप्रमेयसिद्धये उपादीयन्ते । न ह्याकाशादयः पदार्थाः
प्रमाणनिरपेक्षाः स्वयं सिद्धाः केनचिदभ्युपगम्यन्ते । आत्मा तु
प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराश्रयत्वात् प्रागेव प्रमाणादिव्यवहारात्
सिध्यति । न चेदृशस्य निराकरणं सम्भवति । आगन्तुकं हि
वस्तु निराक्रियते न स्वरूपम् । य एव हि निराकर्ता तदेव
तस्य स्वरूपम् । न ह्यग्नेरौष्ण्यमग्निना निराक्रियते । तथा-
ऽहमेवेदानीं जानामि वर्त्तमानं वस्त्वहमेवातीतमतितरञ्चाज्ञा-
सिषमहमेवानागतमनागततरञ्च ज्ञास्यामीत्यतीतानागतवर्त्त-
मानभावेनान्यथा भवत्यपि ज्ञातव्ये न ज्ञातुरन्यथाभावोऽस्ति
सर्व्वदा वर्त्तमानस्वभावत्वात् । तथा भस्मोभवत्यपि देहे नात्मन
उच्छेदो वर्त्तमानस्वभावत्वात् । अन्यथा स्वभावत्वं वा न
सम्भावयितुं शक्यम् ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् २।३।७ ।

Page 70.

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं
नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्व्वं
तस्य भासा सर्व्वमिदं विभाति ॥

कठोपनिषत् २।२।१५ ।

P. 16.

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कृत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।

क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कृत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥

भगवद्गीता १३।३३ ।

P. 74.

सर्वं तत् प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः प्रज्ञा
प्रतिष्ठा प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म ।

ऐतरेयोपनिषत् ३।३ ।

P. 16.

स यथा सोम्य वयांसि वासो वृक्षं सम्प्रतिष्ठन्ते । एवं ह वै
तत् सर्वं पर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ।

प्रश्नोपनिषत् ४।७ ।

P. 16.

य एष सुप्तेषु जागर्त्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्भिमानः ।

तदेव शुक्रं तद् ब्रह्म तदेवानृतमुच्यते ।

तस्मिन्नोकाः श्रिता सर्वे तदु नात्येति कश्चन । एतद् वै तत् ।

कठोपनिषत् २।२।८ ।

P. 79.

यदप्यालयविज्ञाननामवासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पितं तदपि
क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमादनवस्थितरूपं सत्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानवन्नवासनाना-
मधिकरणं भवितुमर्हति । नहि कालत्रयसम्बन्धिन्येकस्मि-
न्मन्ययिन्यसति कूटस्थे वा सर्वार्थदर्शिनि देशकालनिमित्तापेक्ष-

वासनाधीनस्मृति-प्रतिसन्धानादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति । स्थिर-
रूपत्वेत्वालयविज्ञानस्य सिद्धान्तहानिः ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् २।२।३१ ।

LECTURE IV.

Page 87.

कोऽयमात्मेति वयमुपास्महे कतरः स आत्मा । येन वा रूपं
पश्यति येन वा शब्दं शृणोति येन वा गन्धानाजिघ्रति येन वाचं
व्याकरोति येन वा स्वादु चास्वादु च विजानाति । यदेतत्
हृदयं मनश्चैतत् संज्ञानमाज्ञानं विज्ञानं प्रज्ञानं मेधादृष्टिर्धृति-
र्मतिर्भ्रमणीषा जूतिः स्मृतिः सङ्कल्पः क्रतुरसुः कामो वश इति ।
सर्वार्थेष्वैतानि प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवन्ति ।

ऐतरेयोपनिषत् ३।१।२ ।

P. 88.

किमात्मकञ्च पुनरिदं चैतन्यं मन्यते यस्य भूतेभ्य
उत्पत्तिमिच्छन्तीति परः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यः । न हि भूत-
चतुष्टयव्यतिरेकेण लोकायतिकाः किञ्चित् तत्त्वं प्रतियन्ति ।
यदनुभवनं भूतभौतिकानां तच्चैतन्यमिति चेत् तत्तर्हि
विषयत्वात् तेषां न तद्वर्त्मत्वमश्रूयते स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् ।

न ह्यग्निरुष्णः सन् स्वात्मानं दहति । न हि नटः शिञ्चितः सन्
 स्वस्कन्धमधिरोच्यति । न हि भूतभौतिकधर्मेण सता चैतन्येन
 भूतभौतिकानि विषयोक्रियेरन् । न हि रूपादिभिः स्वं रूपं
 पररूपं वा विषयोक्रियते । विषयोक्रियन्ते तु वाह्याध्यात्मि-
 कानि भूतभौतिकानि चैतन्येन । अतश्च यथैवास्या भूत-
 भौतिकविषयाया उपलब्धेर्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते एवं व्यतिरेको-
 ऽप्यस्यास्तेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । उपलब्धिस्वरूपमेव च न आत्मा
 इत्यात्मानो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वं नित्यत्वं चोपलब्धेरैकरूप्यात् ।
 अहमिदमद्राक्षम् इति चावस्थान्तरयोगेऽप्युपलब्धत्वेन प्रत्यभि-
 ज्ञानात् स्मृत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च ।

शाङ्कर ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् ३।३।५४ ।

P. 89.

अपि च वैनाशिकः सर्वस्य वस्तुनः क्षणिकतामभ्युपयन्नुप-
 लब्धेरपि क्षणिकतामभ्युपेयात्, न च सा सम्भवति, अनुस्मृतिः ।
 अनुभवमुपलब्धिमनुत्पद्यमानं स्मरणमेवानुस्मृतिः सा चोप-
 लब्धेऽककर्तृका सती सम्भवति, पुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिविषये पुरुषा-
 न्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात् । कथं ह्यहमदोऽद्राक्षमिदं पश्यामीति च
 पूर्वोत्तरदर्शिन्येकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्ययः स्यात् । अपि च दर्शन-
 स्मरणयोः कर्त्तर्येकस्मिन् प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः सर्वस्य
 लोकस्य प्रसिद्धोऽहमदोऽद्राक्षामिदं पश्यामीति । यदि हि
 तयोर्भिन्नः कर्त्ता स्यात् ततोऽहं स्मराम्यद्राक्षीदन्य इति प्रतीयात्,
 नत्वेवं प्रत्येति कश्चित् । यत्रैवं प्रत्ययस्तत्र दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भिन्न-

मेव कर्त्तारं सर्व्वलोकोऽवगच्छति स्मराम्यहमसावदोऽद्राक्षीदिति
इह त्वहमदोऽद्राक्षमिति दर्शनस्मरणयोर्वैनाशिकोऽप्यात्मान-
मेवैकं कर्त्तारमवगच्छति, न नाहमित्यात्मनो दर्शनं निवृत्तं
निवृत्ते । यथाग्निरनुष्णोऽप्रकाश इति वा । तत्रैवं सत्येकस्य
दर्शनस्मरणक्षणद्वयसम्बन्धे क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरपरिहार्या
वैनाशिकस्य स्यात् । तथानन्तरामनन्तरामात्मन एव प्रतिपत्तिं
प्रत्यभिजानन्नेककर्त्तृकामाजन्मन आचोत्तमादुच्छ्रामादतीताश्च
प्रतिपत्तीरात्मैककर्त्तृकाः प्रतिसन्दधानः कथं क्षणभङ्गवादी
वैनाशिको नापत्रपेत । स यदि ब्रूयात् सादृश्यादेतत् सम्प्रत्यत
इति, तं प्रतिब्रूयात्, तेनेदं सदृशमिति इयायत्तत्वात् सादृश्यस्य
क्षणभङ्गवादिनः सदृशयोर्द्वयवस्तुनोर्ग्रहीतुरेकस्याभावात्
सादृश्यनिमित्तं प्रतिसन्दधानमिति मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात् ।
स्याच्चेत् पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोः सादृश्यस्य ग्रहीतैकस्तथा सत्येकस्य
क्षणद्वयावस्थानात् क्षणिकत्वप्रतिज्ञा पिद्येत । तेनेदं सदृशमिति
प्रत्ययान्तरमेवेदं न पूर्वोत्तर क्षणद्वयग्रहणनिमित्तमिति चेत्,
न, तेनेदमिति भिन्नपदार्थोपादानात् । प्रत्ययान्तरमेव चेत्
सादृश्यविषयं स्यात् तेनेदं सदृशमिति वाक्यप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः
स्यात्, सादृश्यमित्येव प्रयोगः प्राप्नुयात् ।नचायं सादृश्यात्
संव्यवहारो युक्तः, तज्ज्ञावावगमात् तत्सदृशभावानवगमाच्च ।
भवेदपि कदाचित् वाह्यवस्तुनि विप्रलम्भसम्भवात् तदेवेदं स्यात्
तत्सदृशं वेति सन्देहः । उपलब्धरि तु सन्देहोऽपि न कदा-
चिद्भवति, स एवाहं स्यां तत्सदृशो वेति । य एवाहं पूर्व्वेद्युरद्राक्षं

स एवाहमद्य स्मरामीति निश्चितात् तद्भावोपलब्धात् । तस्माद-
प्यनुपपन्नो वैनाशिकसमयः ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् २।२।२५ ।

LECTURE V.

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तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वन्तिके ।

तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः ॥

ईशोपनिषत् ५ ।

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अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिः ॥

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिः ॥

कठोपनिषत् २।२।८, १० ।

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एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।

कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषत् ६।११

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नैवं स्यात् । मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते
 सत्यत्वावधारणात् । वाचारम्भनशब्देन च विकारजातस्यानृत-
 त्वाभिधानात् । दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि 'एतदात्मप्रमिदं सर्व्व' 'तत्
 सत्य'मिति च परमकारणस्यैवैकस्य सत्यत्वावधारणात् । 'स
 आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' इति च शरीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोप-
 देशात् । स्वयं प्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छरीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते न
 यत्नान्तरसाध्यम् । अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वमभ्युपगम्यमानं
 स्वाभाविकस्य शरीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं सम्पद्यते रज्ज्वादिवुद्भय इव
 सर्पादिवुद्भोनाम् । बाधिते च शरीरात्मत्वे तदाश्रयः समस्तः स्वाभा-
 विको व्यवहारो बाधितो भवति, यत्प्रसिद्धये नानात्वांशोऽपरो
 ब्रह्मणः कल्प्यते । दर्शयति च 'यत्तत्त्वस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्
 केन कं पश्येत्' इत्यादिना ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शिनं प्रति समस्तस्य क्रिया-
 कारकफललक्षणस्य व्यवहारस्याभावम् । न चायं व्यवहाराभावो-
 ऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुम् । तत्त्वमसीति
 ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात् । तस्करदृष्टान्तेन (छा,
 ६।१६) चानृताभिसन्धस्य बन्धनं सत्याभिसन्धस्य मोक्षं दर्शयन्नेक-
 त्वमेवैकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति, मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भत्वं च नानात्वम् ।
 उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनृताभिसन्ध
 इत्युच्यते । 'मृत्योः स मृत्युपाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति'
 इति च भेददृष्टिमपवदन्नेतदेव दर्शयति ।

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नैष दोषः सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक्प्रबोधात् । यावच्च न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिस्तावत् प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु व्यवहारेष्व-
नृतबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते । विकाराणैव त्वहं 'ममेत्य-
विद्ययात्मात्मीयभावेन सर्वो जन्तुः प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं
ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा । तस्मात् प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो
लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः । यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य
स्वप्न उच्चावचान् भावान् पश्यतो निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं
विज्ञानं भवति प्राक् प्रबोधात् । न च प्रत्यक्षाभासाभि-
प्रायस्तत्काले भवति तद्वत् ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् २।१।१४ ।

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'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूत' इत्यादि वाक्येभ्यो
नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वरूपात् सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेरीश्वराज्जगदुत्पत्ति-
स्थितिलयाः, नाचेतनात् प्रधानादन्यस्माद्वेत्येषोऽर्थः प्रतिज्ञातो
'जन्माद्यस्य यत' इति । सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव न तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः
पुनरिहोच्यते । कथं नोच्येत अत्यन्तमात्मन एकत्वमद्वितीय-
त्वञ्च भ्रुवता ? शृणु यथा नोच्यते । सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य आत्मभूते
इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्वचनीये
संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति

च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलष्येते, ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः, 'आकाशो
 व तामरूपयोर्निर्वहता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतेः ।
 'नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि,' 'सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचिन्त्य धीरो
 नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन् यदास्ते,' 'एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति'
 इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यश्च । एवमविद्याकृतनामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधोऽश्वरो
 भवति, व्योमेव घटकरकाद्यपाध्यनुरोधि । स च स्वात्मभूतानेव
 घटाकाशस्थानीयानविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणस-
 ङ्घातानुरोधिना जीवाख्यान् विज्ञानात्मनः प्रतीष्टे व्यवहार-
 विषये । तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्ष्यमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं
 सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वञ्च, न परमार्थतो विद्यायापास्तसर्वोपाधि-
 स्वरूपे आत्मनोऽपिशितस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यते ।
 तथाचोक्तम् 'यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति
 स भूमा इति,' 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन
 कं पश्येत्,' इत्यादि च । एवं परमार्थावस्थायां सर्व-
 व्यवहाराभावं वदन्ति वेदान्ताः ।.....व्यवहारावस्थायान्तूक्तः
 श्रुतावपीश्वरादिव्यवहारः—'एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष
 भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसम्भेदाय' इति ।.....
 सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण 'तदन्यत्वमि'त्याह । व्यवहारा-
 भिप्रायेण तु 'स्याल्लोकवदि'ति महासमुद्रादिस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः
 कथयति, अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्च परिणामप्रक्रियाज्ञाश्रयति
 सगुणोपासनेषूपयुज्यत इति ।

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कर्मापेक्षायान्तु ब्रह्मण ईक्षितत्वश्रुतयः सुतरामुपपन्नाः ।
किं पुनस्तत् कर्म यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेरौश्वरज्ञानस्य विषयो भवतीति ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये नामरूपे अव्याकृते व्याचिकीर्षिते
इति ब्रूमः । यत्प्रसादाद्भि योगिनामप्यतीतनागतविषयं
प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमिच्छन्ति योगशास्त्रविदः किमु वक्तव्यं तस्य नित्य-
सिद्धस्येश्वरस्य सृष्टिस्थितिसंहतिविषयं नित्यं ज्ञानं भवतीति ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् १।१।५ ।

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यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु
न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्वात्, एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया न
संस्पृश्यते इति ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् २।२।८ ।

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किं पुनर्जीवस्येश्वरसमानधर्मत्वं नात्स्येव न नास्तीति ।
विद्यमानमपि तु तत् तिरोहितं अविद्याव्यवधानात् । तत्
पुनस्तिरोहितं सत् परमेश्वरमभिधायतो यतमानस्य जन्तोर्वि-
धूतधान्तस्य तिमिरतिरस्कृतस्येव दृक्शक्तिरौषधवीर्यादीश्वर-
प्रसादात् संसिद्धस्य कस्यचिदेवाविर्भवति न स्वभावत एव
सर्वेषां जन्तूनाम् । कुतः । ततो हि ईश्वराद्येतोरस्य जीवस्य
बन्धमोक्षौ भवतः । ईश्वरस्य स्वरूपापरिज्ञानाद्वन्धस्तत्स्वरूपपरि-
ज्ञानात्तु मोक्षः । तथा च श्रुतिः—‘ज्ञात्वा देवं सर्वपाप्मापहानिः

क्षौणैः क्षेणैर्जन्ममृत्युप्रहानिः । तस्याभिधानात् तृतीयं देहभेदे विश्वैश्वर्यं केवलो आत्मकामः' इत्येवमाद्या ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् ३।२।५ ।

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यदि वयं स्वतन्त्रां काश्चित् प्रागवस्थां जगतः कारणत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छेम प्रसञ्जयेम तदा प्रधानकारणवादम् । परमेश्वराधोनात्वियमस्माभिः प्रागवस्था जगतोऽभ्युपगम्यते न स्वतन्त्रा । सा चावश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्या, अर्थवतो हि सा । नहि तथा विना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिध्यति, शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । मुक्तानाञ्च पुनरनुत्पत्तिः, विद्यया तस्या बीजशक्तेर्द्वाहात् । अविद्यात्मिका हि सा बीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुषुप्तिर्यस्यां स्वरूपप्रतिबोधरहिताः शिरते संसारिणो जीवाः ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् १।४।३ ।

P. 141.

नियोज्योऽपि च प्रपञ्चावस्थायां योऽवगम्यते जीवो नाम, स प्रपञ्चपक्षस्यैव वा स्यात् ब्रह्मपक्षस्यैव वा ? प्रथमे विकल्पे निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनेन पृथिव्यादिवज्जीवस्यापि प्रविलापितत्वात् कस्य प्रपञ्चविलये नियोग उच्येत, कस्य वा नियोगनिष्ठतया मोक्षोऽवाप्तव्य उच्येत । द्वितीयेऽपि ब्रह्मैवानियोज्यस्वभावं जीवस्य स्वरूपम्, जीवत्वं त्वविद्याकृतमेवेति प्रतिपादिते ब्रह्मणि नियोज्यभावात् नियोगाभाव एव ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम् ३।२।२१ ।

LECTURE VI.

Page 146.

तदेतत् सत्यम्—

यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः
 सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते स्वरूपाः ।
 तथाक्षरात् विविधाः सोम्यभावाः
 प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापि यन्ति ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषत् २।१।१ ।

Page 1b.

पुरुष एवेदं विश्वं कर्म
 तपो ब्रह्म पराकृतम् ।
 एतद् यो वेद निहितं गुहायां
 सोऽविद्याग्रन्थिं विकरतीह सोम्य ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषत् २।१।१० ।

P. 147.

आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । नान्यत् किञ्चनमिषत् ।
 स ईक्षत लोकान् नु सृजा इति ॥ १ ॥

स इमांलोकानसृजत । अन्धो मरीचीर्मरमापोऽदोऽश्वः
 परेण दिवं द्यौः प्रतिष्ठान्मरीचं मरीचयः । पृथिवी मरो या
 अधस्तात् ता आपः ॥ २ ॥

स ईक्षते मे नु लोका लोकपालान् सृजा इति । सोऽङ्ग
एव पुरुषं समुद्भृत्यामूर्च्छयत् ॥ ३ ॥

ऐतरेयोपनिषत् १ ।

P. 1b.

स जातो भूतान्यभिवैक्षत् किमिहान्यं वावदिषदिति । स
एतमेव पुरुषं ब्रह्म तततममपश्यदिदमदर्शमिति ॥

ऐतरेयोपनिषत् १।३।१३ ।

P. 148.

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।.....तदैक्षत
बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत । तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहु
स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत ।.....ता आप ऐक्षन्त बह्व्यः
स्याम प्रजायेमहीति ता अन्नमसृजत ।.....सेयं देवतैक्षत
हन्ताहमिमास्त्रिस्तो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे
व्याकरवाणीति ।

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।२, ३ ।

P. 151.

श्चेतकेतुर्हार्णय आस तं ह पितोवाच श्चेतकेतो वस
ब्रह्मचर्यं न वै सोम्यास्मत् कुलीनोऽननूच ब्रह्मधन्वुरिव
भवतीति ॥ १ ॥

स ह द्वादशवर्ष उपेत्य चतुर्विंशतिवर्षः सर्वान् वेदानधीत्य
महामनाऽनूचानमानी स्तब्ध एयाय ॥ २ ॥

तं हि पितोवाच श्वेतकेतो यन्नु सोम्येदं महामनाऽनूचान-
मानी लब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राच्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं
मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमिति ॥ ३ ॥

कथं नु भगवः स आदेशो भवतीति यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पि-
ण्डेन सर्वं मृत्समं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं
मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥ ४ ॥

यथा सोम्यैकेन लोहमणिना सर्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्याद्-
वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं लोहमित्येव सत्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

यथा सोम्यैकेन नखकुन्तनेन सर्वं काणायसं विज्ञातं स्याद्
वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं कणायसमित्येव सत्यं एवं सोम्य
स आदेशो भवतीति ॥ ६ ॥

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।१ ।

P. 152.

तस्य क्व मूलं स्यादन्यत्राङ्गोऽङ्गिः सोम्य शुङ्गेन सङ्मूलमन्विच्छ
सङ्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठा यथा तु
खलु सोम्येमास्तिस्त्रो देवताः पुरुषं प्राप्य त्रिवृत्रिवृदेकैका
भवति तदुक्तं पुरस्तादेव भवत्यस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो
वाङ्मनसि सम्पद्यते मनः प्राणि प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परमदेवतायां
स वा एषोऽणिमा ।

एतदात्मप्रमिदं सर्वं तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो ।

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।८।६, ७ ।

P. 155.

यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितर
इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं शृणोति तदितर इतरमभिवदति
तदितर इतरं मनुते तदितर इतरं विजानाति यत्र वा अस्य
सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् तत् केन कं जिघ्रेत् तत्
केन कं शृणुयात् तत् केन कमभिवदेत् तत् केन कं मन्वीत तत्
केन कं विजानीयात् ।

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषत् २।४।१४ ।

P. 1b.

यो वै भूमा तत् सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति भूमैव सुखं भूमात्वेव
विजिज्ञासितव्य इति भूमानं भगवो विजिज्ञास इति ।

यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति तान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति
स भूमा अथ यत्रान्यत् पश्यत्यन्यच्छृणोत्यन्यद्विजानाति
तदल्पम् ।

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ७।२३, २४ ।

P. 159.

त्रिभिर्गुणमयैर्भावैरेभिः सर्व्वमिदं जगत् ।

मोहितं नाभिजानाति मामेभ्यः परमव्ययम् ॥

दैवीद्वेषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।

मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥

न मां दुष्कृतिनो मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः ।

माययापङ्क्तज्ञाना आसुरं भावमाश्रिताः ॥

भगवद्गीता ७।१३-१५ ।

P. 1b.

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

आमयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

तमेव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन भारत ।

तत्प्रसादात् परां शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम् ॥

भगवद्गीता १८।६१, ६२ ।

THE VEDANTA AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT

Lectures delivered before the Theological
Society, Calcutta, during session
1900-1901

BY

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**THE VEDANTA AND ITS RELATION
TO MODERN THOUGHT
VOL II.**

PREFACE

THE second volume of this book comes out eight years after the publication of the first. It would have been impossible for the author to publish it even at the lapse of this long period but for the liberality of an admirer of the Vedanta. The public, specially the religious public, has lately heard much of the public spirit and philanthropy of the Raja of Pithapuram. It is through the pecuniary help of this pious nobleman that the author of these lectures is enabled to give them the comparatively permanent form of a book. Otherwise some of them should not have come out of their ephemeral shape as magazine and newspaper articles and some of them should not have seen the light at all in any shape. The author's debt of gratitude to the kind and noble Raja is immense, and not confined to help in publishing these lectures. Since the publication of his *Religion of Brahman* in 1907, he has been feeling that a kind and appreciative heart is sympathising with him and a strong arm supporting him in his literary efforts, however humble they may be. There will soon be, he trusts, another occasion for the author to express his debt to his broad-hearted and high-souled patron.

These lectures will speak for themselves. It is hoped that the two volumes now given to the

public will give a fair idea of the philosophical and spiritual teachings of the Vedanta to readers educated under the present system, men who are more familiar with modern thought than the treasured experiences of the ancient sages and saints of their own country. It is also hoped that the present volume will, on the whole, be more interesting to some readers than the first, as dealing mostly with subjects more of a practical than of a metaphysical nature. It is an additional source of satisfaction to the author to think that it will increase the circle of pious and thoughtful friends and acquaintances to which his annotations and translation of the *Upanishads* and his other Vedantic and Theistic publications, including the first volume of this book, have introduced him.

The author is indebted to Mr. G. A. Natesan, B. A., Editor of the *Indian Review*, and Mr. Sachchidananda Sinha, Barrister-at-Law, Editor of the *Hindustan Review*, for their permission to reprint in this volume a number of his lectures which appeared in their esteemed journals as articles. The author is also under obligation to those English translators of Sanskrit works from whom he has freely quoted whenever this has been necessary, and whose names are mentioned in the body of the book. As in the first volume, the original texts appear in the Appendix.

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LECTURE VII.

RAMANUJA AND HIS QUALIFIED MONISM.

TILL very lately, Râmânuja was known in Northern India. by little more than his name. His followers, though numerous in the Deccan, are extremely few in the North-West, and scarcely to be found in Bengal. Of the numerous temples in the famous city of Vaishnava pilgrimage, Brindâban, only one belongs, I am told, to the Râmânuja sect. Râmânuja's *Srî Bhâshya*, i. e., his commentary on the *Vedânta Sûtras*, was published for the first time in the Devanagari character only about fifteen years ago, at Benares. The commentary on the *Upanishads* that goes by his name is to be found only in the Telegu character. In fact, all that the people of Northern India knew of Râmânuja's teachings before the publication of the *Srî-Bhâshya* at Benares, was from the brief synopsis of these in Mâdhavâchârya's *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*, while the English translation of this book by Professors Gough and Cowell, and the brief account of Râmânuja's philosophical views in the Introduction to Professor Thibaut's translation of the *Vedânta Sûtras* in the "Sacred Books of the

East" series, were hitherto the only available sources of information regarding him for English readers. An English translation of Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* by Mr. A. Govindāchārya, and the first volume of an English translation of the *Srī Bhāshya* by Professor Rāṅgāchārya and Varadarāja Aengar, have recently been published.* The account that I shall give of Rāmānuja's life in this lecture is taken mainly from the well-known biographical work called *Bhaktamāla*. What I shall say about his philosophy is gathered from his *Srī Bhāshya* and his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*. I have also gathered a few materials from the *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*.

As I have already said in my fifth lecture, in Northern India, specially in Bengal, Vedantism is too much identified with the teachings of Sankarāchārya, and it is well-nigh forgotten that there are at least two more exponents of the teachings of the Vedanta whose interpretations of the Vedantic institutes are accepted by their followers with as much respect as the interpretation of Sankara by his adherents. Whatever the relative truth of these various interpretations may be, the fact is that they

* Professor Thibaut has since given a full translation of the *Srī Bhāshya* in a volume of the "Sacred Books of the East."

are greatly opposed to one another, and that no true or impartial view of Vedantic teachings can be obtained without some knowledge of the way in which these mutually opposed philosophers expound the system.

I have already, in my first lecture, briefly indicated the main differences of these three schools of the Vedanta philosophy. Before I proceed to state Rāmānuja's philosophical views in detail, I shall say a few words on Rāmānuja as a Vaishnava. He is the founder of the Srī sect of Vaishnavas. Srī is another name of Lakshmi, the consort of Vishnu. This sect is chronologically the first of the four recognised Vaishnava sects, the other three being considered as its off-shoots. The latter are identified with the names of Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka. As will be seen from the short life of Rāmānuja that follows, he was a zealous and even a bigotted Vaishnava, and identified himself fully with his sectarian propaganda. This is perhaps one reason why he is thought of more as a Vaishnava than as a Vedantist, and why Vedantism is identified almost exclusively with Sankara's teachings. The sectarianism of the former compares very unfavourably with the unsectarian Vedantism of the latter. Sankara was as much a believer in the gods of the national pantheon as Rāmānuja, and he went even so far with the

followers of the popular religion as to call the higher gods incarnations of God. But he never forgot his Vedantism so far as to say that any incarnation of God can be perfect. In his preface to the *Bhagavadgītā* he distinctly speaks of Śrī Krishna, the most honoured of Divine incarnations, as a partial incarnation of the Deity. Again, Sankara's freedom from sectarian bias comes out in another way. He apparently attaches no importance to the historical or mythical incidents in the lives of deified heroes. His Krishna, for instance, is important to him only as the speaker of the *Bhagavadgītā*, the spiritual guide of Arjuna and through him of the whole human race; he has nothing to do with Krishna as a prince or a statesman or as the beloved of the cowherds and cowherdesses of Brindābana. On the other hand, Rāmānuja's preface to the same work reveals him as a sectarian Vaishnava, believing Śrī Krishna to be the very God infinite, and speaking of even the minute details of his child and adult life depicted in the Puranas as parts of his divine mission on earth. Sankara indeed is classed as a Saiva, and it is not improbable that, as is alleged, he favoured the worship of Siva,—which was the prevailing religion of Southern India and even of many parts of Northern India in his time,—as a lower discipline leading to the

higher forms of spiritual life inculcated in the Vedānta. But if one can judge from his commentaries on the three Vedāntic institutes,—the *Upanishads*, the *Vedānta Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*,—which are the only works that can be ascribed to him without any doubt, he was neither an adherent of Saivism nor an opponent of Vaishnavism. But Rāmānuja's Vaishnava bias is undoubted and appears glaringly even in his purely philosophical writings.

Rāmānuja is known to be a great opponent of Sankara's views, and really a considerable portion of his writings is taken up with the criticism of Sankara's *Māyāvāda* and other doctrines. Apart, however, from the relative truth of their philosophies, one cannot but compare the intellectual powers they bring to their work. It seems to me that if one can draw a distinction between a Logician and a Metaphysician, Rāmānuja is decidedly a greater Logician than Sankara. In his own way, he is also a better Psychologist. In the art of minute criticism and of fine analysis of mental phenomena, he seems decidedly to excel his great opponent. But I cannot say that he possesses the same deep metaphysical insight, the same synthetic grasp of ultimate truths, that characterises the great advocate of Absolute Monism. Rāmānuja's commentary on the first aphorism of the

Vedānta Sūtras is one elaborate criticism of Sankara's doctrine. One cannot but admire deeply the cautious minuteness with which the great Parināmavādin states every argument that has been and can be brought forward in defence of his opponent's position, Mâyāvāda, and then proceeds to answer each of these arguments with the same and almost tiresome minuteness. Sankara, in fact, is not half so systematic and elaborate either in defence of his own views or in criticism of those of his opponents. Rāmānuja, however, possessed the advantage of knowing all that had been written for and against Sankara's philosophy during the three centuries that separated the latter from the former, the one having lived in the ninth and the other in the twelfth century of the Christian era.

The story of Rāmānuja's life can be briefly told. He was born at Perambar, to the north-west of Madras. The date of his birth cannot be fixed with any certainty. He seems to have flourished about the beginning of the twelfth century. His father's name was Keshavāchārya, and his mother's Bhūmi Devī. He was educated at Conjeeveram and began to preach his doctrine in that city. The author of *Bhaktamāla* relates an interesting incident in connection with Rāmānuja's initiation. He was so full of burning zeal for preaching the name

of God, that he believed he could convert the whole town on the very first day of his anointment. Accordingly, immediately on his receiving the holy *mantra*, he ran to the gates of the city and in a loud voice called upon the inhabitants to forsake their evil ways and follow God. No fewer than eighty persons, it is said, responded to his call that very day. From Conjeeveram Rāmānuja removed to and settled for a time at Seringapatam, where he wrote several of his works. He then proceeded on a missionary tour, carrying on theological disputes with the exponents of various sects. His chief controversy seems to have been with the Saivas, and his main object the overthrow of Siva[•] worship and the establishment of Vaishnavism. In the course of his missionary tours, he is said to have taken possession of the temples of Siva at Venkatagiri and other places, and replaced the worship of that god in those places by that of Vishnu. When Rāmānuja returned from his travels to Seringapatam, a fierce dispute arose between the Saivas and the Vaishnavas. The king of the Cholas took the side of the former. He won the chief Brahmanas of his kingdom over to his side,—the turbulent by bribes and the timid by threats—and made them sign a declaration acknowledging the supremacy of Siva over all the other gods. But he could not, by any means,

induce the courageous Râmânuja to do this. The king proceeded to extremes: he sent armed men to seize and imprison the intrepid philosopher. Râmânuja, however, evaded the king's messengers with the help of his followers and threw himself under the protection of Betal Rây, the Jaina king of the Carnatic. The king's Jainism gradually yielded to the teachings of the Vaishnava preacher, and he became a devoted follower of his, being henceforth known as Vishnuvardhana. The new convert built a temple of Krishna at Yâdavagiri, the modern Pailakota, and placed it under Râmânuja's care. Râmânuja lived in this temple for twelve years; but when, at the end of this period, he learnt that his persecutor, the king of the Cholas, was dead, he returned to Seringapatam and spent the remainder of his life there in spiritual culture.

Besides his commentaries on the Vedântic institutes, Râmânuja is said to have written several smaller treatises, such as the *Vedârtha Sangraha*, the *Vedânta Sâra*, the *Vedânta Pradîpa*, the *Vedânta Syamantaka*, etc. He is also said to have founded no fewer than seven hundred *mathas* or colleges, of which only four exist now. Râmânuja, however, unlike Sankara, took care to make his system well-established among householders and did not extol monasticism at the expense of

the domestic life. He is said to have founded eighty-four lines or schools of hereditary *gurus* or spiritual teachers, whereas the number of monastic schools founded by him was only five.

In his criticism of Sankara's philosophy, Rāmānuja first of all takes up the question of *Nirgunavād*. Sankara's view of the Divine nature has all the appearance of a system of Agnosticism. His Brahman is indeed very different from the Agnostic's Inscrutable Power. Even at its greatest subtlety it is pure or undifferentenced intelligence and bliss. But the way in which Sankara states the Absolute's transcendence of all change and difference has the tendency to make it an Abstract Universal. Rāmānuja combats this tendency and tries to show that Brahman is never *nirguna*, attributeless, as he understands '*nirguna*' to mean, but always *saguna*, possessing attributes. In this he somewhat misunderstands Sankara, for, by '*nirguna*' the latter does not mean 'attributeless, but only transcending *sattvam*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the primary *gunas* or qualities of Nature. But Sankara also speaks of the Absolute as unspeakable and indescribable, and although ascribing consciousness to it, denies it the self-distinguishing character of ordinary consciousness. In his view, the Absolute does not distinguish itself either from the objective world or

from finite intelligences, but knows itself as the one, indivisible Reality without a second. In a sense, therefore, he may be said to make Brahman abstract and attributeless, and it is against this tendency that Rāmānuja fights a long and hard fight. To him there is no attributeless reality,—no unity without an element of difference in it. None of the recognised sources of knowledge—neither perception nor inference nor scripture—give evidence of the existence of an attributeless subject or object. Consciousness, which is represented by Sankara as fundamentally an undifferentenced unity, is ably shown by Rāmānuja to be always self-distinguishing,—differentiating itself from objects in time and space. It is true, says he, that the scriptures sometimes speak of Brahman as *nirguna*, but the word means, in such passages, nothing but freedom from lower and natural attributes,—freedom, that is, from the limitations of time and space. As to scriptural texts speaking of the absolute unity of Brahman,—texts which Sankara tries to press into the service of his Unqualified Monism, Rāmānuja argues that the unity spoken of in these texts does not exclude distinction. That there is a manifoldness or difference which is compatible with unity, for instance, that of a tree with many branches, or of the ocean with numberless waves, Rāmānuja knows

very well, so that he meets his opponent very successfully in the interpretation of the passages referred to.

Rāmānuja's criticism of Sankara's Mâyâ theory is most thorough, and displays his critical power at the fullest. But it is one thing to expose the defects of a theory, and quite a different thing to resolve successfully the difficulties which that theory is put forward to explain. How far Rāmānuja succeeds in this most difficult task, we shall see by and by. In the meantime, without entering into all the details of his long and tiresome criticism of the Mâyâ doctrine, I shall notice only one important point,—his defence of the dignity and validity of perception as a source of knowledge against the Mâyāvâdin's strictures on its unreliableness. The Mâyāvâdin makes much of dreams and illusions, and urges these as evidence of the misleading character of perception and the unreality of the material world. In reply to such arguments, our philosopher cites a number of cases which are usually set down as cases of pure illusion, but which, he tries to show, are partially based on reality, such as the appearance of a white conch as yellow to jaundiced eyes, in which case it is really the yellow colour of the bilious substance that is seen by the affected person; the appearance of a crystal gem as red on account

of its close proximity to a China rose, in which case the crystal transparency of the gem is overpowered by the brilliance of the rose ; and similar other cases which the philosopher explains from his standpoint, sometimes with real and sometimes with imaginary science. One ingenious explanation of erroneous perception is, that all objects in Nature are mixed, everything having in it elements of other things and these being liable to be mistaken for those things. Thus, that mother-of-pearl is sometimes mistaken for silver, is due to the fact that silver does really exist as an element in it, so that its silver part is sometimes seen to the exclusion of its shell part, and thus leads to error. Rāmānuja also shows that even real dreams and illusions are not utter unrealities, —that they also are real in some degree. They are real (1) as mental changes, (2) as representations to one particular mind, if not to all minds, (3) as partly though not wholly objective in their reference, and (4) as morally useful to the souls to which they are presented.

Thus far I have considered the critical side of Rāmānuja's philosophy. We have seen how he emphasizes the element of difference in reality, an element which Sankara, in his enthusiasm for unity, all but ignores. In this respect he has done a great service to the cause of Vedantic Philo-

sophy, and the country ought to be grateful to him. But in supplying this much-needed emphasis on difference, Rāmānuja has not been successful, as it seems to me, in keeping his hold strong on unity. He has, indeed, earnestly tried to do so; he has tried to be faithful to the utterances of scripture both on the unity of the Creator and creation and their difference. But his insight seems to have failed him in catching the true spirit of scriptural deliverances on unity. It seems to me that Rāmānuja's attempted reconciliation of Monism and Dualism is mechanical, and that his Dualism is the result of intellectual conviction, while his Monism is due to mere faith in the monistic utterances of the *Upanishads*. To come to details, however. What is Rāmānuja's idea of the relation of God and Nature? According to him Nature is related to God as the body is to the soul. As the body depends for its life on the soul, so does Nature depend for its existence and its movements on God. As the soul penetrates the body, as it were, and keeps every part of it living and active, so does God pervade Nature and act in every part of it. Nature cannot exist without God and is, in that sense, one with him. As Rāmānuja says at the end of a number of quotations from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* in defence of his doctrine: "Similarly, several other scriptural passages

declare that the Highest Person forms the Self of all, and that intelligent and non-intelligent things have no separate existence from him, because those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which exist in the form of subject and of object, and which exist also in all conditions, constitute the body of the Highest Person, and, are in consequence, subject to his control." Again, a few lines below: "Accordingly, with the object of making this very thing known, some scriptural passages say that the world, in its condition as effect, is he himself." (Commentary on the *Brahma-Sûtras*, Aphorism I.) But it may be objected that the body as dead matter can exist without the individual soul that lives in it. Cannot Nature, in the same way, exist without God? I cannot say what answer Râmânuja would give to a question like this. Apart from the figure of the body and the soul, he gives us nothing that can help us in understanding his view of matter and mind. He is not an Idealist like Sankara, and never tells us that the object is relative to the subject as sense is to understanding. But nevertheless he teaches again and again, with tireless uniformity, that Nature is dependent on God and that the utterances on the unreality of Nature in *Sruti* and *Smriti* are really directed against the popular notion of the independence of Nature.

In dealing with the relation of God to the individual soul, Rāmānuja gives us the same figure as before. As the soul is to the body, so is God to the individual self. The latter cannot exist without the former: it is dependent on him. God is the very Self of *jīva*, by which Rāmānuja means, not that the finite consciousness is essentially identical with the Infinite, but that the finite cannot exist without the Infinite. In the case of both Nature and the individual soul, what Rāmānuja teaches is not their unity or identity with God in any real sense, but their inseparable connection with him; and this inseparable connection is not shown by any philosophical process,—either by an analysis of the contents or conditions of experience, or an appeal to Intuition, or by any inference, deductive or inductive,—but is accepted simply as the substance of scriptural teaching. But if it is only inseparable connection and dependence by which Nature and finite souls are related to God, how does Rāmānuja explain such uncompromisingly monistic utterances in the *Upanishads* as '*Sarvam khalu idam Brahma*,' '*Tat tvam asi*,' and the like? Rāmānuja's method of explaining such texts is very simple. When it comes to interpreting texts declaring unity, he simply assumes that by 'unity' the scriptures 'mean nothing but the dependence and con-

nection that he teaches. To him 'Nature is God' means nothing more than 'Nature cannot exist without God,' or 'Nature implies God,' and the same explanation holds good of God's relation to the individual soul. '*Tat tvam asi*' means, 'You cannot exist without God,—God is your Self, that is, that on which you depend for your existence and your activity. The identity implied in this famous text lies, according to him, not between the Universal and the individual Self, as the direct and literal meaning of the text clearly is, but between the Self of the Universe, and the Self of the individual self. In regard to us he is the Self of our selves, as if anything that required another as its Self could be called a Self without doing violence to language. As Rāmānuja says in the same commentary that I have already quoted from, "The word '*that*' points to the Brahman who is omniscient, who wills the truth and who is the Cause of the world.....the word '*thou*,' which is equated with '*that*,' sets forth the Brahman whose body is the individual self which is associated with non-intelligent matter; because a grammatical equation must denote only one thing which exists in two forms." Now, one could accept Rāmānuja's interpretation of the text if by the 'individual self,' he meant the *vijnānātman*, our individuality or egoity; but elsewhere, in the

same commentary, he carefully discriminates the self from egoity, and shows that it is the former, the self, and not the latter, that is the true subject of knowledge. But when we reach the true subject of knowledge, the true Self which makes and at the same time transcends the relation of subject and object, we reach beyond all limitation, we reach the Ultimate Reality, and to say that this Reality requires another Self to make it real, is to say that it is not a self, and to be guilty of a contradiction. I wonder if Râmânuja saw all this.

In his peculiar interpretation of Vedantic doctrines, Râmânuja seems to follow an ancient tradition. He professes to popularise the commentary of Bodhâyana, a work which is now lost. The antiquity of his system is proved by the fact that more than three centuries before him, Sankara expounded and refuted it, in the form in which it then existed, in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sûtras*. Qualified Monism of Râmânuja's type then, must have existed as a recognised doctrine long before Sankara's time. But if Râmânuja's Metaphysics is an ancient system, his Theology, his Vaishnavism, must be as ancient or perhaps more so. The latter belongs to, or is, at any rate, connected with, the Bhâgavata-Pancharâtra school. We find this school mentioned in the second *pâda*, second chapter, of the *Vedânta-*

Sūtras,—mentioned there as a school opposed to Monism. However, as a follower of the *Pancharātra*, Rāmānuja identifies the Supreme Being with Vishnu and describes him, in all his aspects, as a personal Being, essentially and eternally different from finite souls and from material objects, though supporting them by his immanence. God, according to him, has five manifestations, and is to be worshipped in the one or the other according to the capacity of the worshipper. His lowest or grossest manifestation is in *archās* or images as objects of adoration. The next in order of subtlety is *vibhava* i.e., emanation or incarnation—the class of deified heroes. The third is God's fourfold manifestation (*vyuha*) as Vāsudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, and the fourth, called *Sūkshma*, is the entire Supreme Spirit with the six attributes of exemption from sin and the rest. The fifth manifestation is his presence as the *Antaryāmin* or Inner Ruler of all things, described in such texts as those in the *Anataryāmi-Brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*. Of the four *vyuhas* just named, Vāsudeva is the entire Divine Self, Sankarshana his presence in the *antahkarana* or spiritual organs, Pradyumna his guidance of the intellect, and Aniruddha his immanence in the sensorium. The worship of God consists, accord-

ing to Rāmānuja, in (1) *abhigamanam* or access, *i.e.* the sweeping, besmearing, etc., of the way to a temple; (2) *upādānam* or preparation, *i.e.*, the collection of flowers, incense and other appliances of worship; (3) *ijyā* or adoration, *i.e.*, the act of worship; (4) *svādhyāya* or reading, *i.e.*, the study of sacred texts and the uttering of praises to the Deity; and (5) *yoga* or meditation on the nature of God.

The goal of all spiritual culture is, according to Rāmānuja, the attainment of *Brahmasāyujya* or likeness to God and the final translation, without the possibility of re-birth, to Brahmaloka or the Divine regions, as described in such texts as those in the first chapter of the *Kaushitaki Upanishad* or the last section of the *Chhândogya*. There the soul lives in the constant presence of God and in the companionship of other liberated souls. In this state of final beauty, the finite soul, notwithstanding its likeness and nearness to God, is clearly distinguishable from him and is never absorbed in him, as is taught by Sankarāchārya. Rāmānuja claims that his view is upheld by the author of the *Brahma-Sūtras* in the fourth *pāda*, fourth chapter, of this great work. There can be no doubt that the condition of the liberated soul described in this section of the *Sūtras* is a relation of unity-in-difference with the Supreme

Self, and Sankara himself admits this. But while he describes such a state of liberation as only *apekshikam*, partial or relative, holding that absolute liberation is taught elsewhere, Râmânuja interprets the section as a delineation of final liberation and does not look elsewhere for a liberation more absolute than what is herein set forth. While to Sankara the Brahmaloka is one of those lofty regions where the soul halts in its way to final absorption in God, to Râmânuja it is the final destination of all souls which have attained the highest enlightenment and purification. According to him, absorption in Brahman would be, if it were at all possible, not the liberation, but the utter destruction, of the soul. The highest state a finite self can attain to is a state of absolute holiness and entire likeness to the Divine nature, and a clear realisation of its dependence on the Infinite. To the present writer, Râmânuja's interpretation of the section of the *Brahma-Sûtras* referred to above, and of the scriptural texts on which it bears, seems to be substantially far more true to Reason and Scripture than Sankara's. A defence of Râmânuja's interpretation would, however, take us beyond the scope of this lecture. I may refer you to a somewhat full discussion of the whole subject in the essay on "Bondage and Deliverance" in my *Hindu Theism*. I shall

conclude with the remark that the prevalent notion that the Vedanta teaches absorption in God and that absorption is actual annihilation, has brought the Vedanta into bad odour with most minds which know anything about Vedantic doctrines, and has done a great harm to the cause of Vedantism. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the true Vedantic doctrine of liberation, if widely known, is calculated to correct this wide-spread notion and do a great service to the Vedantic cause.

LECTURE VIII.

THE VEDANTA AS A BASIS OF PRACTICAL RELIGION.

It seems to be a widely prevailing opinion that the Vedanta, whatever its value may be as a theory of the universe, cannot supply any proper basis for practical religion. Practical religion consists in dependence on a Higher Power, in offering praise and prayer to a Higher Person than the worshipper, in following a law imposed on the human mind by a Higher Mind and in aspiring after likeness to a Being morally superior to the aspirant. Vedantism, being a monistic system of philosophy, lacks, it is supposed, all the conditions of such a religion. Its Brahman being the only Being in the universe, having no Nature or finite being apart from itself, is not properly, it is said, a personal Being, and it is to a personal being alone that praise and prayer can be offered. Even if the undifferentenced consciousness ascribed to it by the Vedanta be acknowledged as constituting personality, it cannot yet, it is urged, be an object of worship, for its undivided unity excludes other persons, and in the absence of worshippers, makes worship impossible. In the same manner,

by abolishing the distinction between the giver and the receiver of law, Vedantism, it is confidently asserted, makes the moral law itself impossible and takes away the reality from all moral distinctions and moral relationships.

I need hardly say that I do not accept this indictment of Vedantism as a religion without a proper basis. That it is a religion with an elaborate system of disciplines, with formularies of praise and prayer, with a scheme of salvation and clearly laid-down rules for its realisation, cannot admit of any doubt. If my hearers have any doubt about this point, this doubt will be effectively cleared away, I am sure, by the subsequent lectures of the present series, in which I propose to deal more with the practical aspects of Vedantism than the metaphysical, which latter has hitherto occupied me almost exclusively. What is contended for, however, by the opponents of Vedantism, is not that it is not a religion, but that it has no right to be one,—that it is through a supreme inconsistency that it exists as a religion, that if it were consistent with its fundamental principles, it would cease to be a religion. I need, again, hardly say that I do not accept this view of Vedantism. But I must say that I have, to the fullest extent, felt the force of the objections stated above. I have felt their power and have come to a

clear understanding as to how far they are due to the intrinsic difficulty of the Vedanta as a theory of the universe, how far to a wrong presentation of its principles by some of its advocates, and how far to a misunderstanding of these principles on the part of those who have never made an earnest effort to think themselves into it,—to place themselves, for a time, on its point of view and thus endeavour to grasp the fundamental conceptions on which it is founded. It has also often seemed to me that the difficulties found in the Vedantic system are mostly such as exist in one shape or other in every system of religion which professes to be rational, and that though this fact does not in itself maintain the position of Vedantism as a self-consistent system of rational religion, it is not particularly concerned in resolving difficulties which are common to it with all other systems of religion, especially when such difficulties are raised by those whose own systems are not free from them.

To come, however, face to face with the objections and difficulties referred to, let us, first of all, take up the question of personality. I propose to discuss personality under two heads, (1) Divine and (2) human, to see if the Brahman of the Vedanta is a personal Being according to the ordinary meaning of the term, and whether, in that

sense, man himself possesses personality. In the meaning commonly attached to the word personal, two conceptions seem to be included, (1) that of self-distinction and (2) that of self-exclusion. In some minds the two conceptions seem to be blended, self-distinction meaning to them self-exclusion, while in minds capable of finer analysis the two ideas are more or less clearly distinguished. Now, if personality consists in a self-distinguishing consciousness, the Brahman of the Vedanta is undoubtedly a personal Being. 'Consciousness is essentially self-distinguishing,—knowing itself to be infinite in distinction from finite objects and transcending time in the very act of knowing passing events. It is only a wrong analysis of consciousness, or the wrong notion that unity is opposed to and incompatible with difference, that represents the Infinite and Absolute to be an undifferentenced unity and in that sense an impersonal Being. The very essence of consciousness being self-distinction, the infinite and absolute Being must, in knowing himself, distinguish himself from the finite and the relative,—the Creator distinguish himself from his creation. It is a false Infinite for which there is no finite distinguishable from it; it is a false Eternal for which there is no world of change from which it distinguishes itself; and it is a false God who has no world related to and yet

distinct from him. That the God of the Vedanta is not such a God, must be evident to you from what I have said in my previous lectures on the Vedantic philosophy of Nature and Mind. But if Brahman is a personal Being in the sense of a self-distinguishing Consciousness, he cannot be said to be a personal Being in the second of the two senses attached to the term, the sense of self-exclusion. The God of the Vedanta, though distinct from the world of finite objects and changes, is yet related to it,—related to it as its Cause and Support, as its very truth. The world of space and time, though distinguishable from him who transcends space and time, is yet not separable from him, not independent of him. There is therefore, no exclusion in the Divine act of self-distinction. God, in distinguishing himself from finite objects, does not exclude himself from them,—does not give them an independent existence. The independence of Nature, if it were at all conceivable, would make the infinitude of God meaningless, and therefore unreal. Nor can man as a conscious being be held to be independent of God. We have seen how, according to Vedantic teachings, the consciousness in man is identical with the Divine consciousness, being the manifestation of the latter in time and space. If, therefore, personality implies self-exclusion,

and God can be said to be personal only if his consciousness, instead of comprehending human consciousness, excludes it, so that man, in looking within, sees only himself as a finite being, and not God as the Ground and Truth of his being, then surely the God of the Vedanta is not a personal Being. But personality, in the sense we are just considering, amounts to limitation. A conscious being existing out of relation to other conscious beings is really a limited being, and if a personal God is such a being, the God of the Vedanta, in not being personal, loses nothing in dignity. In not being personal, he is not reduced to anything less than, but is rather elevated to something greater than, personal; he becomes super-personal. The Vedantist, therefore, when he is twitted with worshipping an impersonal God, may justly turn the tables upon his opponent and accuse him of worshipping a limited and external God—of being really, though unsuspectingly, a votary of that idolatry which he professes to have outgrown.

However, we shall understand this aspect of the Divine personality better when we have seen in what sense man himself is personal, and in what sense not, to which question, therefore, I shall now draw your attention.

It is evident that man, as possessing a self-distinguishing consciousness, is a personal being.

In this sense, his personality consists in distinguishing himself from and yet finding himself in relation with objects in space and time. In the same way he distinguishes himself and yet feels himself related to his fellow-beings. The difficulty as to man's personality arises, however, when we contemplate his relation to God. The Vedantic doctrine of the unity of God and man seems to efface man's distinction from God and, in that sense, his personality. And if man has no real personality, if he is not, in a real sense, distinct from the Eternal and the Absolute, there does not exist, it is rightly thought, any morality or religion for him in the proper sense of the term. But as in the case of God, so in that of man, we must give up the idle hope of agreeing with unreflecting common sense in all respects. As in the case of God we see that he is not personal in the sense of a consciousness existing in exclusion from the consciousness of man,—that though infinitely transcending the conscious life of man, God at the same time comprehends that life within his infinitude and makes it what it is,—so, in the case of man, we must be prepared to find, as we actually do, that he is not personal in the sense of a consciousness independent of the Divine consciousness,—that though he has an individuality which distinguishes him from God and makes

morality and religion possible for him, his personality is only a subordinate personality, a reflection, as it were, of the personality of God, who is, in a sense, the only personal Being in the universe. It seems to me that it is an invaluable discipline for an aspirant after religious truth and religious life to be once for all convinced of the fact that man has no independence as against God, that he is constantly dependent on him for everything that constitutes his life,—for knowledge, feeling and strength, for all that he has,—and that whatever personality he has is derived from God and depends on him for its existence moment after moment. That this is not the popular belief, is clear. The common belief is that man received his personal existence from God at a particular time and has since been living independently of him, receiving from his Creator additions to his spiritual possessions from time to time, but not constantly depending on him for his very existence. It is a valuable discipline, I repeat, for a religious aspirant to see the utter erroneousness of this belief, the source of all pride and selfishness, and if any religion remains for him after this revelation,—which many seem to doubt,—to try to reconcile it with this stern fact. To me nothing seems to shake the notion of man's independence of God more effectively than the phenomenon of sleep—

profound, dreamless sleep—and I think the composers of the *Upanishads* and their commentators and interpreters fully saw the significance of the phenomenon and drew the conclusions which follow necessarily from it. I ask your attention for a few minutes to this important point and hope you will be amply repaid for any effort you may make in the direction. The essence of man's life is, you will agree with me, consciousness—self-consciousness and the consciousness of objects distinct from the self. Man would not be man without consciousness. Now, if man were an independent being, if his life were anything apart from the infinite Life,—anything existing, even for a time, in exclusion from the Divine existence,—his consciousness would always remain intact; it would never be suspended. The least that can reasonably be expected from an independent being, without which his very existence as a conscious being is inconceivable, is that his existence as a conscious being should be continuous and should not be suspended every now and then. But this is just what we do not find in the case of man. His consciousness is not a fixed, continuous, unchangeable entity, but is in a constant flux, dropping some of its contents every moment,—forgetting the facts of experience, I mean, every now and then,—never holding them all at once, and suffering a

total suspense in dreamless sleep. We see, indeed, that the contents of our consciousness are not really lost,—that they are held indestructibly in the Eternal Consciousness, in which we live, move and have our being, but this fact does not any the less disprove the other stern fact, that in profound, dreamless sleep, our consciousness in its individual form is suspended, or, in other words, we practically cease to exist as personal beings. The infinite, all-comprehending Consciousness, which manifests itself with some of its contents as man's consciousness in his waking hours, remains indeed unchanged and undiminished in our hours of sleep also, and re-manifests itself at the time of re-awakening; but the limitations which distinguish man from it, which confine our knowledge to a definite number of objects, while all things lie constantly revealed to it, are, in the state of sleep, evidently cancelled for a while. Describe this fact anyway you like,—say, if you choose, that in sleep, man ceases to exist, that he is merged in the Infinite, or that he simply rests in the bosom of his Divine Mother,—the utter dependence of man on God revealed by it is undeniable, and we must reconcile with it whatever idea we may form of man's personality and of the nature of the moral and religious life possible for him.

On the other hand, our conception of the Divine personality is very different from what we are forced to form of the personality of man. We cannot think of any the least content of the Divine consciousness being absent from it for a moment. Not only must we think of the contents of what we call *our* consciousness as persisting in the Divine in our waking as well as in our sleeping hours, but we must also think of objects outside our individual life,—the whole cosmos of existence, in fact,—as ever present to the Divine Mind. While for us there is a distinction of within and without—of things present to our consciousness and those absent from it—there is no such distinction for God. While for us, as individuals, knowledge is an event, a process, having a relative beginning and end, so that knowing is being only relatively and not absolutely,—and we *are* the world only partially, only so far as knowledge is realised in us,—to him knowing is an eternal state, so that knowing and being are absolutely one; in knowing the world he constitutes it—he *is* it, though the world is not he in the sense of exhausting him. Though time and space cannot exist without him, and he *is* himself time and space as the Effect-God (Kārya-Brahman), he, in his absolute essence, transcends time and space, so that changes in the present, past

and future exist in him as eternal facts and 'here' and 'there,' 'this' and 'that,' lose their discreteness in the indivisible unity of consciousness. Here, therefore, in the Divine nature, we find personality in the truest sense, combining the ideas of independence, absolute unity and permanence which we necessarily attach to it. God, therefore, is not only a personal Being in the truest sense, but he alone is personal in that sense.

But if man is not a personal being in the sense of a self-subsistent, independent entity, he undoubtedly possesses personality in a subordinate form, being, as we have seen, a partial manifestation or reproduction of the Divine consciousness. I beg you to meditate with me for a while on the true meaning as well as the reality of the personality that thus belongs to man. It is indeed true that it is the Divine mind itself that reproduces itself as the mind of man, that whether we know what we call our own thoughts or what we distinguish as things, though they are thoughts none the less, the mind knowing and the mind known are the same, that it is this identical mind in which thoughts and things exist when, in the hours of sleep, it ceases to manifest itself in an individual form, and that it is the same mind that re-manifests itself in our re-awakening hours. It is also true that the *how* of this partial manifestation

of the Infinite in time and space is a mystery which philosophy has not yet been able to explain fully. But the difference into which the One and Indivisible thus breaks itself without at the same time parting with its oneness and indivisibility, is a stern fact and should be seen in all its fulness and significance if the metaphysical grounds of religion and morality must be comprehended and made secure against an easy-going and self-complacent Pantheism that delights in merging all natural and moral distinctions in a blank, colourless unity. We should see, then, that the manifestation of the Divine life as man constitutes a personality as distinct from the Divine personality as such manifestation could possibly be,—that, in the language of the Athanasian creed, though the substance is the same in God and man, they are two persons, and not one. While God is without beginning, man, however wide the view he takes of his past, always finds something to limit his vision. He has a relative origin, he is born, while God is unborn. While the Divine consciousness is all-comprehensive, the contents of the human, however great in number, are limited even in the wisest of men. While God never forgets anything, man is subject to constant oblivion. While there is no growth and progress for the Eternally-perfect, the very life and glory of

man is in continual growth in perfection. While God is almighty, realising his ends without effort and opposition and capable of performing an infinite variety at the same time, man is continually opposed by forces not his own and has to fight his way on little by little. But the most important distinction between God and man is the moral. While the moral law is eternally realised in God, so that for him there is no gulf between the ideal and the real, with man the law of righteousness is always an ideal, and a life of holiness a process of struggle and growth. While unity with the world, unity with other moral beings, is eternally realised in God, so that the very life and breath of God, if we may so speak, is perfect truth, justice and goodness, man's consciousness of unity with his fellow-creatures and with his Creator, which is the basis of moral conduct and moral feelings, is a thing slowly realised through ages of effort and by means and appliances of infinite complexity.

All these distinctions between God and man, therefore, justify the consciousness of difference from the Divine Being which man feels, in whatever mood he may be, and which lies at the basis of all religion and morality. They justify those conceptions of man's relation to God which are to be found in all popular religions, but which

philosophers, looking too much into the essential unity of God and man and, ignoring the no less undeniable distinction between them, condemn as too dualistic, anthropomorphic and even superstitious. They justify the appellations we give to the Infinite in moods of tender devotion, the names by which we call him out of the fulness of our hearts. He is really our Life and Support, our Hope and Joy, our Father and Mother, our Friend and Helper, our Master and Lord, our Saviour and Redeemer, our everlasting Goal and Rest. It is true that popular conceptions of these relationships between God and man are much mixed up with error and superstition, that while the difference implied in the relations is seen by the unreflecting mind, the underlying unity escapes its vision, and God and man are conceived to be related much in the same way as two finite and mutually independent beings. But there is an opposite error also which I have already noticed, and which ought to be guarded against. It is that of concentrating one's attention so much in the unity as to ignore the difference. Neither the unity nor the difference can, indeed, be completely ignored, and religion, even in its extremest forms, contains both the elements,—perhaps the one more implicitly than the other. Even the most unqualified Monism, for instance, contains an element of difference, however

obstinately it may try to ignore it. It delights in the equation "So'ham,"— 'He is I' or, 'I am He. But this equation would be as impossible without difference as without unity. The "He" and "I" are Brahman in two moods or forms, the Universal and the individual. If the difference of the moods or forms is ignored, the equation, that is to say, Monism as a doctrine or spiritual condition, becomes impossible. The state of supreme illumination in which the unity of God and man is perceived, belongs to the world of manifestation, and being distinguished from the eternal self-knowledge of the transcendent Brahman, implies difference as well as unity. But this difference, it may be said, yields at best only a religion of contemplation, one that is confined to a meditative realisation of the unity of God and man; it cannot yield a religion of fervent devotion and practical usefulness. I admit that to many a Vedantist, religion is little more than meditation and a sort of ecstasy that accompanies its higher stages. But that is due, not to their religion, correctly understood, but to their own inconsistency or narrowness of vision. As I once said elsewhere, monistic attitudes of mind are really conscious acts of subsumption—the subsumption of the finite under the Infinite, and as such acts, they depend, for their very possibility, on the presence

of the finite, in however dependent and phenomenal a form, as well as that of the Infinite. The conditions of worship are not therefore absent in these attitudes, nor can it be said that the only form of worship possible in them is contemplation. If there be room for contemplation in them, there is, I contend, room for more emotional forms of worship also. While in them, the finite, now blessed with conscious unity with the Infinite, cannot but remember the process of discipline that has gradually led it to this height of communion. The series of Divine dispensations that have ended in its finding its deliverance,—in its being freed from the fetters of sin and ignorance,—cannot but be present in thought to it; and the Divine attributes of active love and holiness implied in effecting this blessed act of liberation must be directly present to it in these moments. All this, it is evident, leaves ample room for the free play of those feelings of gratitude, reverence, love, self-consecration and the like which are claimed as the exclusive results of lower forms of worship. On the other hand, what are considered as the most dualistic conceptions of the relation God and man, will be found, on examination, to contain a monistic element, however unconscious of this those may be who use these conceptions. The element of unity in the relation

of father and son, as it obtains in religion, is clear even to ordinary thoughtful people. There must be something of God in man,—man must be of the same substance as God—to be entitled to Divine sonship, and what can the Divine substance be but consciousness? It will not do to say only that there is a unity of kind between God and man, that man is a conscious being as God is one. Mere similarity of substance does not constitute the relation of father and son,—there must be identity of substance. Thus, if the relation of father and son between God and man, which all popular religions recognise, is to have any real meaning, the Divine and the human consciousness must be acknowledged as one—one and yet different. I might examine some other conceptions used by religious men and show that they also are based on a recognition, however implicit it may be, of a real unity of God and man. But I need not go into details. All conceived relationships between God and man that imply any intimate intercourse, are in fact founded on unity. Two mutually independent substances or persons without anything to bind them together, cannot be conceived to have any traffic between them. Human beings, who seem to the superficial observer to be independent of each other, are, to the piercing eyes of science and philosophy, bound

to one another by a thousand bonds of unity, physical and spiritual. When, therefore, God is conceived as seeing our hearts, hearing our prayers, revealing truths to our souls, breathing strength and holiness into us and leading us on by the hand in the path of spiritual progress, the crass dualism of ordinary thought breaks down and a profound unity is recognised between the Divine and the human spirit. If what is called Common Sense Theology does not admit the existence of this unity, it is because it is so far unreflecting, and is contented with accepting popular beliefs without analysing them. Idealistic philosophy, whether here or elsewhere, has never been satisfied with this uncritical acceptance of religious conceptions, but has gone deeply into their source and essence and thus seen that unity which is hidden from the popular view.

We thus see that Vedantism, as a monistic doctrine, as teaching the essential unity of God and man, leaves ample room for practical religion of the most tender and exalted type, and that ordinary dualistic thought, which pretends to enjoy a monopoly of practical religion, has really no advantage over that doctrine in that respect, but is rather vitiated by inconsistency in admitting no underlying unity as the basis of that close intercourse between God and man in which it professes to

believe. It is clear that a system that sees only difference is as incompetent to become the basis of practical religion as one which sees only unity, and that a system like the Vedanta, which sees both unity and difference, can alone constitute a philosophical ground of the moral and religious life. I have shown, in my previous writings, how the Vedanta distinctly recognises both these aspects of truth in its doctrine of the relation of God and man. Perhaps our discussion of the subject would have been more complete if we had taken up one question in connection with it on which I have been purposely silent, namely, the question of man's final liberation or union with God. There is a widely prevailing belief that the Vedantic doctrine of final liberation is nihilistic,—that whatever difference between God and man it may admit as existing in the state of ignorance, it teaches the complete merging of the individual in the Universal in the state of supreme illumination. I need hardly say—what can be gathered from my interpretation of the Vedantic philosophy of God, man and Nature in my previous lectures of this series—that I hold such a doctrine of liberation to be not only irrational, but, clearly unscriptural. As I have shown in my treatise on *Hindu Theism*, and as I shall show once more in the last lecture of the present series, the

Vedantic idea of liberation—the idea that one sees set forth in the *Upanishads* and the *Brahma Sūtras*—is very different from that of the merging of the individual in the Universal,—that while the state of final union with Brahman is one of a complete disappearance of egotism—in which God is seen as All-in-all—this vision of all things in God and God in all things is itself a state in which unity and difference are wonderfully combined, and which, being a state of perfect enlightenment—of a direct perception of the True, the Good and the Beautiful—is necessarily a condition of perfect love and holiness.

I need hardly more than briefly touch upon another aspect of the question in hand, namely the difference between man and man. The same fact,—the fact of finite reproduction in time and space—which makes every man a personality distinct from the Divine, makes him also an individual different from his fellow-creatures. We are all, indeed, one in the indivisible consciousness of God, which is the basis of our being and which makes intercourse between man and man possible, but nevertheless my thoughts, as psychological facts, as *reproductions* of the eternal ideas of the Divine mind, are not your thoughts. Far less are my feelings—my joys and sorrows, my loves and hates—yours. And the same holds good, with

even greater truth, of our volitions. Even self-consciousness, the highest category under which all minor categories have to be subsumed,—the highest truth of which all other truths are only forms—must be contemplated under two aspects, the original and eternal, and the derivative and re-produced, so that while self-consciousness as in Brahman must be conceived as absolutely one and indivisible, as in man it must be conceived as plural and mutually exclusive—exclusive in a relative sense of course. Thus, being distinct and partly exclusive personalities, distinguished from one another not merely by their bodies, their *annamaya koshas*, but even more effectively and permanently by the inner and subtler *koshas*,—the *prānamaya*, the *manomaya*, the *vijnānamaya* and the *ānandamaya*—men find ample room for that intercourse with their fellow-beings—that wonderful play of unity-in-difference—which constitutes the moral life. Every finite person being both one with and different from every other, there is given ample scope for both the distinction and harmony of individualism and altruism—of duty to self and duty to others—of self-development and self-sacrifice, that constitute the ever-recurring and ever-solving problem of morality and religion. Thus the essential unity of all finite consciousness, instead of making morality impossible, is seen, when truly

understood, to be rather the basis of the moral life. As Professor Deussen, a German Vedantist, truly says, the commandment "Love thy neighbour as thyself" finds its reason in the Vedantic principle, "Thy neighbour is thyself." It is only when man sees himself to be essentially one with his neighbour, that the true ground for social morality, for truth, justice, love, benevolence and the complete devotion of self to the service of his kind into which morality culminates, is really perceived. It is then seen that the good for self is the same as the good for others, and that the highest good for man is the conscious realisation, in his thought, feeling and action, of that unity-indifference between man and man and man and God which is eternally realised in the Divine consciousness. As the scriptures say, "He who sees all beings in the Self and the Self in all beings, does not henceforth hate any one. When, for the wise man, all beings become the Self, then, for him who sees unity, there is no delusion and no sorrow." (*Isopanishad*, 6, 7). Again, "He, whose soul is attuned by *yoga*, sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self; he looks with an impartial eye on all. That *yogi*, O Arjuna, who looks on the joys and sorrows of all as his own, lives in me." (*Bhagavadgītā*, vi.)

LECTURE IX.

'THE ETHICAL IDEAL OF THE VEDANTA.

ETHICAL theories may, for all practical purposes, be ranged under three main classes, (1) the Hedonistic, *i. e.*, those which make pleasure the object of all moral actions ; (2) the Legalistic, *i. e.*, those which are based on the abstract idea of right or law,—according to which duty should be done for duty's sake, and not for the sake of any ulterior object ; and (3) the Idealistic, *i. e.*, those which are founded on the idea of self-realisation or self-satisfaction as the end of moral action. It seems to me that Hindu ethical thought successively passed through the Hedonistic and the Legalistic stage, and at last, in matured Vedantism, rested in the Idealistic, retaining, at the same time, all the elements of truth contained in the first two forms of thought. Thus, the ethics of the *Sanhitās* and the *Bráhmaṇas* may be roughly characterised as Hedonistic. They prescribe domestic and social duties, penances and sacrifices, and promise pleasure here and hereafter as their reward. Their criterion of the rightfulness of an action—the end of existence with them—is pleasure ; they see

nothing higher. But at least as early as the time represented by the *Pūrva Mimāṃsā* of Jaimini, we find the Legalistic conception of duty already attained, and even formally, if only perfectly, enunciated. According to Jaimini, the duties prescribed in the Vedas ought to be performed not merely for the pleasurable results they will bring, but because they are enjoined as duties. The laws should be observed for the sake of the laws, even though one may not desire the fruits obtainable by their observance. The individualistic position—the position that one should follow only his own sense of pleasure or of right—was clearly transcended in the stage of thought represented by Jaimini, for he appeals to a higher, universal authority to which every individual must submit. His idea of this higher authority is indeed not free from theological prepossessions, for he identifies it with the Vedas. But his conception of Vedic inspiration is something far more rational than the popular conception. The Vedas, which, according to Jaimini, are nothing but a body of laws, of *vidhi*, and *niṣhedha*, prescriptions and prohibitions,—the science and philosophy contained in them being only illustrative matter and of no essential importance—are, he says, eternal, unwritten, *apauruṣheya*, not the work of a personal author or any number of such authors. The philosophical

defence of this doctrine proceeds upon the pre-supposition that *sabdās* or words, that is to say all ideas—for what are words but the expression of ideas in sound?—are eternal, uncreated, manifesting themselves in the intellectual lives of rational beings, revealing themselves to sages in their plenitude, but without any natural beginning or end. The Vedas, as embodiments of these ideas, are thus unwritten, unoriginated—the *rishis* being only their *drashtāras*, seers, and not authors. That Jaimini hit upon a most important truth, must be admitted by all who believe in the supreme authority of the moral law and regard moral distinctions as ultimately absolute. It was important that a universal and eternal source of the moral laws was seen, and that the ever-changing desires and fancies of the individual mind were perceived to be a totally inadequate basis for it. There was also an important element of truth in recognising the laws and customs that had guided the nation from time immemorial, as an embodiment of moral authority. The mistake lay only in not perceiving the partial and tentative nature of the embodiment—in the complete identification of the Law in its absolute nature with the national code.

The error of individualism and egoistic Hedonism, however, must have been seen by our people

much earlier than the time of the *Púrva Mímánsá*. It must have been perceived as soon as our forefathers passed from the idea of propitiating the gods by mere material offerings to that of the spiritual worship of an infinite Spirit. They must have seen the insufficiency of a mere sensuous view of life and felt after something intrinsically good, and not good merely for the pleasure derived from it. In the *Kathopanishad*, probably one of the earliest of the *Upanishads*, we already find the distinction between the good and the pleasant clearly laid down. *Mritu* or Death says to his interlocutor, Nachiketas. "The good is one thing, the pleasant another. These two bind men in different ways. He who accepts the good, obtains true well-being; but he who chooses the pleasant, loses his highest good. (II. 1.)

In what does the highest good consist? The *Upanishads* are unanimous in teaching that it consists in union with the Absolute, the Infinite, the Soul of souls. He is the true Self of all, and it is the duty of every rational being to free himself from the mistaken identification of himself with finite objects and realise his unity with the Infinite. The search after Brahman, the Absolute Self, is the one absolute duty of every moral agent—the substance, as it were, of which all other duties are only forms. The Divine or

absolute standpoint—the consciousness of unity with Brahman—is the criterion of right, the measure with which the value of all actions is to be measured, the ideal condition in which there is no sin, no sorrow. As the *Isopanishad* says: “He who sees all things in the self, and the self in all things, hence hates no one.” Again: “When, to the wise man, all things have become the self, where is illusion, and where is sorrow to him who sees unity?” The Being with whom unity is thus sought, and unity with whom constitutes the ideal of perfection, is not, with our theologians, a purely intellectual Being, far less a mere metaphysical abstraction of being, as is sometimes represented by superficial critics. He is, to them, a moral Being, a person of perfectly holy will, the Teacher, Guide and Saviour of finite souls. As the *Svetâsvatara Upanishad* says: “That person is the great Lord; he is the Mover of the heart, the guide to this holy state, and an inexhaustible Light.” (III 12.) “Man is liberated,” says the same *Upanishad*, “by perceiving him in the soul who is the giver of holiness, the destroyer of sin, the Lord of glory, the immortal, the support of all things. (VI. 6.)

Now, this view of Nature and life—the unity of all souls in one Supreme Soul, and man's duty of realising his unity with this Universal

Soul—revolutionised previous ethics, the ethics of selfishness. When the real self of man was perceived to be not individual, but universal, the search after mere individual satisfaction was felt to be an unworthy object. The pursuit of selfish desires was found to obstruct the true vision of the soul and impede its union with the Absolute. The old religion of penances and sacrifices was therefore condemned, or retained only as a lower discipline calculated to divert the mind from the grosser pleasures of the visible world and draw it up to supramundane objects. The *Mundakopanishad*, after speaking of sacrifice as a duty, says: "These boats in the form of sacrifices, consisting of eighteen members (*i.e.* sixteen priests, the performer of the sacrifice and his wife), in which the lower duty has been prescribed, are weak. Those who commend this (*i.e.*, this lower duty) as the good, become subject to old age and death again. Those who are ignorant and yet consider themselves wise and learned, those fools suffer much and wander like blind people led by a blind man.' (*I. Mundaka, II. 7, 8*). Though the lower code of sacrificial duties was not altogether discarded, the motives to which it appealed were condemned uncompromisingly. The rites and ceremonies prescribed in the old code might be performed, but it was to be done

without any desire for reward, here or hereafter. They were to be performed merely as purificatory disciplines, or as means of showing respect to the gods. The same unselfish motive should guide the performance of domestic and social duties. The object of all is to purify the heart, to discipline the mind, to bring all the propensities of the soul under the control of Reason. The natural, lower life of man, which is under the guidance of the senses and the intellect, takes no cognizance of the higher life open to Reason alone,—the life in union with God. Hence the reign of Reason is to be established both within and without, in the inner life of thoughts, feelings and desires, and the outer one of practical conduct. As the *Kathopanishad* says: "He whose charioteer is Reason, and whose reins are the mind, reaches the end of the path,—the highest place of the All-prevading." (III. 9.) Again: "When all the desires (*i.e.* selfish, individual desires) that have taken hold of man's heart, are destroyed, he becomes immortal, and obtains Brahman even here."

All this is taught with a greater richness of expression, if not with a greater emphasis in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The *Gītā*, as you already know, is called the *Smṛiti Prasthāna*, ethical institute, of the Vedānta, the two other *Prasthānas* being the *Upanishads*, the *Sṛuti Prasthāna* or scriptural

institute, and the *Brahma Sūtras*, the *Nyāya Prasthāna* or logical institute. The ethical as well as the metaphysical teachings of the book are only an elaboration of the teachings of the *Upanishads*, and as it is mainly to indicate the type and not the details of the ethical teachings of the Vedānta that I speak, I shall not draw upon it more largely than making two extracts from it. In the following, which occurs in the sixteenth chapter, the *Gītā* seems to sum up the main features of a godly character:—"Freedom from fear, purity of heart, perseverance in the pursuit of knowledge, abstraction of mind, gifts, self-restraint, sacrifice, the study of the Vedas, discipline, straightforwardness, harmlessness, truth, freedom from the habit of backbiting, compassion for all beings, freedom from avarice, gentleness, modesty, absence of vain activity, noble-mindedness, forgiveness, courage, holiness, freedom from a desire to injure others, absence of vanity, are his, O descendant of Bhārata, who is born to god-like endowments."

In several passages of the book, specially in the earlier chapters, the author seems to labour under the legalistic idea—that of actions being right or wrong for their own sakes. But gradually the supreme end of all action, the perfection of the soul,—the realisation of the Universal in individual life—issues out of his struggles—struggles against

the legalistic prepossessions of his early training. This realisation of the Universal on the part of the individual is termed by the author *Brahmanirvāna*—extinction in Brahman—a significant but rather misleading word. It is a most appropriate term from the author's standpoint, for when God, the Universal Soul, is seen to be all-in-all, the individual perceives that in itself it is nothing, that it is only a reproduction, manifestation or incarnation of God, and not anything independent of or apart from him. It feels itself to be merged in or unified with God. But that this merging or unification is not a natural event, but a spiritual condition, a condition necessitating the *existence* of the individual, though in conscious *union* with God, is evident. Hence '*nirvāna*,' misleads only the superficial and the thoughtless, those who have no experience of the phase of spiritual life to which it is applied. However, let us see how the author of the *Gītā* describes *Brahmanirvāna*. He says: "The devotee whose happiness is in the self, whose rest is in the self, and whose light also is in the self, becomes one with Brahman and obtains *Brahmanirvāna*. The sages whose sins have perished, whose doubts are resolved, who are self-restrained and who are intent on the welfare of all beings, obtain *Brahmanirvāna*. The ascetics who are free from desire and wrath, and whose minds are

restrained, and who have knowledge of the self, have *Brahmanirvāna* on both sides of death. He who has restrained the senses, the sensory and the understanding, whose highest aim is final emancipation, from whom desire, fear and wrath have departed, has already obtained liberation. He, knowing me (*i. e.* God) to be the acceptor of all sacrifices and austerities, the great Lord of the worlds, and the friend of all beings, attains tranquillity." (V. 29.)

Now, there is a widely prevalent idea that the Vedānta favours monasticism, cries down the active duties of domestic and social life, and inculcates isolation and detachment from the world. The idea owes its origin to the strong tendency to monasticism and isolation visible in certain classes of Vedāntists and finding prominent expression in the writings of Sankarāchārya and other post-Buddhist Vedāntists. But to identify the teachings of the Vedānta with the teachings of these writers is the same mistake as, for instance, to confound Christianity with the Mediæval Monasticism of Europe. The custom of retiring from public life and devoting oneself to devotional exercises in the seclusion of the forest in old age, was indeed known even in the early days of the *Upanishads*, and that there were isolated persons of both sexes who either indefinitely

delayed entrance into the married state, or did not enter it at all, is also apparent from cases like those of Raikva and Gārgī Vāchaknavī. But that there were orders of monks and nuns recruited from persons of all ages and filled with people who shrank from the bitter discipline of domestic and social life, and looked upon isolation and mendicancy as the best way to liberation, does not appear from the earliest literature of Vedantism. Such a state of things is clearly against the teachings of the Vedas, and became fashionable only after the Buddhistic heterodoxy had been established, and was then largely imitated even by enthusiasts who were orthodox in their views in other respects. There are, indeed, isolated passages here and there in the *Upanishads* in which monastic life is prescribed or praised; but most of the teachers whose utterances are recorded in these ancient compositions, show a delightful contentment with domestic life, and many ignore the very idea of detachment from society as a part of the routine of life. I may refer, for illustration, to two outline views of the principal duties of life in which there is no mention whatever of retirement from domestic life even in old age. The first of these summaries is contained in the first *valli* of the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, and the other forms the close of the *Chhândogya*. The latter goes so

much against monasticism that it was, in later times, tortured by the extreme defenders of that scheme of life into meaning that the life of a householder is intended for those only who merely read the Vedas, but do not understand their purport! However, as to the way in which one should live as a domestic and social being,—as to the place of human affections in the total scheme of life, I shall quote an ancient teacher of Vedantism, the great sage Yājñavalkya, who was first a householder, but who seems to have retired to the forest in an advanced age. Maitreyī, one of his two wives, having declined the offer of mere earthly treasures at the time of his retirement, and asked for instruction on the life eternal, he is overjoyed and compliments the lady by saying: “You are surely dear to me, but you have increased my love for you (by asking this question).” He then goes on: “Surely, the husband is not dear for the sake of the husband, but for the sake of the Self is the husband dear. Surely, the wife is not dear for the sake of the wife, but for the sake of the Self is the wife dear. Surely, sons are not dear for the sake of the sons, but for the sake of the Self are sons dear.” (*Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, II. 4. 5.) In the same way, Yājñavalkya speaks of riches, domestic animals, the worlds, the gods, the Vedas, creatures, and all things generally as dear not for

their own sake, but for the sake of the Self. That this 'Self' is not our small individuality, which is all that the natural man or even the philosophical Hedonist understands by the term, but the Infinite Universal Self, the common Self of all, appears from what follows this enumeration of finite things that are dear to us. On the knowledge of this Self, says Yājñavalkya, all things are known. Those who suppose anything to be out of the Self, are forsaken by all things, *i.e.*, remain in utter darkness as to their real nature. "These gods," says the teacher in unmistakable terms, "these Vedas, all these creatures, all this is the Self." The love of God, then, is the great object to be realised through all domestic and social duties. I shall make only one more reference before I close. The spirit in which man should be served,—that every service rendered to man is really rendered to God—is taught by a parable, in the *Chhândogya Upanishad* which reminds one of the words of Jesus in speaking of the Last Judgment—"Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these, my brethren, ye have done it unto me." An anchorite whom two devout householders had refused food, reminded them that God, though unseen, existed in many forms, that all food was really prepared for him, and that in refusing food to the poor

beggar, they had really refused it to him. The householders were thankful for the reminder and satisfied the anchorite.

I shall close this short and imperfect sketch of Vedantic ethics by referring to certain unjust criticisms made from time to time by Christian critics on these ethics. The Vedanta is sometimes charged by these critics with being a purely metaphysical system and being indifferent to ethical distinctions. The charge is sometimes based on the fundamental Monism of the Vedanta, which, it is said, leaves no room for moral distinctions, and sometimes on certain mystical passages which seem to mean, to the superficial reader, that he who has known Brahman has risen above the distinction of virtue and vice and is at liberty to do whatever he likes. Now, as to the first part of the charge, I have already tried to dispose of it in my eighth lecture,—that on the Vedanta as a basis of practical religion. I shall here deal with the class of passages referred to. The following are instances of such passages :—

“When the seer sees the bright and active Lord, the source of the lower Brahman, then the wise man gives up both virtue and vice, and attains pure and supreme equanimity.”

(III. *Mundaka*, 1. 3.)

"He who has no egotism, whose mind, *i.e.*, desire, is not mixed up with the act, would not kill even if he were to kill these people, and is not fettered by the consequence of his action."

(*Bhagavadgītā*, XVIII. 17.)

"As one embraced by a beloved wife knows not anything without nor anything within, so this person (the individual self), when embraced by the all-knowing Self, knows not anything without nor anything within. His condition becomes one of satisfaction in self, of the absence of desire (for other things), and above sorrow. In this condition the father becomes not-father, the mother not-mother, the worlds not-worlds, the gods not-gods, the Vedas not-Vedas. In this condition the thief becomes not-thief, the destroyer of a fetus not-destroyer-of-fetus, a *chandāla* not-*ckandala*, a *paulkasa* (a low-class man) not-*paulkasa*, a *sramana* (anchorite) not-*sramana*, an ascetic not-ascetic. He is not touched by virtue, nor by vice. He passes beyond all the sorrows of the heart."

(*Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, IV. 2. 12.)

"The thought 'Why did I not do the right? Why did I do the wrong?' does not agonise him. He who knows this looks upon them from the standpoint of the self. He who knows this looks upon both from the standpoint of the self."

(*Taittirīya*, II. 9.)

Now, it must at first be premised that if such passages occurred in works which were elsewhere silent on or indifferent to morals, the construction put upon them by the critics in question would be unobjectionable. In that case their immoral tendency would not admit of any doubt. But occurring, as they do, in works the authors of which call upon their readers at every turn to abjure wicked deeds and desires, authors who would not be contented with anything short of the utter eradication of egotism and an unbroken union with the All-holy, it seems little short of perversity to represent them, as some do, as indications of an unholy libertinism resulting from a certain philosophical extravagance. To one who would not shut his eyes against the rigorous course of moral and spiritual discipline prescribed everywhere in these works, these passages would seem to admit of the following explanation. In the first place, they are protests against the selfish motives that dictate popular morality,—the desire for obtaining reward and avoiding punishment which is fostered by the *Karmakānda* of the Veda itself. In saying that the wise man who knows God avoids both virtue and vice, the *Rishi* means that such a man rises above popular morality,—above the desire for reward and the fear of punishment. Secondly, these passages indicate the purely impersonal

attitude to which the mind is raised by conscious union with God, an attitude so far above all considerations of personal gain and loss, and so perfectly at one with the universal, that if one were to do even an apparently sinful act from such a standpoint, no sin would or should be imputed to him. This does not mean that good and bad deeds are all the same, but that, as the motives that dictate sinful acts to ordinary mortals—the motives in which the sinfulness of the acts consists—are absent in the person living in constant union with God, he cannot be said to incur sin even if he does such acts. In such a case there would be no sinful motive, and hence no imputation of sin. Thirdly, such expressions,—expressions of the absence of difference, even the difference between virtue and vice,—are intended to emphasise the fundamental unity—the unity of God—underlying all things. Expressions like those in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* just read are intended not to ignore differences altogether, but to emphasise the underlying unity in which all things, however great their differences, rest and are in that sense one. The same purpose finds expression in another form,—in the form of a trustful contentment with life as a whole notwithstanding our moral failures and disappointments. Such a contentment arises from the faith, that the final disposal of things is in

the hands of God, in whose all-seeing eye there is no absolute evil, and who makes what is relatively evil a stepping stone to the good. It is such faith that seems to have dictated the passage from the *Taittirīya Upanishad* just read, in which the writer disparages vain regrets at the close of life for things done or undone, and teaches the dying aspirant to look at both virtue and vice from the standpoint of the Self, *i.e.* from the divine standpoint, as having contributed, under divine dispensation, to self-realisation, the final goal of all human efforts.

But, nevertheless, it must be remembered, that it is with the general drift and purport of the scriptures, and not with particular passages, specially those of doubtful meaning, that we are mainly concerned, and it may be freely confessed that the authors of these works are by no means men of the same spiritual level. Their utterances represent varying shades of spiritual growth and therefore varying degrees of inspiration. But I must go even farther and admit that there are one or two passages in the *Upanishads*—and it is with the *Upanishads* and the two other *prasthānas* with which we are mainly concerned, as the final authority on Vedantism—there are passages, I say, in the *Upanishads*, which are diametrically opposed to the whole spirit of these compositions.

But because they are so diametrically opposed to the *Upanishads*, it is incredible that they could be composed by any one really connected with the movement represented by them. Their admission into the canon of Vedantic scriptures cannot be otherwise explained than by attributing it to a certain oversight or incautiousness on the part of the early compilers. I refer specially to a passage of undoubtedly immoral import in the fourth *Bráhmna*, sixth chapter, of the *Brihadáran-yaka Upanishad* and one of similar import, but a little less indelicate, in section 13 of the second *prapáthaka* of the *Chhândogya*. Now, the *Brihadáran-yaka* and the *Chhândogya*, as well as some of the other *Upanishads*, are evidently compilations and contain utterances of varying spiritual worth. Besides, the section of the *Bri-hadáran-yaka* in which the passage just referred to occurs, is probably a later addition. The whole tenour of the section, apart from the particular passage in question, suggests a certain lowness of taste and the prevalence of superstition and ritualism. It would not perhaps be far from the truth, therefore, to fix its composition at a time when the tide of old spirituality had ebbed away, and it had become possible for persons who would be disowned by the old *rishis* to step occasionally into their holy seats.

If we leave out these exceptional passages then, the Vedantic system of Ethics stands out as a grand and imposing structure, both as regards its foundations and the practical principles built on them. It is a system which may bear a favourable comparison with any of the most advanced systems that have been propounded in ancient or modern times. As I have already said, it is a system which, though founded on the idea of self-realisation, combines in itself the good elements of all the other chief systems of ethics. Though not fundamentally individualistic, it sees the truth of individualism so far as to admit that the perfection to be realised by every moral agent is his own personal perfection, which, though realisable in and through social life, is not identical with, and cannot wait for, any imagined perfection attainable by society in general. Though not Hedonistic in its basis, Vedantism is Hedonistic to the extent of believing that the union with Brahman in which perfection consists is a state of supreme felicity—the only state, according to it, which is truly happy. As Sanatkumára says to Nárada in the *Chhândogya*, "The Infinite alone is blissful, there is no happiness in things limited." Vedantic ethics do not found on the idea of abstract law, that of duty for duty's sake, without reference to any realisable object; but they do favour this idea so

far as to teach that every duty, as a partial realisation of our true self, is duty for its own sake, and is, in that sense, absolute and not relative to anything else. I may add before closing that the Vedantic system of ethics, as I have expounded it, seems to bear a somewhat close resemblance to the Hegelian system and the British school of ethics that has lately arisen under the influence of Hegelian teaching. The tracing of this resemblance, both in its doctrinal and historical aspects, would be an interesting study, and might even lead to practical results in the great fusion of races, religions and civilisations that is now going on in this country.

LECTURE X.

THE VEDANTIC SYSTEM OF SPIRITUAL CULTURE.

WE have seen what the Vedanta aims at as the object of all human efforts. It is the attainment of unity with Brahman. It is an end at once ethical and spiritual. There can, indeed, be no distinction between the ethical and the spiritual in a system of culture based on the idea of self-realisation—the attainment of the Infinite Self or Spirit. Every step in moral progress is a step in self-realisation—a step forward in spiritual life. Having spoken, therefore, of the ethical ideal of the Vedanta, I have nothing more to say on its spiritual ideal. The two ideals are identical. But in my last lecture, I spoke mainly of the ideal,—of the end—to be attained. I did not speak of the means of attaining it, except so far as the end could not be spoken of apart from the means. In this lecture I propose to speak particularly of the *sādhans*, the disciplines or methods of spiritual culture prescribed in the Vedanta.

I said in my second lecture that the *rishis* held God to be unknowable to the impure-hearted, the restless, the thoughtless and the irreverent,

and that they led their disciples through a long process of discipline before trying to instil into them the principles of the divine science. I added that the moral and spiritual exercises indispensable for the acquisition of the science of God had been, in later times, formulated into what is called the *Sādhana Chatustaya*, the fourfold discipline. I then gave a brief exposition of these *sādhans*, following Sankara's commentary on the first aphorism of the *Sārīraka-Mīmāṃsā* and Govindānanda's annotations on the commentary. I also said that those *sādhans* would be found enumerated and expounded in all important Vedantic works, with only slight variations in the exposition. I shall now, in a somewhat detailed exposition of these disciplines, follow one of these works, the well-known *Vedāntasāra* of Paramhansa Sadānanda Yogīndra, widely used as a hand-book of the Vedānta Philosophy.

Sadānanda goes a step backward and speaks of the exercises leading to the *Sādhana Chatustaya*. Regarding the qualifications of a student of the Vedānta, he says: "The qualified person is one who possesses due intelligence, that is, one who, by reading the Vedas and Vedāṅgas according to rule, either in this life or in a former one, has obtained a general idea of the meaning of the whole,—who, by performing the constant

and occasional rites, the penances and devotional exercises, and abstaining from things done from a desire of reward and from those which are forbidden, has got rid of all sin and so thoroughly cleansed his mind,—and who has adopted the four-fold discipline. The ‘things done from desire of reward’ are the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and other things of a similar kind which are the means of procuring heaven and other objects of desires. The ‘forbidden things’ are the slaying of a Bráhmaṇ and the like which result in hell and other undesirable things. The ‘constant rites’ are the *sandhyá* prayers and the like, the omission of which causes evil. The ‘occasional rites’ are such as the birth-sacrifice following the birth of a son, and such like. The ‘penances’ are such as the *Chândráyana* and others which are undergone only for the removal of sin. The ‘devotional exercises’ are such as the *Sándilya Vidyá* (of the *Chhândogya Upanishad*) and the like, consisting of meditations on the immanent Brahman. The principal object of the constant and occasional rites and of the penances, is the purification of the intellect, and that of the devotional exercises the concentration of the mind.” (Col. Jacobs’ translation, slightly altered.)

Sadānanda then explains the *Sādhana-Chatustaya* thus: “The four disciplines are (a)

Discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, (b) indifference to the enjoyment of rewards here and hereafter, (c) the possession of quiescence, self-restraint &c., and (d) desire for liberation.

"(a) Discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal is the discernment of the truth that Brahman is the only eternal substance and all else is non-eternal.

"(b) Indifference to the enjoyment of rewards here or hereafter is complete indifference to the enjoyment of the things of this world, such as garlands, sandals and other objects of sense,—and of those pertaining to the next world, such as nectar and other sensuous objects, because, being the result of actions, they are non-eternal.

"(c) Quiescence, self-restraint etc., are quiescence, self-restraint, abstinence, endurance, contemplative concentration and faith. Quiescence is the restraining of the mind from objects of sense other than hearing (the scriptures) etc. Self-restraint is the turning away of the external organs from objects other than hearing (the scriptures) etc. Abstinence is the continued abstaining of the external organs from sensuous objects other than hearing etc., after they have been turned away from them; or it may be the abandonment of prescribed acts in a legitimate manner (*i.e.*, by

becoming an ascetic.) Endurance is bearing the polarities of heat and cold etc. Contemplative concentration is the fixing of the restrained mind on hearing and similar things helpful to them. Faith is trust in the utterances of the spiritual teacher and of the Vedanta.

“(d) Desire for liberation is the longing for emancipation from bondage.”

This exposition of the fourfold discipline by an old Vedantist, though eminently correct and authoritative, will not perhaps have made things quite clear on account of its brevity. I shall therefore make a quotation on the subject from a modern Vedantist who has had the double advantage of the most liberal education that the West can afford and of being trained and guided in her spiritual life by native spiritual teachers of eminence. I refer to the much respected theosophical leader, Mrs. Annie Besant, who in her *Path of Discipleship* speaks thus of the qualifications of an initiate into spiritual life :—

“The first qualification is the outcome of the experiences through which he has passed ; they awake and train in him *Viveka* or discrimination, discrimination between the real and the unreal, between the eternal and the transitory. Until this appears, he will be bound to the earth by ignorance, and worldly objects will exercise over him

all their seductive glamour. His eyes must be opened, he must pierce through the veil of Máyá, at least sufficiently to rate earthly things at their true value, for from *Viveka* is born the second of the qualifications—

“*Vairágya*. I have already pointed out to you that a man must begin to train himself in separation from action as regards its fruit. He must train himself to do action as a duty without continually looking for any sort of personal gain. That training, we will suppose, has been carried by a man certainly for life after life, before the demand is made on him, which he must answer to a very considerable extent before initiation is possible, that he shall become definitely indifferent to earthly objects. . . . As reality and permanency make themselves felt in the man's mind, it is inevitable that wordly objects shall lose their attraction, and that he shall become definitely indifferent to them. When the real is seen, the unreal is so unsatisfactory; when the permanent is recognised, if only for a moment, the transitory seems so little worth striving after; in the probationary path, all the objects around us lose their attractive power, and it is no longer by deliberate effort of the will that he does not permit himself to work for fruit. . . . Seeing objects, then, in their transitory character, it is quite natural

that out of indifference to the objects should also grow, as a matter of course, that which he has long been striving after, namely indifference to their fruits; for the fruits are themselves but other objects. The fruits themselves share the impermanency and unicity which he recognises, having seen the real and the permanent.

“And then the third of the qualifications has to be gained on the probationary path: *Satsampatti*, the sixfold group of mental qualities or mental attributes which show themselves within the life of this chela-candidate—as perhaps we may call him. He has long been striving to rule his thoughts in the manner with which we are familiar. He has been practising all those methods which we spoke of yesterday, to gain self-control, to acquire the habit of meditation, and to perform the building of a character. These have prepared him now to show forth in the real man—for we are concerned with the real man and not with the illusory appearance—to show forth in the real man *sama*, control of the mind, that definite regulation of thought, that definite understanding of the effects of thought, and of his relation to the world around him, as he affects it for good or for evil by his own thinking. By the recognition of that power that he has, either to help or to mar by his own thought the lives of other men, how to hinder

or to help the evolution of the race, he becomes a deliberate worker for human progress and for the progress of all evolving beings within the limits of the world to which he belongs. And this regulation of thought—now a definite attitude of the mind—is preparing him, as we shall see, for complete and definite chelaship, where every thought is to be made the instrument of the Master's work, and where comparatively without effort the mind is to run along the grooves that are traced for it by the will.

“Out of that regulation of thought, now so largely accomplished, follows, inevitably *dama*, control of the senses and the body, that which we may call regulation of conduct. Do you notice how, when dealing with things from the occult standpoint, they are reversed as compared with the standpoint of earth? Worldly men think more of conduct than of thought. The occultist thinks far more of thought than of conduct. If the thought be right, the conduct must inevitably be pure; if the thought be regulated, the conduct must inevitably be well-controlled and governed. The outer appearance or action is only the translation of the inner thought which in the world of form takes shape as what we call action; but the form is dependent on the life within, the shape is dependent on the moulding energy which makes it. The

Arupa world is the world of causes. The *Rupa* world is only the world of effects ; and therefore, if we regulate thought, the conduct must be regulated, as it is the natural and inevitable expression of thought."

Mrs. Besant's exposition of the next *sādhana*, *uparati*, does not agree with that of any of the Vedantic authorities I have consulted. She explains it as "a wise and sustained tolerance" of all human errors and frailties. I shall omit her exposition of this discipline and pass on to that of the next, *titikshā*. "The next point, in this (*i. e.*, the aspirant's) mental attitude, is," she says, "*titikshā*, endurance, a patient bearing of all that comes, a total absence of resentment. You will remember how I drew your attention to this as a thing to strive for, how a man was gradually to get rid of the tendency to feel injured, how he was to cultivate love and compassion and forgiveness, and the result of that cultivation of the mind is this mental attitude, steady and defined. The inner man thus gets rid of resentment—resentment towards everything, towards men, towards circumstances, towards every thing that surrounds him in life, Why? Because he sees truth and he knows the Law, and therefore knows that whatever circumstances surround him, they are the outcome of the good Law. He knows that whatever man

may do to him, they are only the unconscious agents of the Law. He knows that whatever comes to him in life is of his own creating in the past, and so his attitude is the attitude of absence of resentment. He realises justice, therefore he cannot be angry with anything, for nothing can touch him which he has not deserved ; nothing can come in his way which he has not put there in his former lives. Thus we find that no troubles and no joy can turn him aside from his path ; he is no longer to be changed in direction by anything that comes in his way. He sees the path and treads it ; he sees the goal, and he presses towards it. He is no longer following devious and indefinite ways, here, there and everywhere ; but firmly, steadily he follows the path he has chosen. He cannot be attracted away from it by pleasure ; he cannot be driven away from it by pain. He cannot be discouraged by dullness, by voidness, by emptiness, he cannot be induced to stray from it by offers from any save the one Guru whose feet he seeks. Incapacity to be turned aside, strong in endurance—ah, there is a quality he needs indeed on this probationary path.” Mrs. Besant then goes on saying how the progress of the aspirant is expedited by a sturdy endurance backed by firm resolution, so that he accomplishes in a few lives what others

would take hundreds of lives to accomplish. In regard to the next discipline, *sraddhā*, she says :—" Thus in these struggles, these difficulties, these efforts, he (the aspirant) gains the fifth mental attitude, and that is—*Shraddhā*, faith, or we may call it confidence—confidence in his Master and in himself. You can understand how that will be the result of such a struggle. You can understand, how on the further side of the struggle, confidence must come out as the flower must open under the stimulating influence of sunshine and rain. He has learnt confidence in his Guru, for, has he not led him through all this thorny path and brought him to the other side where the gateway of initiation begins to open in front of him ? And he has learnt confidence in himself—not in his lower self, whose weakness he has conquered, but in his divine self, whose strength he is beginning to recognise. For he understands that every man is divine, he understands that what his Guru is to-day, he himself is going to become in the lives that still stretch out in front of him. And the confidence he feels is in the power of the Master to teach and to guide him, in the wisdom of the Master to lead and to instruct him ; and a confidence in himself, most humble yet most strong, that in as much as he is himself divine, he also has the power to accomplish ;

that however much of effort may be needed, however much of difficulty still remains to conquer, the strength that is in him is one with Brahman, and is enough for every difficulty, enough for every trial."

"The sixth mental attribute," continues Mrs. Besant," is *samādhān*, balance, composure, peace of mind, that equilibrium and steadiness which result from the attainment of the foregoing qualities. With the gaining of this, the probationary path is trodden, the chela candidate stands ready before the gateway, and there appears without further effort, the fourth qualification :—

"*Mumukshā*, the desire for emancipation, the wish to gain liberation, that which, crowning the long effort of the candidate, shows him to be an *adhikārī*, to be ready for initiation. He has been proved and not found wanting: his discrimination is keen, his indifference is no temporary disgust due to a passing disappointment, his mental and moral character is lofty, he is fit, he is ready for initiation. No more is asked, he stands fit to come face to face with his master, face to face with the life that he so long has sought."

These, then, are the preliminary disciplines which lead to actual admission into the life of a Vedantic student, an aspirant after the realization of the ideal set forth in the Vedānta. When that

life is actually entered, we come face to face with three disciplines, *sravana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, and their ultimate result, *darsana*. As Yājñavalkya says in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, II. 4. 5. "The Self, O Maitreyi, is to be seen, heard, contemplated and meditated upon." I shall define these disciplines in the words of Yogi Sadānanda.

"*Sravan* or hearing," says he, "is the ascertaining of the drift of all the Vedantic writings regarding the Secondless Reality, by the use of the sixfold means of knowledge." "The sixfold means," I may remark, "is only a statement of the method of studying the Scriptures, and is not of much importance. Without being detained by it, therefore, I pass on to *manana*. "*Manana* or contemplation," says Sadānanda, "is unceasing reflection on the Secondless Reality which has been heard of, in conjunction with arguments in support of the Vedānta." *Sravana* and *manana*, in short, are the thoughtful study of sacred literature,—a discipline which, in the present disintegration of Indian Society, has become an extremely rare thing even in the life of the more earnest and thoughtful amongst us. We have forgotten what our scriptures are, or have come to entertain a pseudo-liberal idea that all good books on all important subjects, or all good books on religion are our scriptures. There is indeed some truth

in such an idea, but it seems to me that as our time and powers are limited, it is better to pay particular attention to a few books treating impressively of the fundamental principles of inner religion than to try to compass the whole range of sacred literature opened to us by modern scholarship; and the spiritual history of our nation has proved what those books are. Tradition, based, as it seems, on true spiritual experience, has fixed the *Prāsthānatraya*,—the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma Sūtras* and the *Bhagavadgītā*,—as the concentrated essence of spiritual teaching. Whatever else is read,—and a good deal of spiritual literature both Indian and Foreign, may, in fact, be most profitably read,—the *Prāsthānatraya* must be read too by all who would not be diverted by the multifarious interests and activities of life from its central aim—the attainment of union with the Absolute. But the method of study is scarcely less important than the subject of study. People in general have very vague and wrong notions of what study, specially religious study, means. A friend of mine, much interested in and devoted to reading religious books, asked me one day, on seeing the *Bhagavadgītā* very often in my hand in early morning, why I read that book so frequently when I already knew its contents thoroughly well. The same friend inquired into the cause of my reading;

the *Upanishads* again and again when I had studied them so well as to have translated and written annotations on them. The idea underlying my friend's inquiry represents the common opinion about the method of studying religious books. It is that when you have attentively gone through a book once, specially when you have learnt what its main ideas are, you have done studying it, and you need not take it up again unless you are actually required to refer to it on some particular occasion. This is only, at best, a scholar's idea of study, and is wholly inadequate to the purposes of spiritual culture. For those purposes, for the realisation of the higher life, the fundamental truths of religion,—the presence of God in Nature, in the individual life and in the history of the race, the divine perfections, the varied duties of life, the ideals of social and spiritual life to be realised—must all be ever and anon brought before the mental eye; and nothing accomplishes this more effectively than the devout study of sacred literature, conversation on spiritual subjects with fellow travellers on the path of the higher life and listening to the inspired words of experienced spiritual teachers, all of which are comprehended in the discipline called *śravaṇa*.

But study or listening to religious exhortations is nothing if it is not accompanied or followed by thought and the mental effort to understand and

be deeply convinced of religious truth. Conviction can come out of thought only—deep and systematic thought—leading not merely to a mastery of the contents of religious books,—of the findings of the various systems of philosophy and theology—but to nothing less than the building of a regular system in the mind—a system of reasoned conclusions and verified intuitions about the leading truths of spiritual religion. The building of such a system is necessary before the possibility of the next *sādhana*, *nīdīdhyāsana*, continuous meditation, which Yogī Sadānanda defines as “the continuance of ideas consistent with the Secondless Reality, to the exclusion of the notion of the body and such like things, which are inconsistent with it,” i.e., as I understand him, the effort to mentally realise the presence of God as the only real thing. This effort, if successful, leads to *samādhi* or *darsana*. It is usual to enumerate eight *angas*, i.e., members or stages of *samādhi*. These are *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prānāyama*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. I again follow Sadānanda in defining these disciplines. *Yama* or acts of forbearance are sparing life, truthfulness, not stealing, chastity and non-acceptance of gifts. *Niyama* or religious observances are purification, contentment, endurance of hardships, inaudible repetition of sacred texts and concentration of the

thought on God. *Asana* or religious postures are distinguished by particular positions of the hands and feet such as the *Padmāsana*, *Svastikāsana*, and others. *Prāṇāyāma* or regulations of the breath consist of the method of restraining it known as *rechaka*, *pūra* and *kumbhaka*. *Pratyāhāra* or restraint of the organs of sense is holding them back from their several objects. *Dhāraṇā* or fixed attention is the fixing of the mind upon the Secondless Reality. *Dhyāna* or contemplation is the continuing of the current of thought upon the Secondless Reality in the midst of its breaks." *Samādhi* is, as has already been said, the actual realisation or apprehension of the Supreme Reality.

Samādhi is said to be of two kinds, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*. In the former, though the Supreme Reality is realised, an appearance of the duality of subject and object remains. The apprehension of God takes the form—"I know God." In the latter, the distinction of subject and object is fully sublated, the knower and the known being felt as the same, so that the Supreme Reality is revealed as an indivisible, undifferentiated Unity. I again quote Sadānanda: "*Savikalpaka Samādhi* is the resting of the mind on the Secondless Reality, whose shape it has assumed, *without* any concern as to the merging of the distinction between

the knower and the knowledge. Then, just as there is the perception of earth and that alone, even though there be the appearance of an earthen toy-elephant, etc., so too is there the perception of the Secondless Reality alone, even though there be the appearance of duality. As it has been said by those engaged in such contemplation : ' I am that Secondless One who is ever free, whose essence is knowledge, like the ether that is pure and formless, supreme, once seen, *i.e.*, never-changing, as the moon, etc. do, unborn, alone, everlasting, undefiled by contact with ignorance, etc.; all-pervading; I am pure knowledge, whose essence is invariableness; I am neither fettered nor set free.' (*Upadesasāhasrī*, 73 and 74)

"*Nirvikalpaka Samādhi* is the resting of the mind on the Secondless Reality, whose shape it has assumed; *with* concern as to the merging of the distinction of the knower and the knowledge, so as to be completely identified with him. Then just as, owing to the disappearance of salt after it has melted and so assumed the shape of the water into which it was thrown, nothing appears but the water, so by the disappearance of the mental state after it has assumed the shape of the Secondless Reality, nothing appears but the latter."

Sadānanda adds, after drawing the above distinction of *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka*

Samādhi: "It must not be supposed that this state (*i.e.*, the latter kind of *samādhi*) and sound sleep are identical; for, though in both alike a modification of the mind is not perceived, there is nevertheless this one distinction between them, that it is present in the former (*i.e.*, in *samadhi*) but not in the latter."

Now, is this distinction of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* in *samādhi* a valid one? The subject is a most abstruse one, and not quite fit for discussion in a public place and before a mixed audience like the present one. But there is an aspect of it which is intelligible to and capable of being discussed by even the ordinary student of the Vedānta. In that aspect, we have, in a manner, already discussed the subject in some of our previous lectures. The question to be answered is, whether the Supreme Reality can ever be realised as an undifferentenced unity. The distinction of matter and mind, subject and object, the finite and the infinite as independent realities, is, indeed, foreign to the Vedānta. But we have seen that even when the unity of these related aspects of Reality is perceived, such unity is seen to be not an undifferentenced, abstract unity, but a unity-in-difference. Even when *sthūla bheda* or difference in a gross sense is seen to be unreal, a sort of *sūkshma bheda* or subtle difference remains un-

resolved, and is, in fact, of the very essence of consciousness. Even in the act of realising itself to be one, unlimited and eternal, consciousness distinguishes itself from and thus finds itself related to the many, the limited and the temporal. And then as to the particular case of *samādhi*, the realisation of the universal by the individual self, the element of difference in it is plain enough, and it is rather wonderful how it could escape detection by the class of Vedantists represented by the *Vedāntasāra*. *Samādhi*, even in its highest form, is a mental state, as Sadānanda himself admits, an event that takes place at a particular time, and as the effect of antecedent events, and is thus distinguished from the eternal self-consciousness of Brahman which it reveals, and the form of which it assumes, in the language of Sadānanda. Being thus distinguishable, as a mental state of the individual, from its object, the Universal, it ceases to be *nirvikalpaka* in Sadānanda's sense. And this Sadānanda himself indirectly and perhaps unconsciously admits when he says that *nirvikalpaka samādhi* is distinguished from profound sleep in having a mental modification present in it, though in an unperceived form, while in dreamless sleep no mental modification exists. That a mental modification should exist unperceived, is, of course, impossible; and the

the only sense in which such a statement can be accepted is that a mental modification can remain unattended to in a special manner. It is true that when the mind of the worshipper is deeply concentrated in the unity and infinity of the ultimate Reality, the difference and finitude implied in the state of *samādhi* ceases to draw special attention; and may seem to be completely sublated to ordent minds not drilled in the art of mental analysis. But nevertheless it *is* there and must be recognised in all systems of philosophy and spiritual discipline that claim to be true to facts. The distinction of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka samadhi*, therefore, if at all to be recognised and retained, must be accepted as only a relative distinction, the element of difference being noticeable in the former along with unity, while in the latter it disappears from the sphere of clear consciousness.

Thus far we have been dealing with the three *sādhana*s, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *vidyā*, indicated in the *Upanishads*. Some of the details I have given are not to be found in them, but are evidently later developments. But that *yoga*, as a process of regulating the breath and concentrating the mind on the Supreme Reality, was prevalent in times represented by the *Upanishads*, appears from references to it here and there in these works, specially in the *Katha* and *Svetāsvatara Upanishads*.

As to the way in which Brahman should be meditated upon, the *Upanishads* are very particular. They are full of directions as to the forms which devout meditation on Brahman should take. These directions vary from mere hints to fully drawn meditations under the name of *upāsanas* or *vidyās*. The *Chhândogya Upanishad* contains the largest number of these *vidyās* or *upāsanas*. Some of them are very beautiful and may profitably be used even at the present time as aids to public and private devotions. But there are several which seem puerile and unsuitable for devotees of the present day. Some of these are addressed to the gods, and others are full of fanciful derivations of Vedic words, and imaginary analogies drawn between the syllables of sacred words or the objects of Nature on the one hand and sacrificial objects or parts of sacrifices on the other. However, I shall give a few specimens of the first-mentioned class of *upāsanas*—those which I have pronounced to be useful even to enlightened aspirants of the present time.

The following are from the *Kathopanishad* :—

“ This Person, who wakes while all things sleep, making one desirable object after another, that alone is bright, that is Brahman, that verily is called the immortal. In it rest all the worlds, and none go beyond it. This is that.” (II. 2. 8.)

"As the one fire, entering the world, takes the form of each object it burns, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object, and is also beyond all objects." (II. 2. 9.)

"As the one air, entering the world, takes the form of each object, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object, and is also beyond all objects." (II. 2. 10.)

"As the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not mixed up with the unholy external objects visible to the eye, so the one Inner Self of all creatures, beyond all objects, is not mixed up with the sorrows of the world." (II. 2. 11.)

12. "The one Ruler, the Inner Self of all creatures, who makes his one form manifold—those wise men who perceive him in themselves, obtain everlasting happiness, and not others."

13. "The Eternal among non-eternal things, the Consciousness of conscious beings, who, though alone, dispenses to many their objects of desire,—those wise men who see him in themselves, obtain everlasting peace, and not others." (II. 2. 12.)

"How shall I know him whom wise men know as 'It is this' and obtain great and unspeakable happiness? Does it shine by its own light or by the light of another?" (II. 2. 14.)

"The sun does not shine there, nor the moon, the stars or these lightnings. How shall this fire

shine there? All shine after him, the shining one. All this shines by his light." (II. 2. 15.)

The following are from the *Svetâsvatara Upanishad* :—

"To that Deity who is in fire, who is in water, who prevades the whole world, who is in herbs, who is in trees, we bow down again and again." (II. 17.)

"O Rudra, thou who dispensest good to these mountain regions, look upon us with that propitious form of thine which is beneficent, serene and the source of holiness."

"Here is one, struck with fear, who approaches thee with the words, 'O thou unborn.' O Rudra, protect me ever and ever with that propitious face of thine."

The following, called the *Sândilya Vidyâ*, is from the *Chhândogya* :—

"All this is Brahman, for everything is born of him, is absorbed in him and exists in him. One should meditate on him calmly. Now, because a man consists of desire, therefore as his desire is in this world, so will he be when he has departed from this world. He should desire accordingly. Brahman is full of *manas* (intelligence), life is his body, light his form, truth his thought, his nature is like ether. All actions, all desires, all odours and all tastes are in him. He pervades all this.

He is without speech, without attachment. This my Self within the heart is smaller than a corn, smaller than a barley, smaller than a mustard seed, smaller than the kernel of a mustard seed. This my Self within the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than these worlds. All actions, all desires, all odours and all tastes are in him. He pervades all this. He is without speech, without attachment. This my Self within the heart, this is Brahman. When I depart from this world, I shall attain him. Verily one who has this faith, has no doubt. Thus said Sândilya, thus said Sândilya (III. 14.)"

I shall close these extracts with one from the *Bṛihadâraṇyakopaniṣad*, which abounds in beautiful passages on the nature of the Supreme Being, for example the 'Antaryâmi Brâhmana' and other utterances of Muni Yajnavalkya; but I refrain from quoting them, as they are not exactly of the nature of *vidyâs* or *upâsanâs*. The following, as will be seen, is a prayer:

"Lead me from the unreal to the real; lead me from darkness to light; lead me from death to immortality." (I. 3. 28.)

Those who are familiar with the form of public and private devotions adopted in the Brâhma Samâj, will see that some of the above *upâsanâs*, as well as several other texts from the *Upanishads*, have

been incorporated in it, and that the *arâdhanâ* or adoration which forms such a prominent part of the Brâhma Samâj service, is nothing but a meditation on the attributes of God after the manner of Vedantic *vidyâs*, only turned into the form of a direct address to the Deity.

Thus far, however, I have dealt with the spiritual disciplines prescribed in the *Upanishads* themselves and in Vedantic works which have elaborated the hints thrown out in these ancient hand-books. The disciplines taught in the *Bhagavadgîtâ* deserve separate treatment, and I shall briefly refer to them, though in doing so I shall have to travel, to a certain extent, on the same ground as has already been traversed in my last lecture.

The *Gîtâ* system of spiritual discipline is an eminently scientific one. It consists in the culture of *jñân*, *bhakti* and *karma*,—knowledge, reverential love, and action. It is evidently founded on a clear recognition of the threefold division of mental powers—that into knowing, feeling and willing. In other words, *jñân* is the culture of the knowing faculty, *bhakti* of the higher feelings, and *karma* of the power of willing or acting. But I shall first allow an old Vedantist to speak on the subject. The venerable Svâmi Madhusudan Sarasvatî, one of the most respected of the commentators of the *Bhagavadgîtâ*, says in the intro-

duction to his learned commentary :—" The object of the *Gītā* 'is complete deliverance, the total cessation of worldly life and its cause, (*i.e.*, ignorance.) The state of deliverance is the attainment of the highest place of the All-pervading, the perfect condition that consists in truth, intelligence and bliss, and the attainment of which is taught by the threefold Vedas. Just as there are three *kāṇḍas* or sections in the Vedas, *karma*, (work), *upāsti* (adoration), and *jñāna*, (knowledge), so there are three sections in the *Gītā*, which consists of eighteen chapters. Every six chapters form a distinct section. The first six treat of work, and the last six of knowledge. As there can be no harmony between these two, for they are opposed to each other, *bhakti* or reverential devotion to God is taught in the intervening chapters. *Bhakti*, which removes all obstacles, is related to both work and knowledge. It is of three kinds—that which is united to work, that which is joined to knowledge and that which is pure, unmixed. In the first section, the object *tvam*, thou, as pure self, is investigated with proofs, by the way of renouncing work, *i.e.* work inspired by desire. In the second, the object *tat*, it, that is, the All-blissful Lord, is ascertained by the way of inculcating devotion to him. In the third, the unity of the two, the meaning of the phrase (*Tat tvam asi*, "Thou art that")

is clearly indicated. This is the relation of the three sections."

Now, we must confess to some doubt as to the correctness of the division which the Svâmi has made of the chapters of the *Gîtâ*,—nay of the very idea that the writer of the work had the *mahāvākya*, '*Tat tvam asi*,' distinctly before him as a guiding thread for the arrangement of his thoughts. But there can be no doubt that the treatise is an exposition of the three main aspects of spiritual life—knowledge, love and work,—and if we give up the idle hope of finding an exactly logical division of chapters in an ancient work like the *Bhagavadgîtâ*, the Svâmi's division of the book into three parts, each containing six chapters and treating respectively of *karma*, *bhakti* and *jñāna*, will be found to be practically a very convenient one. Let us see, then, how these three sections deal with their respective subject matters.

As has already been said, the first six chapters treat of work, or rather duties, personal, sacrificial and social. Of personal duties, the subjugation of the passions is the one which occupies the author most. He is not for the total extermination of our natural appetites and propensities. It is his distinct opinion that they should have their legitimate play. What he insists upon is that the soul should not be subject to them,—should not be guided by

them. For the soul to be under the guidance of sensuous passions, is like a boat to be under the caprices of fitful winds. The passions should always be under the guidance of Reason. It is Reason that should lead them to their legitimate satisfaction. Desires for earthly gratification should be eschewed. Satisfaction should be sought within. If earthly pleasures come to the soul without being sought after, without being pursued, they may be accepted. The soul should be like the ocean, satisfied with its own fullness and wanting nothing and yet receiving the waters of the rivers flowing into it.

Consistently with the principle of renouncing selfish desires, the performance of sacrificial and other duties with a view to obtaining objects worldly or other-worldly, for personal satisfaction, should also be given up. In the *Karmakānda* of the Vedas and in the *Dharma Śāstras* or treatises on moral and social duties, various duties are inculcated, and to each a reward here or hereafter is attached. The performance of those duties for the sake of the rewards promised for them is not calculated to promote that calmness and serenity of mind, that entire subjection to Reason, which the author of the *Gītā* inculcates. Hence he speaks often and emphatically against the performance of duties from interested motives. He is not

against duties, either sacrificial or social. On the contrary, he dwells on the obligatoriness of sacrifices as acknowledgements of our debt to the gods, the various powers of Nature, and the necessity of social duties for the preservation of the social order and the perpetuation of the world. What he insists upon is that duties should be done from a pure sense of duty, and not from any desire for individual satisfaction here or hereafter. The pleasant or painful effects of duties should not be thought of, and such thoughts should not be allowed either to exult or depress us. Duty should be done from a pure, unselfish motive, with a constant consciousness of God's presence and as an act of worship offered to him.

But this lofty mood of mind,—this profound consciousness of God and this pure sense of duty for duty's sake,—cannot be attained without a systematic cultivation of devout meditation. The *Gîtâ* therefore gives detailed directions as to how such meditation should be practised. After dwelling on the nature of the seat on which the devotee should place himself and other circumstances favouring a proper concentration of mind, the author next speaks of the process of making the mind calm,—rendering it free from distracting thoughts due to worldly desires. He then tells the devotee to fix his thoughts on the Self, which he

has taught, by a previous analysis, how to discriminate from limited objects. The nature of true meditation is then described by an enumeration of its beneficial effects. These effects are, mainly, an intense joy far surpassing the pleasure derived from earthly objects, the drawing away of the heart from temporal objects, and a growing consciousness of God in all things internal and external.

The subject of concentrationg the mind in God having been already introduced at the close of the last section, the second section, beginning with the seventh chapter, deals in greater detail with the various modes of devout meditation. Knowing that the act of worship, in the proper sense, is impossible unless the mind has a correct knowledge of God's relation to the finite soul and the world,—unless it knows how and where to seek the object of its worship,—the author of the *Gītā* proceeds to enlighten the reader on these matters. The objective world, he says, is the *aparā prakṛiti* or lower nature of the Deity, and the subjective world, the world of finite souls, his *parā prakṛiti* or higher nature. It is the latter, it is the divine intelligence, that manifests itself in the form of individual souls and that, on the other hand, supports the objective world. Both these aspects of existence are identical with God, and he may be sought both in and out; but the distinction of

higher and lower, of the supporting and the supported, drawn between them, should not be forgotten. The *Gîtâ* condemns, in almost unmeasured terms, the popular disregard of this distinction,—the exclusive identification of God with material objects and the ignoring of the transcendent nature of the Deity. These remarks are extremely important with reference to the current forms of popular worship. However, the transcendent aspect of the Divine nature being always kept in view, it is a very useful discipline to try to realize the Divine presence in the more glorious objects of Nature and in the more exalted specimens of human character. The next discipline prescribed is therefore *bibhûti-yoga*. It consists in the habit of realising the presence of God in those objects of Nature which are characterized by superior power, grandeur, beauty or usefulness, as also in men of uncommon heroism, wisdom or holiness. All objects are indeed manifestations of God, but for ordinary mortals, it is not possible to take them as such before they have passed through a course of spiritual development. It is easier to realise God in unusually great objects and persons than in Nature in general and in ordinary persons. The Himalayas help us incomparably more in feeling the Divine presence than small hills, the Ganges more than ordinary streams. So, it is easier to

feel the divinity of man when contemplating a Ráma or a Krishna, a Kapila or a Vyása, than a person of mediocre powers and attainments. The *Gítá*, therefore, exhorts us to contemplate these *bibhútis* or special manifestations of God as a help to his realisation everywhere. In the enumeration of these *bibhútis*, the author of the *Gítá* of course follows his own scientific and historic light, a light which may be insufficient for us, or even mislead us sometimes. But whether this or that *bibhúti* mentioned by him be such a glorious object or not as he describes it to be, the discipline inculcated by him must be pronounced as a really efficacious one, and must be adopted by those who, not contented with the mere knowledge or belief that God is, or that he is near, seek to make this knowledge a living reality. We may correct and enlarge the list of divine manifestations by the light of modern science and history. In doing so, we should be only following the spirit of the *Gítá*, for it distinctly says at the close of its enumeration of *bibhútis*, that it is unnecessary to name any more than what have been named, as the whole world is God's manifestation—one aspect of his nature.

The third discipline prescribed in the *Gítá*, *visvarupa-darsanam*, the vision of God as manifested in the, or, to be more correct, *as the various*

visible objects of Nature, comes naturally after *bibhûti-yoga*. The devotee has attained success in the practice of seeing God in special objects. He now desires to see him in all objects. It is of course impossible to see God with carnal eyes, and so Arjuna, who represents the worshipper, obtains *divya*, i. e. heavenly or spiritual eyes from his Guide and Instructor. When such eyes are obtained in the course of spiritual culture, the veil, the materiality, of Nature is removed, and it appears as the manifold form of the Formless. So the veil of humanity that enshrouds the divinity of man is also taken away, and we, like Arjuna, lament our blindness in treating with lightness and irreverence the Infinite One in the persons of our friends and connexions. The vision of God as the All-in-all must be, at less advanced stages of spiritual life, too dazzling a one to be borne for a long time, and so Arjuna is represented as praying Krishna, after looking at him as the spiritualized cosmos, to hide his glorious cosmic form and re-assume his everyday human appearance. We do the same every day when, from the contemplation of Nature and humanity from the Divine standpoint in our moments of rapt worship, moments in which we rise above ordinary conceptions and earthly relations, we relapse into our habitual mood, and feel comfort in finding ourselves among the realities of the

material world and embraced by the sweet relations of domestic and social life. But nevertheless, the difference between a life occasionally visited by the blessed vision of the All-in-all, and one to which such a vision is a stranger, is immense; and notwithstanding the failures of ordinary devotees, a life in which the perpetual vision of all things in God and God in all things is a never-failing light, and the ordinary conceptions and relations of practical life only a system of unavoidable conventionalities, is by no means inconceivable. Whether such a life has ever been realised in flesh or not, it guides every earnest soul in all its struggles and aspirations, and is realised in every step it takes towards union with the All-holy.

Next comes *bhakti-yoga*, the offering of reverential worship to God. The author of the *Gītā* is never tired of speaking of the great importance of reverential worship. Some of the forms in which it should be offered are, (1) contemplation of God's power, wisdom and goodness, (2) remembering him constantly with a devout heart, (3) conversing on him with devout persons, (4) singing his praises with fellow-worshippers, and (5) doing all actions as his service.

The third section of the *Gītā*, which consists of the last six chapters of the book, and which, accord-

ing to Svāmi Madhusudan, treats of *jñāna*, the highest stage of spirituality, deals with the practical duties of life as much as with knowledge. The distinction of subject and object, already touched in the second section, is here drawn up more fully. It is not merely the objects of sense that belong to the objective world; many subtle objects, including even thoughts and feelings,—in fact all that can be made objects of reflection—are included in the class of *kshetras*, and the pure and transcendent intelligence that reveals objects is alone called *kshetrajña*. God himself, it is distinctly said, is the *kshetrajña* or subject in all objects. The distinction of subject and object, again, prevades all things. All things present a union of subjective and objective aspects,—there being nothing which is purely subjective or purely objective. But though God is the objectivity of all objects and the subjectivity of all finite subjects, his infinitude, his transcendence of all limits, must never be forgotten; he must be worshipped as *Purushottama*, the Supreme Person, transcending objects and higher than finite persons. These general principles of the Divine science being laid down, the *Gītā* proceeds to a nice discrimination of the three fundamental qualities of Nature, *sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the principles of knowledge, action and ignorance, and taking these as fundamental

categories, it reduces all virtues, all duties, one may even say all objects whatever, into them. *Sattvam*, *rajas* and *tamas* are, in this comprehensive view of things, only different names for *good*, *middling* and *bad*, and according as the author places an action or a trait of character in the one or the other class, it is seen what value he attaches to it in his estimate of the ideals, aspirations and disciplines of spiritual life. With this trichotomy of moral distinctions, and in some instances, with the dichotomy of *daivi* and *ásurí* (*sampat*), he estimates the value of the various classes of meats, sacrifices, penances, charities, knowledge, actions, agents, intelligence, attention and happiness that exist in the world. The things which he pronounces *sáttvika* from one standpoint and *daiva* from another, must be understood as the things that are favourable to and in harmony with the highest spirituality. I shall not enter into the details given by the author. I shall close by reciting two stanzas from Arjuna's address to the Deity when he saw his *visvarupa* or manifold form.

"Thou art the Father of the whole world, movable and immovable; thou art its great and adorable Teacher; no one is equal to thee, and who can be greater than thee in the three worlds, O thou of matchless glory?

So, bowing down to thee, I shall propitiate thee, the adorable Lord. O God, pardon my sins as a father pardons the sins of his son, as a friend of his friend, and a lover of his beloved."

LECTURE XI.

THE VEDANTIC DOCTRINE OF THE FUTURE LIFE.

IN Hindu Philosophy one misses the elaborate and long-drawn arguments for the immortality of the soul which form a prominent feature of the philosophical Theology of Europe. The explanation of this is, no doubt, to be found in the general unanimity of Hindu philosophers as regards the doctrine in question. All the six orthodox schools of Hindu Philosophy agree in thinking of the soul as not only immortal, but also eternal. The heterodox school of Buddhist Philosophy too accepts the doctrine in a modified form. It is only out-and-out Materialists like the Chárvákas that questioned it. There was therefore little occasion for our philosophers spending time and energy in proving that the soul does not perish with the body. But that the Materialist's arguments were not left quite unheeded, appears from controversial passages here and there in Hindu philosophical works,—passages which are apparently directed against the heretics just mentioned. For instance, in his commentary on the 53rd and 54th aphorisms of the 3rd *páda*, third chapter, of the *Brahma*

Sûtras, Sankara first states and then argues against the views of the Lokáyatikas or Chárvákas. The aphorisms commented upon occur in a place where no one would expect them, which shows perhaps that they were the result of an after-thought on the part of the author, and also the slight interest he felt in the superficial speculations of the Materialists. I shall, however, give the substance both of the arguments of these philosophers, as stated by Sankara, and of his refutation of them. The reasonings of the Materialists amount to this: "Though consciousness is hidden in external objects, it becomes manifest in these objects when they form an organism, just as the intoxicating power hidden in certain objects is manifested when they are made into wine. There is therefore no soul apart from the body which is capable of either going to heaven or attaining liberation. The properties of an object are those which exist while it exists, and cease to exist in its absence. Heat and light are, in this sense, properties of fire. Now, the vital functions, sensibility, memory and the like, which are believed to be properties of the soul, are found in the body, and not found without the body. They are therefore not the properties of an extra-organic object, but really properties of the body." Sankara's reply, which is an amplification of the aphorism referred to, is in subs-

tance this: "If the properties of the soul are to be set down as properties of the body, because they exist while the body exists, why should not they be concluded as *not* properties of the body for their *not* existing while the body exists. Form and such other qualities, which are really properties of the body, exist so long as the body exists; but the vital functions and the rest do not exist in the body after death. Besides, form and other properties like it are perceived even by others, but the properties of the soul, sensibility, memory etc., are not perceived by any one else than the soul to which they belong. Then, again, one knows the existence of these properties in the body while it lives; how can one be sure that at the destruction of one body they are not transmitted to another? Even the possibility of this refutes Materialism. Then, as to the true character of consciousness, the Materialist will perhaps admit that consciousness is the knowledge of matter and material objects. If so, he must also admit, that, inasmuch as matter and material objects are objects of consciousness, it cannot be their property. For matter to perceive matter is as impossible as it is for fire to burn itself and for a dancer to climb upon his own shoulders. Form and other properties of matter cannot, we see, make themselves or other properties their objects. Inas-

much, therefore, as consciousness makes both internal and external things its objects, it is not a material property. If its distinction from material objects be admitted, its independence of them must also be admitted. Moreover, its identity in the midst of changing circumstances proves its eternality. Remembrance and such other states of the mind become possible only because the knowing self is recognized as the same in two successive states. Thus in the consciousness 'I saw this before,' the seeing and recognising self is known as the same. The argument that because perception takes place while the body exists, therefore it is a property of the body, has already been refuted. It is as valid an argument as that because perception takes place while such materials as lamps etc., are present, therefore it is a property of lamps etc. The body is only an instrument of perception like lamps etc. Nor is the body absolutely necessary even as an instrument of perception, inasmuch as a variety of perceptions takes place in the state of dreaming, when the body is inactive. Thus the existence of the soul as something different from the body is an irresistible fact."

The other pivot on which the Vedantic doctrine of immortality turns, is the doctrine of *Karma*,—the doctrine that every action must be followed by

its proper effect. This doctrine is sometimes stated in a shape so abstract as to give it the appearance of a law of mechanical causality ; but really, in its application to rational beings, it has an ethical aspect also. As an ethical law, it lays down, when stated in its most general form, that every moral action must have a moral effect. In its popular form it prescribes happiness as the result of every virtuous act and suffering of every vicious act. But thus stated, it looks very much like the Christian doctrine of justice,—the doctrine that every virtuous act deserves happiness as its reward and every vicious act necessitates suffering as its punishment. Reward and punishment are personal acts,—the awards of a personal judge, and the Christian doctrine of justice is necessarily connected with that of such a judge. Hindu thinkers, on the other hand, distinctly deny the personal character of the law of *Karma*. In aphorism 34 of the 1st *pāda*, second chapter, of the *Brahma Sūtras* as well as in the commentary thereon, the results of the moral action of rational beings are described as irrespective of the Divine activity and as dependent on the free activity of individual agents. The *Bhagavadgītā* also says : “The Lord creates neither people’s actions, nor their agency nor the fruits of their actions ; in this matter, Nature takes its course.” Never-

theless, the impersonality of the moral law is not always consistently kept in view by Vedantists, and the same *Gîtâ* which speaks rather mysteriously in some places of Nature as a cause other than God, describes the Supreme Being in other places as the Dispenser of heaven and hell as the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice. Even though we may set down such descriptions as only occasional lapses into popular modes of thought, it must be admitted, on the other hand, that the Vedantic conception of the moral order of the world is not, and could not be, purely impersonal. The universe being the manifestation of a Conscious Being, a Being embodying in himself the highest perfections, and the individual rational beings being so many reproductions of the Divine life, ever tending to perfection, the moral order, with all the vicissitudes of rise and fall, suffering and enjoyment, must be held as teleological at the bottom, as having a grand purpose which it is fulfilling, though gradually, at every step. Though not personal, therefore, in the popular sense, the moral order, or, in other words, the law of *karma*, may be called personal in a higher sense,—personal in the sense of its fulfilling a divine purpose. As such, it is a strong proof of the soul's immortality—its continued moral activity in another sphere of life when one is

closed to it. Every moral action must have, as the law lays down, a moral effect. If the effect is pleasant, the pleasantness is only incidental; it must lead to a certain elevation or degradation of the soul, as the case may be, but ultimately to the former,—to moral progress. If the effect is painful, the pain is only an instrument, like pleasure, for bringing about a certain moral effect. Moral actions, again, have a certain collective effect. They all tend to the building of a moral character,—a character with fixed tendencies to thoughts, feelings and actions of a definite nature. Every rational being—and a rational being must be moral by virtue of his possessing reason—has such a character at the time of death, and the law of *karma* demands that this character must be perpetuated—must continue to have the effects which exist potentially in the moral forces embodied in it. To suppose a cessation of life and activity at the destruction of the body, is, first of all, to suppose a violation of the law of universal causation understood in its broadest sense. The law of causation requires not only that every cause should have an effect, but that the effect should be adequate to the cause. Human character is an aggregate of moral causes, moral forces; its effects also must therefore be moral, and there can be no moral effects in the true sense without a

conscious, personal centre of activity,—without the perpetuation, that is, of the lives of moral agents. Secondly, to suppose an extinction of the soul at the death of the body is to pronounce rational and moral life as purposeless,—to deny the moral order of the universe and to conceive it as the play of blind forces. If, therefore, there is a moral order in the universe, if rational life has a purpose, that purpose cannot be anything higher than moral progress—the attainment of perfection by rational beings—and such a purpose necessarily requires the perpetuation of the conscious life of individuals. The gradual elevation of the mere race, to which the moral efforts of individuals contribute—an idea which seems to satisfy some thinkers,—does not fully meet the requirements of the case. There is no meaning in the elevation of a race unless the individuals composing it are conceived as elevated, and to say that one set or generation of individuals exists in order to contribute to the elevation of another set or generation, is to deny the most essential characteristic of a rational being,—that of his being not an instrument or means to any other being or thing, but an end unto himself. Individuals do indeed contribute to the elevation of other individuals, but to say that an individual lives only for other individuals is to make every thing hopelessly relative, to deny the

existence of an absolute end, and to eviscerate moral worth of its very essence—its personal character.

We thus see that the law of *karma*, understood as just explained, guarantees the perpetuation of the moral life of every rational being and his gradual progress and final attainment of perfect union with the All-good, the ultimate end of his existence.

The next question that concerns us is the form of immortality conceived by the Vedānta. Does the soul remain disembodied in its future life or does it undergo a process of rebirth? With this question is connected that of the soul's pre-existence, its existence before a particular incarnation. The Vedānta is decidedly of opinion that every individual soul passes through a practically infinite number of incarnations—incarnations determined by its own moral activity and determining it in turn. The formation of a soul, *i.e.*, of a complex intellectual and moral organism, in the course of a few months or a few years, it apparently conceives as an impossibility. It will appear so also to the modern intellect if we take a number of most important facts into serious consideration. It is undeniable that we are born with definite intellectual and moral characters. Circumstances indeed affect and contribute to the formation of

character ; they, however, do not act upon empty minds and souls equal and identical in their blankness, but upon clearly defined moral powers and tendencies of infinite variety both in quality and quantity. If, in mature life, all formations, whether intellectual or moral, demand a history, an explanation in the form of a series of previous actions, and all differences a difference of history, does not the complexity and variety of endowments with which our present life begins demand a similar explanation, a similar history projected into the unknown past ? A striking confirmation of the Vedantic doctrine of the soul's pre-existence is supplied by the theory of evolution now so widely accepted. This theory seems distinctly to militate against the current supposition that the human soul is the work of about nine months' time. The human body has an almost incalculably longer history behind it. Its present form, with its nice adaptations and its wonderful capacity for multiplying itself, is the result of a series of evolutions extending through millions of years during which it has passed through innumerable lower and tentative forms. It is a law of nature that the time required for the evolution of an organism is long in proportion to its richness, niceness and complexity. The human mind, then,—the richest, nicest and most complex of organisms,—far from

requiring only nine months for its formation, would seem to demand for its evolution a much longer period than any physical or physiological structure whatever. The theory of the transmission of acquired powers from father to son cannot, it seems, go farther than explaining the superior richness and adaptability of the organism with which succeeding generations are favoured, compared with those possessed by their ancestors. The net result of experience, the acquired niceness of the organism, its fitness for higher action and thought, may be, as it is said to be, transmitted to its reproductions. But unless the favoured organisms are occupied by superior minds, unless the laws that govern physiological evolution are acknowledged as obtaining in the spiritual world also, the current theory of transmitted experience does not seem sufficient to explain the variety and complexity of the human soul at its birth. The direct transmission of powers from one soul to another, and the origin of the soul of the child from that of the father—suppositions which underlie current thinking on the subject—are theories without any rational grounds whatever, and are hardly even conceivable. On the other hand, the analogy of physiological evolution points to a parallel process of spiritual evolution,—the gradual development of souls by experience gathered in

each life, and their re-birth in fresh lives, the extent of their development determining the quality of the organisms occupied by them. In these re-incarnations, the souls may be conceived to carry with them the result of their previous experiences, with the details dropped from memory, but the substantial progress in intellectual and moral power uninterrupted and ready to determine and be increased by fresh experience.

Now, if these considerations help to solve problem of pre-existence, they also help to solve the allied problem of re-incarnation. But I shall discuss the latter problem a little further. I have, in some of my previous writings, referred to the phenomena of sleep and re-awakening and of forgetting and recollecting as having very important bearings on the philosophy of mind, and as facts from which our old Vedantists drew the legitimate conclusions. I shall now show how these phenomena help in solving the problem of re-incarnation. It seems to me that in relation to this problem they have a double bearing, (1) that of proving the continuance of the contents of the individual consciousness, with all their variety and limitations in tact, even without the instrumentality of the body, and (2) the necessity of the body for the re-manifestation of those contents after their suspense in death. In. profound, dreamless sleep,

our individuality, or rather the manifestation of individual life, suffers a partial suspense. The wave that constitutes it seems to return to the ocean. But this temporary suspense of individuality is not a merging, not a total sublation of difference. The contents of every individual life are maintained in tact,—in all their fullness and distinction. There is no loss, and no mingling. When the time comes, each individual starts up from the bosom of the Eternal, the Ever-waking, with its wealth of conscious life undiminished, with its identity undimmed. Every one gets back what is his own, and nothing but his] own. There seem to be separate chambers in the Eternal Bosom for each individual to rest soundly and unmolested. Now, this fact seems to prove that the contents of our conscious individual life can exist in the Eternal Consciousness, with their totality and difference in tact, even in the absence of the body and its organs. It is not the body, not the brain, not the nervous system, that can be said to sustain thought. The contents of consciousness can be retained only in a conscious being. To say that they can exist in an unconscious form—'in a sub-conscious region'—is to be actually guilty of a contradiction. Thoughts can persist, can retain their essence and identity, only in a thinking being remaining conscious and self-identical in the midst of change. The reproduc-

ing of such contents in us in the forms "I am the same being now that I was before," "this object is the same that I saw yesterday," "this idea is the same that occurred to me before I slept" etc., implies that, during the temporary lapse of individual life, these ideas are retained as ideas and not as anything else in the very Being who is the basis of our lives, a Being who is thus seen to have an unchanging and ever-conscious aspect of his nature besides his intermittent manifestation as 'our' consciousness. As Sankara says in his commentary on the *Brahma Sûtras*, II. 2. 31, "Unless there exists one relating principle in the past, present and future, one which is unchangeable and sees all things, the facts of remembrance, recognition etc., which depend upon mental impressions requiring space and time and occasional cause, cannot be explained." However instrumental our brain-cells may be in the reproduction of the contents of our conscious life in the state of re-awakening, they cannot explain their persistence in the hours of sleep; far less can they be identified with those contents.

But if the phenomena of sleep and awakening prove the continuance of the individual consciousness in the Universal and its independence of physical conditions for this continuance, they also prove the dependence of that consciousness on such

conditions for its actual manifestation. Sleep indicates the temporary exhaustion of nervous power. When, by continual activity, the nervous system has lost its strength and requires refreshment by rest, it ceases to work, and the cessation of its activity is accompanied by a temporary suspense of consciousness in its individual form. It is only when the strength of the organs has been restored by sufficient rest, that the flow of thoughts and feelings that constitutes individual life recommences, and the identity and continuity of individual consciousness is re-established. In the waking state also, the health and vigour of mental life are found determined by the soundness and strength of the organism, and injuries to the organs specially connected with the manifestation of consciousness are seen to materially affect the order and vividness of this manifestation. A valid induction from these patent facts is that the reappearance of individual consciousness after the dissolution of the present body will require a fresh organism with essentially the same properties. We cannot indeed be absolutely sure that there are no other conditions of the re-manifestation of consciousness than those with which we are acquainted. It seems just barely possible that, as is asserted, at a certain stage of development individuals acquire the power of disembodying themselves,—extricating

themselves from their gross bodies and continuing their conscious lives in a subtle body imperceptible to the senses. That some such environment, however fine and subtle, is required for the individual soul, seems to be axiomatic from its nature as a finite being. The *sukshma sarira* spoken of in our theological books,—the body that consists of the five vital airs, the five organs of knowledge in their subtle forms as powers, and the five organs of actions conceived in the same fashion,—the body which is described as the vehicle of the soul's migration to the *Pitriloka* and the *Brahmaloka*, the regions of the manes and the Divine regions,—seems to be too fine for the purpose which it is conceived as fulfilling. For locomotion and activity in space a material body, having extension and parts, is necessary, and such a body must be supposed to belong to even the most advanced and richly endowed of souls in the other world. But the evolution of such a fine, etherial body must be conceived to follow the same slowly acting laws that obtain in the region of gross matter, and also to be dependent on a corresponding growth of spiritual power. Admitting, therefore, the evolution of such a body in extraordinary cases, it may be safely laid down that, so far as ordinary individual life is concerned, there is no probability of its reproduction and actual continuance except in

connection with an organism similar to that which we possess in our present life.

From another point of view, re-incarnation seems to be the most probable form of immortality. The conditions of ethical progress would apparently be absent in a disembodied existence. The ethical life must be social. There is neither morality nor spirituality for an isolated being. Virtue is indeed personal, individual. There is no meaning in the purity of a society in which the individuals are not pure. But the purity of individuals and their continued growth in righteousness imply their inclusion in a society of which the members owe duties to one another, and in which a free exchange of thoughts and sentiments and an active co-operation in good work are possible. These things are inconceivable in a state of existence in which souls are disembodied; for it is through our bodies that we are able to communicate with one another. The very conditions of that spiritual life, then, which makes immortality necessary and desirable, require that souls should be reborn either in this very world or in others more or less similar to this.

An ever-recurring objection against the doctrine of pre-existence and re-incarnation is that we have no memory of a previous existence and cannot possibly remember the events of this life if we

should be reborn, and that the enjoyment or suffering of the fruits of actions which have passed out of memory involves an apparent injustice. The phenomena of sleep and re-awakening, and those of forgetting and recollecting, to which I have already referred, supply an answer to this objection. They prove an important truth which is often overlooked and the overlooking of which lies at the basis of the objection just mentioned. That truth is, that by passing out of our memory, a fact does not cease to have connection with our mental life, and even to determine it materially. In an independent, self-sustained mind like the Divine, the presence or absence of an idea can mean nothing less than its presence or absence in consciousness. If anything could possibly pass out of its cognizance, it would cease to have any existence for it. But this is not true of our finite minds, which are contained in and perpetually sustained by the Infinite. Facts are constantly going out of our individual consciousness and returning to it from the Divine Mind, which forms its eternal base, and in which they are perpetually held. At the present moment, for instance, when I am intent upon reading this paper, how few of the manifold facts of my life are actually present with me! But they are nevertheless determining my present action from the back ground of my

consciousness, in which they lie hidden. How many events have preceded and made the preparing and delivering of this lecture possible! Most of them cannot, by any efforts I may make, be recalled, and will not perhaps revisit my mind any more. Some can be recalled, but are absent now. Others are starting into consciousness from the dark chambers of the mind in which they lay concealed only a few moments back. My present action is, it is clear, due to a certain permanent form which my mind has taken as the combined effect of these various classes of facts and to the recurrence of a certain number of them. In the same manner, the moral character which I now possess, and which determines the ethical quality of my present actions, is the combined result of a long series of thoughts, feelings and actions many of which have passed entirely out of my consciousness, and many more which may be recalled only with great difficulty. But all these facts are, in a sense, present with me in their effects, *i. e.* my character, and if I now suffer in consequence of sins committed before but now forgotten, or enjoy the fruits of righteous conduct equally forgotten, I do not feel myself wronged in the one case or specially favoured in the other. In sound, dreamless sleep, again, the facts of life, as we have already seen, beat a complete retreat

from the field of consciousness and leave it utterly empty so far as its individual manifestation is concerned. But they are, by no means, lost in consequence of this temporary disappearance, and do not cease to determine waking life. Now, considered in the light of these facts, the objections to pre-existence and re-incarnation referred to are seen to be groundless. That we have at present no recollection of any previous state of existence, does not, in the first place, prove that it will never come back to our memory. For aught we know, its re-appearance may be waiting for conditions to be hereafter fulfilled. In the second place, even if it should so happen that no such facts will ever recur to us under any circumstances, it would not follow that they never occurred and are not determining our present life. As we have already seen, the richness and complexity of our minds even at the moment of birth, and their speedy development in definite lines under the varying circumstances of this life, point to a long mental history through which we must have passed in the unremembered past. In the third place, if, in our present life, we have to lose and gain constantly in consequence of actions which we have utterly forgotten, but which have nevertheless left lasting effects on our character, there can be no injustice in our enjoying or suffering the fruits of

actions which were done in previous states of existence, and which, though forgotten now, have yet made us what we are. And finally, it may also be, that the few years during which we live in forgetfulness of our past lives, are, in proportion to the actual span of our existence, a much more shorter period than are our hours of dreamless sleep in proportion to the total extent of our present life. The alleged recollection of previous states of existence by many persons characterized by uncommon purity of heart, is a subject which I simply mention and pass by ; its discussion would be beyond the limited scope of this lecture.

I shall refer to one more aspect of the Vedantic doctrine of the future life before I close. The law of evolution in the physical and physiological world point, as we have seen, to a similar law in the spiritual world. Does not the same law, we may now ask, testify to the reasonableness of the Vedantic view that the animating principles of all creatures are substantially of the same nature and the transmigration of these principles from one species to another is quite possible? If man's body is historically linked to, being the development of, the bodies of the lower animals, where is the unreasonableness of thinking that his soul also has passed through a similar process of gradual development, having animated lower organisms in the

more remote periods of its pre-existence, gaining in intelligence and moral strength as it migrated into higher and higher organisms and at last attaining humanity both physically and spiritually? Current European thought draws a hard and fast line between man and the lower animals and practically sets down the latter as soulless beings. Apart from the progress of philosophical speculation, the recent discoveries of natural historians as regards the highly developed social feelings of some of the lower animals, and the existence in them of sentiments akin to the ethical, have been showing more and more clearly, day by day, the hastiness of such a view, and it now seems impossible to imagine a gap between human consciousness in its lowest forms and the consciousness of the higher brutes. It seems quite probable, therefore, that psychological science will, in not a very distant future, confirm the anticipations of the Vedānta philosophy and link together all conscious existence by a law similar to the law of physiological evolution. We shall then see with the eyes of science, as we already see with the eye of intellectual intuition, that the humanity of which we are proud is an acquisition which has come to us as the result of a long struggle carried on through millions of years, leading us, under the slow but beneficial law of *Karma*, through organic and spiritual conditions.

of an infinitely diverse nature, to that which seems to be the nearest to God. But the reverse process—from humanity to animality—which the old Vedantists seem to have thought as likely as the other—seems to be quite improbable in the light of both natural and moral science. Progress from seed to tree, from child to man, from the jelly-fish to the highest mammalia, from barbarism to the highest civilization—is the order of Nature, and so, while the teachings of the Vedanta, interpreted scientifically, inspires the hope that we shall one day be gods and partake of the Divine blessedness, they leave no room for the fear that we may one day descend to that brute condition from which we have risen.

As to the details of the future life, the different destinies assigned by the Vedanta to persons following different lines of conduct, we shall consider them in our next lecture, that on the Vedantic Doctrine of Liberation.

LECTURE XII.

THE VEDANTIC DOCTRINE OF LIBERATION.

In this final lecture of the present series, we approach the most important doctrine of the Vedanta system, the doctrine of the soul's liberation or salvation. The Vedantic doctrine of liberation has been claimed, by those who accept it, as the very pride and glory of the system, whereas those who reject it pronounce it as its disgrace. The bad odour which the Vedanta has with some classes of people in this country is due to a certain interpretation of this doctrine, an interpretation which many people accept as the only one possible. Those who know the history of the Bráhma Samáj are aware that it is chiefly the Vedantic doctrine of liberation, as he understood it, which repelled Maharshi Devendranáth Thákur from the system and led him to discard his youthful faith in Vedantism and declare a simpler Theism as the religion of the Bráhma Samáj. As I shall show in the course of this lecture, the Maharshi misunderstood, as many others have done, the true import of the doctrine. The misunderstanding continued for many years in the Bráhma Samáj, till Brahmánanda Kesavachandra Sen gave a true interpretation of

the doctrine in a remarkable Bengali sermon entitled "*Yogi Akshay o Apar*" from the Brahma Mandir pulpit in his last days. The Brahmánanda was not a philosopher; but he was possessed of rare spiritual insight, and so, though his interpretation of the Vedantic doctrine of liberation given in the sermon referred to is not a reasoned one, and will not satisfy those who seek intellectual satisfaction, it shows that our late revered leader had attained to the spiritual condition from which the *rishis* had spoken of the final union of the individual soul with the Universal. He seems to have felt, in his higher moods of communion with God, that there is really a condition of the soul in which it can be said to be absorbed or merged in God, but that this absorption is not in any sense a physical but rather a spiritual condition, one in which the individual is fully conscious of itself. However, the Brahmánanda's interpretation was and is still far from being intelligible to the Bráhma community in general, and is perhaps so much as known only to a very small number of Bráhmas. The common misunderstanding of the doctrine is as deep as ever, and the Vedanta still continues to be looked upon with misgiving and suspicion by simple-minded Theists both in and outside the Bráhma Samáj. I hope to correct this misunderstanding and remove this suspicion to some extent by my present lecture.

The current notion about the Vedantic doctrine of liberation is that it teaches what is really nothing less than the total destruction of the individual soul. Now, I admit that the Māyāvādi interpretation of the doctrine does really amount to one of utter annihilation. But I shall show in the course of this lecture that this interpretation is both irrational and unscriptural. The Māyāvādi doctrine of liberation is a direct outcome of the Māyāvādi doctrine of creation. From my previous lectures of the present series, specially from my fifth and sixth lectures, you must have seen what this doctrine is and also that it is both irrational and unscriptural. Now, if the Māyā theory of creation is so, the Māyā theory of liberation also cannot but be of the same nature. According to the former, our existence as individuals is due to ignorance, though it cannot explain to whom the ignorance belongs. It follows therefore that when ignorance is dispelled by a knowledge of the true nature of the soul, our existence as individuals ceases. But if our existence as individuals is not the result of ignorance, if it is, as I have shown, by appealing to both Reason and Scripture, a datum of true knowledge, it cannot be put an end to by any amount of knowledge, either of things earthly or heavenly, that we may acquire. It is not a "bondage" from which we can be

liberated by any spiritual exercises, however rigorous, or indeed one from which we need to be liberated. Nor does liberation from it really mean anything unless it be utter annihilation. Such annihilation, even if it were possible to effect it, would be something of which 'liberation' would be the least appropriate name possible, for liberation implies the continued existence of the thing liberated and its change from a lower to a higher state of existence. Bondage and liberation then, whatever else they may mean, do not surely mean the existence of finite souls and their subsequent annihilation in consequence of the attainment of enlightenment by them. Their beginning to exist, I repeat, is not caused by their ignorance, and their annihilation, therefore, cannot be effected by the attainment of enlightenment on their part.

I shall dispose of another false view of bondage and liberation before I ask you to see what they really are. Bondage does not consist in incarnation or even re-incarnation—in the mere fact of having a body. Liberation may be obtained even when one continues to have a body of flesh, and even saved souls who have once left their bodies, may be and have been, according to the Śāstras, incarnated for the good of the world. Several persons who had attained to a

consciousness of unity with Brahman and taught the science of God from that standpoint, are described in sacred literature as emancipated souls, and several who are represented as incarnations of God are said to have come again and again to the earth and taken upon them the burden of flesh in order to accomplish particular ends or the general purpose of uprooting vice and establishing virtue. On the other hand, souls that leave their gross bodies at death, and are, for the time being, disembodied, cannot be called emancipated merely for the fact of their being disembodied. Whether they are free or in bondage, depends upon the spiritual possessions with which they have left their bodies. The difference between a saved and an unsaved soul does not therefore consist in the one having a body and the other not having one. The mere presence or absence of the body is indifferent. The difference lies, as we shall see, in the way in which the body is looked at. The unsaved soul identifies itself with its body, and its desires are all more or less concerned with it, whereas the saved soul looks upon it as a mere instrument, and is above all carnal desires. Carnal desires are supposed to result necessarily in re-incarnations, whereas in the case of the spiritually minded, the saved, the resumption of a body is optional. Hence the

mere having a body, the mere fact of re-incarnation, is often spoken of as a state of bondage, and freedom from the necessity of re-incarnation, from the binding force of carnal desires that inevitably leads to re-embodiment, represented as a state of freedom. But this is only one aspect of the question, and we must try to have a full view of the subject.

The *Svetâsvatara Upanishad* describes bondage and liberation in the following way :—" In that great Brahma-wheel (i. e., the world) in which all creatures live and rest, the traveller (i. e. the finite soul) wanders, thinking himself to be different from the Ruler. When blessed by Him, he attains immortality." (I. 6.) Bondage, then, consists in thinking oneself different from God— as having a self of one's own different from the Supreme Self, and liberation means freedom from this belief by the blessing of God. But the matter is not one of mere ignorance and knowledge in their purely intellectual aspects. One who identifies himself not with the Universal Self, but with this or that finite object, gross or fine, must necessarily be subject to desires connected with that object. He must wish for things that may satisfy the self he conceives. These things, again, in consequence of their intrinsic finitude and transitoriness, must either be often unobtainable,

and thus cause disappointment to the person desiring them, or, even when obtainable, fail to give him full and lasting satisfaction. The state of bondage, therefore, is one not of mere ignorance, but also of suffering—suffering caused by various passions and desires, and the state of liberation, on the other hand, one of freedom from desires—desires for finite objects,—and freedom from the suffering caused by such desires. Bondage, again, is a state of sin. The consciousness of the Absolute, the Universal, that all conscious beings have, either in a distinct or indistinct form, dictates laws of conduct and claims the submission of all personal desires to these laws. It condemns selfishness and all thoughts, desires and actions that proceed from it. It urges us to rise to the Divine standpoint and look on all beings with an impartial eye. But the passions are all egoistic and seek for individual satisfaction. Thus there results a conflict, and the conflict, when the self-seeking desires prevail, gives rise to sin, for sin consists in the pursuit of a lower ideal in the presence of a higher, in seeking individual satisfaction at the cost of absolute, universal good, in following passion instead of Reason. Sin, therefore, constitutes one of the bonds of the soul, and the state of liberation is one of holiness, freedom from sin. The scrip-

atures, in their repeated exhortations on bondage and liberation, dwell on all these aspects of the question,—sometimes on the one, sometimes on the other, and sometimes on some or all of them combined. They speak of bondage as consisting in the ignorance of the true Self, in desire, suffering and sin, and of the state of liberation as one of unclouded self-knowledge resulting in freedom from desire, suffering and sin, and full of the lasting joy of self-realization, the consciousness of unity with Brahman. Thus the *Mundaka* says, "The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are resolved, and all his (*i. e.* the devotee's) works perish, when he has seen him who is high and low, *i. e.* both cause and effect" (II. 2. 8.) "He who knows that highest Brahman," says the same *Upanishad*, "becomes Brahman himself. In his family, no one is born ignorant of Brahman. He overcomes suffering, he overcomes sin. Freed from the fetters of the heart, he becomes immortal." (III. 2. 9.) The *Katha* says: "When he is freed from all those desires that dwell in his heart, the mortal becomes immortal, and obtains Brahman even here." (VI. 15.) Says the *Svetâsvatara*: "Immersed in that tree (*i. e.* identifying himself with his body) and bewildered, man suffers out of impotence. When he sees the other, the blessed Lord, and his glory, he becomes free from

suffering." (IV. 7). The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* says: "He that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, sees the Self in himself, and all things in the Self. Sin does not overcome him, he overcomes all sin. Sin does not torment him, he torments, i. e. destroys all sin. He becomes a Bráhmaṇa, free from sin, free from desire, free from doubt. This is the Brahma-world, O Emperor. Thus spoke Yájñavalkya." (IV. 4. 23).

The supreme place given to knowledge,—the knowledge of God as our true self,—in the Vedantic scheme of salvation, is easily explicable when knowledge is understood to be not mere intellectual, inferential knowledge, but a state of lasting enlightenment—a never-failing light illumining all departments of conscious life—colouring the sensuous perceptions, guiding the judgments, touching the feelings, controlling the desires, and determining the decisions of Conscience. On analysing sinful desires and actions, the absence of true self-knowledge,—an erroneous identification of the self with a finite object instead of the Absolute,—will be found at the root of all. Thus when we are seized with a desire for sensuous pleasures, we, for the time being, identify ourselves with the senses and seek to satisfy ourselves by satisfying them. Then, in a fit of anger, for instance, in

which we desire pain or ruin to the object of anger, there is, at the bottom, an erroneous abstraction of the self of the offending person from our own selves. On a similar offence committed by ourselves, or even by some one dear to us, we would not consider the offender to be deserving of anything worse than compassion and mercy. The impossibility of having these feelings in the case imagined is due to the non-recognition of the fundamental unity of self between the offending and the offended. Again, in the case of pride, to take another instance, when we are puffed up by our own achievements—by the praise that men choose to heap on us,—what causes this vain self-glorification but a most erroneous notion that the individual thing I call my self is, with all the intellectual and moral attainments, all the thoughts, feelings and actions that make it up, an independent reality—something apart from the Being that perpetually sustains and manifests himself in the form of all individual life? In the sphere of purely devotional life also, it is this erroneous view of things, it is our thinking of God as something apart from us, and not as the very Self of our selves, that dries up all higher emotions and makes devotional exercises an empty show or an unprofitable toil to the soul. On the other hand, in proportion as we learn to identify ourselves with the Self of all, to find our

‘true self in him, sensuous desires, angry, vindictive and censorious feelings towards others, self-glorification and self-indulgence, not to speak of darker and grosser sins,—all become more and more impossible, and from trying to satisfy the tiny sensuous or merely intellectual thing that we call our self in our unenlightened state, we come to seek the satisfaction of the larger Self with which we learn to identify ourselves—the realization of the Divine perfection in the collective life of all rational beings.

This enlargement of the self, in which liberation consists, involves, it is evident, a negative, destructive process. It involves renunciation, both intellectually and practically, of the false self. While, before the attainment of true self-knowledge, there seem to be as many selves as there are individual lives, it is seen, when enlightenment dawns upon the soul, that there is only one Self in all, only one subject illumining and containing all objects, gross and fine. In the language of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, “There is no seer but this, there is no perceiver but this, there is no knower but this.” (III.7. 23.) Or, as the Divine Being says in the *Bhagavadgītā*, “O Bhārata, know myself as the subject (*īśhetrajaṇa*) in all objects (*īśhetra*).” There is a sense, therefore, in which the attainment of emancipation is the

destruction of the individual self, *i. e.*, of that figment of a self which the unenlightened intellect of the natural man erroneously conceives as existing independently of the Supreme Self. On the attainment of true self knowledge, it is seen that there is no such thing really existing, but that it is the universal, cosmic Self that shines as the self of all finite beings—that manifests itself through those thoughts, feelings and volitions that we call our own. There is, then, something to be renounced, something to be destroyed, in order that the individual may be united to the Universal. There is really something to be merged and lost in Brahman. But it is only a figment, only an appearance, something that seems real to the blurred vision of the unenlightened man, but has no existence for enlightened Reason. It is this, and not any real object, that is merged and lost in God, who is seen to be All-in-all.

When the reality of this destructive process in salvation,—the annihilation of the false self of ignorance—is seen, one begins to understand those obscure utterances in the scriptures which seem at first to indicate that utter annihilation of conscious individual life which we have seen to be opposed both to Reason and to the teachings of the *Upanishads*. These utterances evidently describe the change that comes over the wor-

shipper when, with the dawn of true self-knowledge, he begins consciously to live the free, universal life of Brahman,—feels constrained to renounce that false idea of independence with which he was beguiled while he was under the influence of *avidyā*. Thus the remarkable passage at the close of the *Mundakopanishad*, which at first sight reads very much like a description of the utter annihilation of individual existence, may be very well interpreted as indicating the purely spiritual change spoken of above. “Those anchorites who have,” says the *Upanishad*, “known well the object (*i. e.* Brahman) of the science of the Vedanta, who have purified their hearts by means of renunciation,—they all, obtaining the highest immortality, become free in the Brahma-worlds [at the time of the great end.” Thus far there is no talk of annihilation, but only a promise of liberation in the highest sense for those who are pure in heart. But the *Upanishad* goes on: “Their fifteen parts go to their sources; their senses all go to their corresponding divine powers; their deeds and their intellectual self become all one with the Highest, the Unchangeable.” “The fifteen parts” are the five senses, the five organs of action and the five vital powers. They all go, we are told, to their sources; the five senses, it is repeated, go to their divine powers, *i. e.*, the eye to the sun, by

whose aid it performs its function : the ear to the air, which makes hearing possible, and so on. Now, what does this "going" on the part of the organs mean? It may mean their dissolution and return to their original substances. But it may also mean the attainment, on the part of the worshipper, a true knowledge of their dependence on the powers of Nature and the consequent destruction of egotism. The acquirement of a correct knowledge of the the Vedanta, which the writer has spoken of as a condition of liberation, involves the destruction of that false notion of independence to which the natural man is subject, the notion that we, with all that we possess, are independent of the Divine Power. By emphasising the unity underlying all difference, the Vedanta lays the axe at the root of this egotism, and makes us feel, at the first instance, that our bodies are only parts of Nature, and that the performance of their different functions by the different senses, organs, and vital powers depends on the constant action on them of the powers of Nature, which are nothing but the powers of God. Gradually it is seen that what we call our actions have for their ultimate cause the same Divine Power which makes the activities of Nature possible; and that our individual selves, the root of all egotism, are themselves

reflections of the Highest Eternal Self, the Brahman. It is evidently the revelation of this highest truth to the soul of which the *Mundaka* speaks in the *mantra* quoted above. The same seems to be the purport of the verse that follows, though it apparently bears a different import. "As flowing rivers," says the *Upanishad*, "disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, so a wise man, freed from name and form, goes to the Divine Person who is greater than the great." The figure is likely to mislead; but it is only a figure and must not be strained. When once the inward change that comes with enlightenment becomes familiar to the mind the figure itself does not seem to be an inapt one. The enlightened soul feels that it is not different from the Infinite, but one with it,—that names and forms are unreal when looked at from the Divine standpoint, that individuality does not really separate us, as it seems to do, from the Universal,—that the Divine Being is all-in-all. This consciousness of unity with God as a spiritual fact could scarcely be expressed by a better figure than that of the ocean as comprehending all waters in its all-embracing unity. The conscious subsumption of individual existence in the universal, the renunciation of egotism, is not inaptly represented by the flowing of the river into the sea. The individual mind, so long as it

thinks itself different from the Universal, so long as it is bound by banks of egotistic ignorance, is like a river bound by steep banks on both sides. When the finite feels itself to be one with the Infinite, feels that the same undivided consciousness is universal in one aspect and individual in another, it becomes like a river mixing its water with the water of the sea. That the writer who used this figure did not contemplate the annihilation of individuality, seems clear also from the *mantra* that follows. If annihilation had been what he intended to teach, he should have stopped at the *mantra* just quoted, for, what more can possibly be said of one who, as an individual, has ceased to exist? But the writer goes on speaking of the emancipated soul in the following terms:—"He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman. In his race no one is born ignorant of Brahman. He passes beyond sorrow, he passes beyond sin; freed from the fetters of the heart, he becomes immortal." A teacher of annihilation could scarcely have closed his subject with words like the above.

There are, however, one or two obscure texts in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* which do not seem to admit of the explanation just given, and the writer of which seems to have held the doctrine of individual annihilation. For instance, the

passage about the close of the fourth Brāhmaṇa of Chapter II. of the *Upanishad*, in which Yājñavalkya teaches his wife, Maitreyī, the nature of immortality, appears in fact to teach the total extinction of individual consciousness. I shall extract the whole passage for your consideration. Yājñavalkya says :—

“‘As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge; and having risen from out these elements, vanishes again in them. When he has departed, there is no more knowledge (name), I say, O Maitreyi’ :—thus spoke Yājñavalkya.

“Then Maitreyi, said: ‘Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilderment. Indeed, I do not understand him.’

“But he replied: ‘O Maitreyi, I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature.

“For when there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one salutes the other, one hears the other, one perceives the other, one touches the other, one knows the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he smell another, how should he taste

another, how should he salute another, how should he touch another, how should he know another? How should he know him by whom he knows all this? That Self is to be described by 'No, no'! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended; he is imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. How, O beloved, should he know the knower? Thus, O Maitreyi, thou hast been instructed. Thus far goes immortality.'" (II. 4. 13-15)

Now, the explanation that follows Maitreyi's expression of surprise and bewilderment at the sage's teaching makes the import of the passage somewhat doubtful. Read in its light, it seems only to emphasise the ultimate unity of consciousness, denying the existence of an opposed subject and object in perfect self-realisation. But even after the explanation, the meaning of the passage remains obscure. A similar obscurity attaches to a few other passages in the same *Upanishad*, perhaps the product of the same writer, which liken liberation to the state of dreamless sleep, a state in which difference is only potential and not actual. If that is the meaning of liberation, it is, of course, nearly, if not quite, equivalent to annihilation. But in these passages also, it is perhaps the intention of the writer to emphasise

the ultimate unity rather than teach the negative and destructive character of the state of emancipation. These exceptional passages are, however, clearly opposed to the general spirit of the *Upanishads*, and to passages of unmistakable import teaching the continuance of individuality in the state of final union with Brahman. Let us consider some of these passages and also see what the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* understood by them.

According to the *Upanishads*, the impious, those who do not follow the Vedic discipline in any form, are subject to immediate re-incarnation after their death as the lowest kinds of animals, whereas in regard to the pious, they indicate two very different destinations according to the nature of the disciplines they have passed through. The followers of the *karmakānda*, those whose worship consists in offering sacrifices to the gods, are destined for the *pitrilokas*, the habitations of the manes, where they pass through a way figuratively described as consisting of a number of phenomenal objects such as mist, dark nights, clouds, etc. Through this way, they pass to the moon, which either contains the *pitrilokas* or is associated with them. There they dwell in enjoyment of the fruits of their good works until they are spent out, when they have to retrace their steps to the earth and

be re-born according to their merits. On the other hand, the followers of the *jñānakānda*, the spiritual worshippers of the Infinite, are destined for the *Brahmaloka*, the world of God. They too have to follow a particular path called the *devayāna*. This also consists of a number of elements which are altogether more auspicious than those composing the *pitriyāna*. The most prominent are the rays of the sun, which perhaps represent spiritual enlightenment. The elements named are, by some expounders, interpreted as mere symbols of the divine persons escorting the disembodied spirit to its destination. There is, of course, nothing irrational in the idea of a soul reaching its final goal with the help of advanced spirits. Under its glorious escort, however, the spirit reaches the house of God. As to the contents of that house the *Upanishads* are generally very brief. Nor do they, as a rule, enter into details as to the conditions of life there. They are mostly contented with the statement that the spirit lives there in perfect beauty, and does not return from it to any mundane state of existence. But some of them, and pre-eminently the *Kaushitaki*, dwells upon what takes place there when the soul approaches the divine mansions. I need not reproduce these details. I simply refer the inquisitive inquirer to Chapter I. of the

Upanishad named. One thing only deserves particular mention. It is the soul's declaration of unity with the Divine Being in answer to the question put by Brahman himself as to what it knows about its own nature. This declaration leaves no doubt that it is of the highest class of devotees that the Scriptures deal with in these figurative yet most significant descriptions. However, it is said that after this declaration has been made, to the full satisfaction, as one may suppose, of the Divine Teacher, the soul lives for everlasting years in the heavenly mansion in union with Brahman and in company of the gods and other emancipated spirits. Now, it is remarkable that in connexion with these descriptions, which avowedly treat of the final goal of those who have passed through the highest order of discipline, no assertions are made as to any higher destination reserved for a higher class of devotees. The *Chhândogya*, for instance, actually closes where one of these descriptions ends. It says not a word which may indicate that the state of existence described by it is the reward of a lower discipline and that there is a higher discipline for which this life in union with Brahman, with an unresolved element of difference, is an inadequate return, and that the only sufficient reward for that higher culture is the utter annihilation of individual

existence. But this is exactly the view taken by Sankara. According to him the goal described is not the Supreme, but the Lower Brahman, Hiranyagarbha, and the worshippers referred to are not those of the highest class, those who have known the Supreme Unity, but rather those who worship God as a Being distinct from them. For the worshippers of the highest class there is no passage to pass through and no place to reach. They are merged in God without any the slightest difference. The followers of the lower discipline, on the other hand, reach the world of the conditioned Brahman and live there as long as the world lasts and are merged in the Supreme Brahman, along with the object of their worship, at the end of the cycle. For these doctrines Sankara adduces the following arguments :—1. The Supreme Brahman is not far from any one of us ; it is our self. There is, therefore, no meaning in 'reaching it.' 2. It being our very self, there is no meaning in passing through a particular way in order to reach it. 3. The conditioned Brahman being finite, reaching it and following a particular way to it, are quite reasonable in its reference. 4. The Scriptures expressly declare that the *prānas* (vital powers) of the highest class of devotees do not pass to any other sphere. This is clear from what is said in the sixth and seventh verses

of the fourth Brāhmaṇa, Chapter IV., of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*. The passage is follows:—
 “And here there is this verse: To whatever object a man’s own mind is attached, to that he goes strenuously together with his deed; and having obtained the end (*i.e.*, the last results) of whatever deed he does on earth, he returns again from that world to this world of action. So much for the man who desires. But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital airs do not depart elsewhere,—being Brahman, he goes to Brahman.”

Now, Sankara’s view does not seem to me to be consistent with the teachings of the *Upanishads*; and it is well-known that Rāmānuja, the other great commentator of the *Prasthāna-trayam*, differs with him diametrically in his interpretation of the relative texts. I shall briefly examine Sankara’s arguments. 1. The Supreme Brahman, though it is our very self, has yet to be reached in a sense. We have to be freed from the influence of *avidyā* and all its baneful effects and be united to our true Self in knowledge, love and will. Even going to a particular place in connexion with the attainment of final emancipation is not an irrational idea. The partial realisation of unity with God which most people

attain in this world, may wait for translation into a more blessed region to attain fullness and permanence; and though God is not confined to any particular sphere, there may be a particular region inhabited by emancipated souls where the realisation of the Divine presence and blessedness is more attainable than elsewhere; so that the idea of a *Brahmaloka* in which God reveals himself more fully and vividly than in this world, is by no means inconsistent with the Divine infinitude. Reaching God not being quite unmeaning, particular ways and means to attain this end are no more without meaning. The *devayāna* described in the Scriptures may be a purely spiritual process represented by material figures. But even if it represents an actual way to an actual world, there is nothing unreasonable in its idea. If there is an actual Brahma-world to be reached, there must be a way to it. 3. If there be no meaning in reaching the Supreme Brahman because he is not far from any one of us, neither can there be any meaning in reaching the Lower Brahman; for the latter also, as the sum of all conditioned existence, is near to every one of us. He is no more confined to a particular spot than the unconditioned Brahman. 4. The text of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* referred to does not seem to relate to the class of devotees spoken of by Sankara or point to any such

state as he contemplates. Having said that the worshippers of the gods through sacrifices, the seekers after particular limited objects, return again and again from the happy regions reached by them as the result of their works, the *Upaniṣad* speaks of those who have no desires or who desire only the Infinite Self. For them, it says, there is no return. There is indeed something in the text which seems to indicate that the souls of this class of devotees do not follow any way and do not go anywhere. But the same class of devotees, the same disinterested seekers of Brahman, are spoken of in numerous other passages as following the *devayāna* path, so that this isolated passage, not very clear in its purport, cannot be accepted as a scriptural proof of Sankara's peculiar views.

Let us now see what view the author of the *Brahma Sūtras* takes of the subject. The last three *pādas* of Chapter IV. of the *Sūtras* are devoted to the exposition of the soul's passage to the *Brahmaloka* and its existence there. In the first of these *pādas*, the second *pāda* of the Chapter, while expounding the mode in which the soul comes out of the body,—its condition in this disembodied state,—and starts for its final journey, the author incidentally notices the case of those who, even in this life, attains the highest

knowledge. On the authority of the text I have already referred to, he seems to take the view that souls of this class do not pass through the *devayāna* path, but directly attain unity with Brahman. As to those who travel through the *devayāna*, the author of the aphorisms seems to take the view that they have not obtained perfect emancipation, but that they do so when they arrive at the *Brahmaloka*. In the third *pāda* of the Chapter, the *devayāna* is described in detail. The various phenomenal objects named in the Scriptures as forming the stages of the way, are described by the author of the *Sātras* as so many spirits leading the half-unconscious soul to the Divine regions. The second *pāda* is devoted to the discussion of the important question whether, through this path, the soul attains to the Higher or the Lower Brahman, or, in other words, whether the emancipation obtained by the soul is complete or incomplete. There is a peculiar circumstance which makes it difficult to ascertain the opinion of the author on the matter. He arrays the arguments on both sides of the question *pari passu*, but does not distinctly identify himself with any of the two opinions expressed. The substance of the discussion is simply this:—According to Bādari, it is the Lower Brahman that is reached in this manner; according to Jaimini, it is the Higher.

Now, it is the uniform practice of the author of the aphorisms, whenever he has to controvert any opinions, to state them first and give his own views last. From this it would appear that, on the present question, he identifies himself with Jaimini's views, which are put last, and this is the conclusion to which some commentators have actually come. But Sankara differs from these commentators and takes the opposite view. He identifies the author with Bádari's views. The reason put forward for this procedure is that the other view, namely that the Supreme Brahman is reached by going through a path, is unreasonable. I have already said that this alleged unreasonableness does not strike me as real. The infinitude of Brahman does not necessarily exclude a process through which he is reached by the finite soul. The opinion of the author of the *Sútras* on the question may be gathered with greater certainty in another way. In the fourth *páda*, which treats of the state of the emancipated soul, and in which the distinction of absolute and relative emancipation, as made by Sankara, might be expected to be dealt with, the distinction is not even spoken of, which proves that it has no place in the mind of the author. The state described is that of union with Brahman with an element of unresolved difference. According to Sankara, it is only one of

relative emancipation—it is union with Hiranyagarbha, the Lower Brahman, and not with the Supreme. But the *pāda* does not speak of any higher state than unity with difference; and its end is also the end of the whole system. It would surely be a strange procedure on the part of a theologian to close the exposition of his system without saying anything on what, according to him, is the final object of all human efforts, the highest goal to be reached by the soul. I cannot charge the learned author of the *Brahma Sūtras* with this inconsistency, and therefore conclude that what Sankara calls relative emancipation,—union with Brahman with an element of unresolved difference—is the only kind of emancipation taught by the author of the aphorisms. That in teaching this, he follows the main current of the teaching of the *Upanishads*, I have already shown. In confirmation, however, of this conclusion, I shall examine the *pāda* referred to a little more closely.

In the first aphorism, it is taught that the soul, when it obtains the supreme light, appears in its true nature. The second teaches that such a soul is emancipated, *i.e.*, from all kinds of evil. In the third, the light spoken of in the first aphorism is said to be nothing but the Self,—the Supreme Self. The fourth inculcates the undivided unity

of the individual and the universal Self. The fifth notices Jaimini's view that the individual soul assumes a form similar to the universal. The sixth puts forward Audulomi's contention that as consciousness is the only form of the soul, other attributes are either based or figuratively imposed upon it. In the seventh, Bádaráyana suggests that the primary and secondary attributes of the soul are not mutually contradictory. The ninth contends that the emancipated soul is not subject to any one, *i.e.*, not to any other individual soul, as appears from the context. The tenth records Bádari's opinion that the liberated soul has no body and organs. The eleventh puts forward Jaimini's argument that since the scriptures speak of the liberated soul's assuming various forms, it has a body and organs. In the twelfth, Bádaráyana opines that having or not having a body depends on the will of the emancipated soul. According to the thirteenth and the fourteenth, not having a body is comparable to a dreamy state, and having one to the waking state. The fifteenth shows how an emancipated soul can enter several bodies at once. The sixteenth raises and decides an important point. The author has admitted several elements of difference in the emancipated soul. But there are texts in the *Upanishads* which speak of a state of undifferented unity. Are not

those texts opposed to the state of liberation he is describing? He says, "No, for these texts refer to the state of dreamless sleep, or to *kaivalya*, and not to the state of liberation we are describing." Now, Sankara here has an opportunity of saying, with a show of reason, that the state described in the *pāda* is only a state of relative emancipation, and that the state of *kaivalya* or undifferented unity recognized in those texts is the higher goal reserved for the devotees of the highest class. The author of the *Sūtras* of course says no such thing, but he leaves it uncertain what place the state of *kaivalya* occupies in his system. That for him there is no *higher* state than that described in this *pāda*, appears from the first and the fourth aphorism, which I have already explained. The unresolved difference which he admits in the state of liberation is further emphasised in the aphorisms that follow. In the seventeenth, the author says that the emancipated soul obtains all powers except that of creating, sustaining and destroying the world. The eighteenth teaches that all powers are in the hands of God, so that the emancipated soul is subject to him. The nineteenth contends that emancipated souls do not obtain the immutability of God. The twentieth cites the authority of Revelation and Tradition as to the immutable aspect of

the Divine nature. The twenty-first confirms the doctrine of the dependence of the soul on God by quoting scripture to the effect that it is only in enjoyment that the individual soul is equal to God. The twenty-second closes the chapter and the whole body of aphorisms by saying that, according to scripture, the emancipated soul does not return to the world. Not a word is said as to its being merged and lost in Brahman. The only conclusion, therefore, that appears possible to me is that, according to both the *Upanishads* and the *Sûtras*, the state of final liberation is one of fundamental unity with a relative difference, and not of absolute, undifferentenced unity, with the Supreme.

Here closes this series of lectures, commenced more than a year ago. My feelings on the occasion are those of profound thankfulness, first to God, for having enabled me to speak, as I proposed to do, of our relation and duty to him, after our ancient *rishis* and *âchâryas*, secondly to the pious, young friend of mine whose pecuniary help, and the Theological Society whose earnest efforts, caused this lectureship to be founded, and thirdly to you, my hearers, for having given me a patient hearing. May the Supreme Being enable us all to know him, to love him, and to do his will, and thus be wholly united to him !

Sàntih, Sàntih, Sàntih, Harih Om.

APPENDIX.

LECTURE VIII.

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यस्तु सर्वानि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति ।

सर्वभूतेषु आत्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते ॥

यस्मिन् सर्वानि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद्विजानतः ।

तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥

ईशोपनिषद्, ६, ७ ।

सर्वभूतस्यमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।

ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ।

आत्मौपस्येन सर्वत्र समं पश्यति योऽर्जुन ।

सुखं वा यदि वा दुःखं स योगी परमो मतः ॥

भगवद्गीता, ६ । २८, ३२ ।

LECTURE IX.

Page 48.

अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेय-

स्ते च मे नानार्थं पुरुषं विनीतः ।

तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु भवति
 हीयतेऽर्थाद् य च प्रेयो वृणीते ॥
 कठोपनिषद्, १।२।१।

Page 49.

महान् प्रभुर्वै पुरुषः सत्त्वस्यैष प्रवर्त्तकः ।
 सुनिर्मलामिमां प्राप्तिमीशानो ज्योतिरव्ययः ॥
 धर्मावहं पापमुदं भगेशं
 ज्ञात्वात्मस्थममृतं विश्वधाम ॥
 श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्, ३।१२। & ६।६ ।

Page 50.

प्रवाहेते अहदा यज्ञरूपा
 अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।
 एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा
 जराश्लथुं ते पुनरेवापि यन्ति ॥
 अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्त्तमानाः
 स्वयं धीराः पण्डितमन्यमानाः ।
 जहन्न्यमानाः परियन्ति मूढा
 अन्धे नैव नीयमाना यथान्धाः ॥
 मुण्डकोपनिषद्, १।२।७, ८ ।

Page 51.

विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनः प्रग्रहवान्नरः॥

सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्रोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥

कठोपनिषद्, १।३।८।

यदा सर्वं प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।

अथ मर्त्योऽस्यतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥

कठोपनिषद्, २।३।१४।

Page 52.

अभयं सत्त्वसंशुधि र्ज्ञानयोगव्यवस्थितिः ।

दानं दमश्च यज्ञश्च स्वाध्यायस्तप आर्जवम् ॥

अहिंसा सत्यमक्रोधस्त्यागः शान्तिरपैशुनम् ।

दया भूतेष्वलोलुप्धं मार्दवं क्लीरचापलम् ॥

तेजः क्षमा धृतिः शोभनद्रोहो नातिमानिता ।

भवन्ति सम्पदं देवीमभिजातस्य भारत ॥

भगवद्गीता, ६।१—३ ।

Page 53, 54.

योऽन्तः सुखोऽन्तरारामस्तथान्तर्ज्योतिरेव यः ।

स योगी ब्रह्मनिर्वाणं ब्रह्मभूतोऽधिगच्छति ॥

लभन्त ब्रह्मनिर्वाणश्च यक्षीणकल्मषाः ।

किं ब्रह्मैवा यतात्मानः सर्वभूतहिते रताः ॥

कामक्रोधवियुक्तानां यतीनां यतचेतसाम् ।

अभितो ब्रह्मनिर्वीणं वर्त्तते विदितात्मनाम् ॥

यतेन्द्रिय-मनोबुद्धिर्मुनिर्मोक्षपरायणः ।

विगतेच्छाभयक्रोधो यः सदा युक्त एव सः ॥

भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां सर्वलोक-महेश्वरम् ।

सुहृदं सर्वभूतानां ज्ञात्वा मां शान्तिश्चच्छति ॥

भगवद्गीता, ५।२४, २५, २६, २८, २९ ।

Page 56.

स होवाव याज्ञवल्क्यः प्रिया वै खलु नो भवती
प्रियमवृध्न्त ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् ४।५।५ ।

स होवाव न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो
भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति । न वा
अरे जायायै कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति, आत्मनस्तु
कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति । न वा अरे पुत्राणां
कामाय पुत्राः प्रिया भवन्ति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पुत्राः
प्रिया भवन्ति ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् २।४।५ वा ४।५।६ ।

इदं ब्रह्मेदं क्षत्रमिमे लोका इमे देवा इमानि
भूतानीदं सर्वं यदयामात्मा ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, २।४।६ वा ४।५।७ ।

Page 58-59.

यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्धं

कर्त्तारमीशं पुच्छं ब्रह्मयोनिम् ।

तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विभूय

निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषद्, ३।१.३ ।

य य नाहंस्ततो भावो बुद्धिर्यच्च न लिप्यते ।

हत्वापि स इमांस्तोक्तान् हन्ति न नियध्यते ॥

भगवद्गीता, १८।१७ ।

तद् यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न वाह्यं
किञ्चन वेद नान्तरमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परि-
ष्वक्तो न वाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरं तदा अस्यैतदा-
सकामम् आत्मकामम् अकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम् । अत्र
पिताऽपिता भवति माताऽमाता लोका अलोका देवा
अदेवा अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाऽभ्रूणहा
चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः श्रमणोऽ-
श्रमण स्तापसोऽतापसो नन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं
पापेन तीर्थी हि तदा सर्व्वान् लोकान् हृदयस्य मर्षति ।

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ४।२।२०-२२ ।

एतं ह वाय न तपति । किमहं साधु नाकरवम् ।

किमहं पापमकरवम् । स य एवं विद्वान् एते आत्मानं
 सृणुते । उभे ह्येवैष एते आत्मानं सृणुते । य एवं वेद ।
 तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्, २।६ ।

यो वै मूमा तत्सुखं नालो सुखमस्ति ।

छान्दोग्योपनिषद्, ७।१३।१ ।

LECTURE X.

Page 67-68.

अधिकारी तु विधिवदधीत-वेद-वेदाङ्गत्वेन आपात-
 तोऽधिगताखिल-वेदार्थोऽस्मिन् जन्मानि जन्मान्तरे
 वा काम्य-निषिद्ध-वर्जन-पुरःसरं नित्य-नैमित्तिक-
 प्रायश्चित्तोपासनानुष्ठानेन निर्गतं निखिल-कल्मषतया
 नितान्त-निर्मल-स्वान्तः साधन-चतुष्टय-सम्पन्नः
 प्रमाता । काम्यानि स्वर्गादीः साधनानि ज्योतिषो-
 मादीनि । निषिद्धानि नरकाद्यनिष्ठ-साधनानि
 ब्रह्महत्यादीनि । नित्यानि अकरणे-प्रत्यवाय-साध-
 नानि सन्ध्यावन्दनादीनि । नैमित्तिकानि पुत्र-जन्मा-
 द्यनुबन्धिनी जातेष्ट्यादीनि । प्रायश्चित्तानि पापक्षय-
 मात्र-साधनानि चान्द्रायणादीनि । उपासनानि

सगुण ब्रह्म विषयक-मानस-व्यापार-रूपाणि शाण्डि-
व्यविद्यादीनि । एतेषां नित्यादीनां बुद्धिशुद्धिः परं
प्रयोजनम् उपासनानान्तु चित्तैकाग्रम् ।

वेदान्तसारः, ६ ।

Page 68-70.

साधनानि नित्यानित्य-वस्तु-विवेकेहामुत्र-फलभोग-
विराग-शमदमादि-सम्पत्ति-मुमुक्षुत्वानि ।

१ । नित्यानित्य-वस्तु-विवेकस्तावत् ब्रह्मैव नित्य-
वस्तु ततोऽन्यदखिलमनित्यमिति विवेचनम् ।

२ । ऐहिकानां सूत्रक चन्दनादि-विषय-भोगानां
कर्म्मजन्यतया अनित्यत्ववत् आमुष्मिकानांमपि अष्ट-
तादि-भोगानाम् अनित्यतया तेभ्यो नितरां विरतिः
ईहामुत्रफलभोग-विरागः ।

३ । शमदमादयस्तु शम-दमोपरति-तितिक्षा-
समाधान-श्रद्धाः । शमस्तावत् श्रवणादि-व्यतिरिक्त-
विषयेभ्यो मनसो निग्रहः । दमः बाह्येन्द्रियाणां
तद्व्यतिरिक्त-विषयेभ्यो निवर्तनम् । निवर्त्तितानाम्
एतद्व्यतिरिक्त-विषयेभ्य उपरमणम् उपरतिः, अथवा
विहितानां कर्म्मणां विधिना परित्यागः । तितिक्षा
शीतोष्णादि-द्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता । निगृहीतस्य मनसः

अवणादौ तदनुगुणविषये समाधिः समाधानम् । गुरु-
वेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः अष्टा ।

४ । सुमुद्यत्त्वम् मोक्षेष्ट्या ।

वेदान्तसारः, ६-११ ।

Page 78.

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदि-
ध्यासितव्यः ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, २।४।५।

अवणं नाम षड्विधलिङ्गैरशेष वेदान्तानाम्
अद्वितीय-वस्तुनि तात्पर्यावधारणम् ।

वेदान्तसारः, ७७ ।

मननन्तु श्रुतस्य अद्वितीय-वस्तुनो वेदान्तार्थानु-
गुण युक्तिभिः अनवरतम् अनुचिन्तनम् ।

वेदान्तसारः, ८१ ।

Page 81, 82.

अहिंसा-सत्यास्तेय-ब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः यमाः ।
शौच-सन्तोषतपः स्वाध्यायेश्वर-प्रणिधानानि नियमाः ।
कर-चरणादि-संख्यान-विशेष-लक्षणानि पद्म-स्वस्ति-
कादीनि आसनानि । रेचक-पूरक कुम्भक-लक्षणाः
प्राणनिग्रहोपायाः प्राणायामाः । इन्द्रियाणां स्वस्व
विषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहारणं प्रत्याहारः । अद्वितीय-वस्तुनि

अत्तरिन्द्रिय-धारणं धारणा । तत्र अद्वितीय-वस्तुनि
विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्य अत्तरिन्द्रिय-वृत्तिप्रवाहः ध्यानम् ।

वेदान्तसारः, ८४—८७ ।

Page 82, 83.

सवित्पको नाम ज्ञातृज्ञानादि विकल्पलया-
पेक्षयाद्वितीय-वस्तुनि तदाकाराकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेर-
वस्थानम् । तदा चक्षुष्य-गजादि-भानेऽपि चक्षुष्यवत्
द्वैतभानेऽप्यद्वैतं वस्तु भासते । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः—

दृशिस्वरूपं गगनोपमं परं
सृष्टादिभातं त्वजमेकमव्ययम् ।
अलेपकं सर्वगतं यदद्वयम्
तदेव चाहं सततं विमुक्तम् ॥
दृशिस्तु शुद्धोऽहमविक्रियात्मकी

नमेऽस्ति बन्धो न चामे विमोक्षः । इत्यादि ।

निर्विकल्पकस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादि भेदलयापेक्षाद्वितीय-
वस्तुनि तदाकाराकारिताया बुद्धिवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभावे-
नावस्थानम् । तदा तु जनाकाराकारित-लवणानव-
भासेन जलमात्रावभासवद्वितीय-वस्त्वाकाराकारित-
चित्तवृत्त्यनवभासेनावितीयवस्तुमात्रमेवावभासते ।

वेदान्तसारः, ८९—९३ ।

Page 84.

ततश्चास्य सुषुप्तेऽस्माभेदश्चङ्का न भवति । उभयत्र
वृत्त्यभ्याने समानेऽपि तत्सङ्गावासङ्गावमात्रेण अनयो-
र्भेदोपपत्तेः । विदान्तरारः, ८३ ।

Page 87-90

य एष सुषुप्तेषु जागर्त्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः

तदेव शकं तदूब्रह्म तदेवास्तमुच्यते ।

तन्मिर्ल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तदुनात्येति कश्चन ।

एतदू वै तत् । २।२।८

अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो

रुपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा

रुपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥ २।२।९

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो

रुपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा

रुपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥ २।२।१०

सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुः

न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्वाद्यदोषैः ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा

न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन वाद्यः ॥ २।२।११

एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा

एकं रूपं बहुधा वै करोति ।

तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरा-

स्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् ॥ २।२।१२

नित्योऽनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्

एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।

तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरा-

स्तेषां शान्तिः शाश्वती नेतरेषाम् ॥ २।२।१३

तदेतदिति मन्यन्तेऽनिर्देश्यम्परमं सुखम् ।

कथं नु तद् विजानीयां किमु भाति विभाति वा ॥

२।२।१४

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकम्

नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।

तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं

तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ २।२।१५ ।

कठोपनिषद् ।

यो देवो अग्नौ यो असु यौ विश्वं भुवनमाविवेश ।

य ओषधीषु यो वनस्पतिषु तस्मै देवाय नमोनमः ॥

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्, २।१७ ।

या ते रुद्र शिवा तनुरघोरापापकाशिनौ ।

तया नस्तनुवा शन्तमवा गिरिशन्ताभिचाकशीहि ॥

श्वेत, ३।५।

अजात ईत्येवं कश्चिद् भीरुः प्रतिपद्यते ।

रुद्र यत्ते दक्षिणं मुखं तेन मां पाहि नित्यम् ॥

श्वेत, ४।२१।

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत
अथ खलु क्रतुमयः पुरुषो यथा क्रतुरक्षिप्तोके पुरुषो
भवति तथेतः प्रेत्य भवति स क्रतुं कुर्वीत ।

मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारुपः सत्यसंकल्प आका-
शात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः
सर्वम् इदम् अभ्यान्तोऽवाक्यनादरः ।

एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदयेऽणीयान् ब्रोहेर्वा यवादा
सर्वपादा श्यामाकादा श्यामाक तण्डूलादा एष म
आत्मान्तर्हृदये ज्यायान् पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरीक्षा-
ज्यायान्दिवो ज्यायानेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः ।

सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वमिद-
मभ्यान्तोऽवाक्यनादर एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदय एतद्-
ब्रह्मैतामितः प्रेत्याभिसम्भवितास्मीति यस्य स्यादन्नं न
विचिकित्सास्तीति ह स्माह शाण्डिल्यः शाण्डिल्यः ॥

छान्दोग्योपनिषद्, ३।१४ ।

असतो मा सद्गमय तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय
चक्षोर्मांश्चतं गमय ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् १।१।२८ ।

Page 102, 103.

पितासि लोकस्य चराचरस्य

त्वमस्य पूज्यश्च गुरुर्गरीयान् ।

न त्वत्समोऽस्यभ्यधिकः कुतोऽन्यो

लोकत्रयेऽप्यप्रतिमप्रभाव ॥

तस्मात् प्रणम्य प्रणिधाय कार्यं

प्रसादये त्वामहमीशमीश्वरम् ।

पितेव पुत्रस्य सखेव सख्युः

प्रियः प्रियायाद्वसि देव सोऽङ्गम् ॥

भगवद्गीता, ११।४३, ४४ ।

LECTURE XI.

Page 105.

अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देह-
श्रितिरिक्तात्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु
वाङ्मेषु पृथिव्यादिवहृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकार-
परिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति सम्भावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं

मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति-
 चाहुः । न स्वर्गगमनायापवर्गगमनाय वा समर्थो
 देहव्यतिरिक्त आत्माऽस्ति यत्कृतं चैतन्यं देहे स्यात् ।
 देह एव तु चेतनश्चात्मा चेति प्रतिजानते हेतुश्चाचक्षते
 “शरीरे भावादिति” । यद्वि यस्मिन् सति भवत्यसति च
 न भवति तत् तद्धर्मत्वेनाध्यवसीयते यथाग्निधर्मा-
 वौष्णप्रकाशौ । प्राणचेष्टा-चेतन्य-स्मृत्यादयश्चात्म-
 धर्मत्वेनाभिमतः आत्मवादिनां तेऽप्यन्तरेव देह उप-
 लभ्यमाना वह्न्यानुपलभ्यमाना असिद्धे देहव्यतिरिक्ते
 धर्मिणि देहधर्मा एव भवितुमर्हन्ति ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्, ६।३।५३ ।

Page 106.

यदि हि देहभावे भावात्, देहधर्मत्वम् आत्म-
 धर्माणां मन्येत ततो देहभावेऽप्यभावात् अतद्धर्मत्वम्
 एषां किं न मन्येत । देहधर्म-वैलक्षण्यात् । ये हि
 देहधर्मा रूपादयस्ते यावत् देहं भवन्तु प्राणचेष्टादयस्तु
 सत्यपि देहं सत्तावस्थायां न भवन्ति । देहधर्माश्च
 रूपादयः परैरप्युपलभ्यन्ते न त्वात्मधर्माश्चैतन्य-स्मृत्या-
 दयः । अपि च सति तावत् देहे जीवदवस्थायाम् एषां
 भावः शक्यते निश्चेतुं न तत्सत्यभावः । पतितेऽपि

कदाचिदस्मिन् देहे देहान्तर-सञ्चारेणात्मधर्मा अनु-
वर्त्तेरन् । संशयमात्रेणापि परपक्षः प्रतिपिध्यते ।
किमात्मकञ्च पुनरिदं चैतन्यं मन्यते यस्य भूतेभ्यः
उत्पत्तिमिच्छतीति परः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यः । न हि भूत-
चतुष्टय-व्यतिरेकेण लोकायतिकाः किञ्चित् तत्त्वं प्रति-
यन्ति । यदनुभवनं भूत-भौतिकानां तच्चैतन्यमिति
चेत् । तत्तर्हि विषयत्वात् तेषां न तद्धर्मम् अनुवीत
स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् । न ह्यग्निदणः सन्
स्वात्मानं दहति । न हि नटः शिञ्जितः सन् स्वस्त्वम्
अधिरोच्यति । न हि भूतभौतिक-धर्मण सता चेतन्येन
भूतभौतिकानि विषयीक्रियेरन् । न हि रूपादिभिः
स्वं रूपं पररूपं वा विषयीक्रियते विषयीक्रियन्ते तु
वाद्याध्यात्मिकानि भूतभौतिकानि चैतन्येन । अतश्च
यथैवास्या भूत-भौतिक-विषयाया उपलब्धेर्भावोऽभ्यु-
पगम्यते एवं व्यतिरेकोऽप्यस्यास्तेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।
उपलब्धि-स्वरूपमिव च न आत्मा इत्यात्मनो देहव्यति-
रिक्तत्वं नित्यत्वञ्चोपलब्धेरैकव्यात् । “अहमिदमद्रा-
क्षम्” इति च अवस्थान्तरयोगेऽपि उपलब्धत्वेन प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानात् स्मृत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च । यत्तूक्तं शरीरे भावात्
शरीरधर्म उपलब्धिरिति तद् वर्णितेन प्रकारेण
प्रत्युक्तम् । अपि च सत्सु प्रदीपादिषु उपकरणेषु

उपलब्धिर्भवति असत्सु न भवति । न च एतावता
प्रदीपादिधर्म एव उपलब्धिर्भवति । एवं च सति
देहभावे उपलब्धिर्भवति असति च न भवति इति न
देहधर्मा भवितुम् अर्हति । उपकरणमात्रेणापि प्रदी-
पादिवत् देहोपयोगोपपत्तेः । न चात्मन्तं देहस्योप-
लब्धौ उपयोगो दृश्यते । निश्चेष्टेऽपि ज्ञास्मिन् देहे
स्वप्ने नानाविधोपलब्धि-दर्शनात् । तस्मात् अनवयं
देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनोऽस्तित्वम् ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्, १।१।५४ ।

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न कर्तृत्वं न कर्मणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः ।

न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्त्तते ॥

भगवद्गीता, ५।१४ ।

Page 117.

य हि कालत्रयसम्बन्धिनि एकस्मिन् अन्यविनि असति
कूटस्थे वा सव्यर्थदर्शिनि देशकाल-विनिश्चापेक्ष-
वासनाधीन-स्मृतिप्रतिसन्धानादि-व्यवहारः सम्भवति ।

शाङ्कर-ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यम्, २।२।५१ ।

LECTURE XII.

Page 132.

सर्वा जीवे सर्वसंख्ये दृहन्ते
 अस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रे ।
 पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारश्च मत्वा
 जुष्टस्तैस्तस्तेनाद्यतत्त्वमेति ॥
 खेताश्चतरोपनिषद्, १।६ ।

Page 134, 135.

भिद्यते हृदयगन्धिच्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
 क्षीयन्ते चाय कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे धरावरे ॥
 मुण्डकोपनिषद्, २।२।८

स यो ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेदं ब्रह्मैव भवति ।
 नास्याब्रह्मवित् कुले भवति ।
 तरति शोकं तरति पाप्मानं
 गुहाग्रन्थिभ्यो विमुक्तोऽद्यतो भवति ॥

मुण्डक, ३।२।८ ।

यदा सर्वं प्रभिद्यन्ते कर्माणि येऽयं हृदि श्रिताः ।
 अथ मर्त्तोऽद्यतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समग्रं ते ॥
 कठोपनिषद्, ६।१५ ।

समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नो-

ऽनीशया शोचति सुहृत्मानः ।

जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम्

अस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः ॥ २॥

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद्, ६।७

तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो हान्त उंपरतस्तिष्ठतिः समाहितो
भूत्वामन्येवात्मानं पश्यति सर्वमात्मानं पश्यति नैनं
पाप्मा तपति सर्वं पाप्मानं तपति विपापो विरजो
विचिकित्सो ब्राह्मणो भवत्येष ब्रह्मलोकः सम्राडिति
होवाच याज्ञवल्काः ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ४।४।२३ ।

Page 137.

नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽ-
तोऽस्ति मन्त्रा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ३।७।२३ ।

क्षेत्रं ब्रह्मापि मां विप्रि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारत ।

भगवद्गीता, १३।२ ।

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वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितायोः

सत्यासयोगात् यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।

ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले

परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्व्व ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषद्, ३।२।६ ।

गताः कलाः पञ्चदश प्रतिष्ठा

देवाश्च सर्व्वं प्रतिदेवतासु ।

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा

परेऽव्यये सर्व्वं एकीभवन्ति ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषद्, ३।२।७ ।

Page 141.

यथा नद्यः स्रन्दमानाः समुद्रे-

ऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।

तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद् विमुक्तः

परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥

मुण्डकोपनिषद्, ३।२।८ ।

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स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽवाह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन
एवैवं वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽवाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन
एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तानेवानुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य
संज्ञास्तीत्यरे ब्रवीमीति होवाच याज्ञवल्काः । सा

होवाच मैत्रेय्यतैव मा भगवान् मोक्षान्तमापीपिपन्न वा
 अहमिमं विजानामीति स होवाच न वा अरेऽहं मोहं
 ब्रवीम्यविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनुच्छिन्तिधर्मा । यत्र
 हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितर इतरं
 जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं रसयते तदितर इतरमभिवदति
 तदितर इतरं शृणोति तदितर इतरं मनुते तदितर
 इतरं स्पृशति तदितर इतरं विजानाति यत्र त्वस्य
 सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् तत् केन कं जिघ्रेत्
 तत् केन कं रसयेत् तत् केन कमभिवदेत् तत् केन कं
 शृणुयात् तत् केन कं मन्वीत तत् केन कं स्पृशेत् तत्-
 केन कं विजानीयाद् येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तत् केन
 विजानीयात् स एष नेति नेत्यात्माऽगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते-
 ऽशीर्यो न हि शीर्यतेऽसङ्गो न हि सज्यतेऽसितो न
 व्यथते न रिथति विज्ञातारम् अरे केन विजानीयाद्
 इत्युक्तानुश्रवसनासि मैत्रेय्येतावद् अरे खल्वस्यतत्त्वम् ॥

बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ४।५।१३-१५ ॥

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तदेव श्लोको भवति

तदेव संताः सह कर्मणैति

लिङ्गं मनो यत्र निषक्तमस्य ।

प्राप्यान्तं कर्मणस्तस्य यत्किञ्चैह करोत्ययम् ॥

तस्माल्लोकात् पुनरेत्यस्मै लोकाय कर्मण इति न
 कामयमानोऽथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम
 आसकाम आत्मकामः न तस्य प्राणा उत्कामन्ति
 ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति ।

वृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ४।५।६ ।



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